[EM] Trying to have CD, protect strong top-set, and protect middle candidates too

Thu Nov 17 10:54:24 PST 2016

But wouldn't Smith//Approval, with approval cutoffs in the rankings, share
MDDTR's burial-vullnerability?

...with, additionally, vulnerability to truncation, which MDDTR _doesn't_
have?

And Smith//Approval trades MDDTR's FBC for Smith, which I consider an
unfavorable trade.

I now again consider Benham & Woodall to be the best proposals for an
electorate that wants &/or needs rankings...because of the IRV mitigations
that i mentioned in my previous posting, and because of the context of the
always high price of CD, as exemplified by MDDTR.

It could be debatable whether IRV's CWs elimination problem is worse than
MDDTR's burial vulnerability problem, but, because of IRV's mitigations, I
tend to feel that IRV is better, _for people who want or need routine
ranking_.
Myself, I personally prefer MDDTR, with middle-ranking usually avoided, but
I'm talking about what's best for the electorate as a whole.

In polls with balloting by both Approval & Score, I've observed
overcompromisers doing better with Score than with Approval. They (and
rival parties) would probably do even better with rankings.

Suggested merit-order for electorates that want &/or need rankings:

1.Benham
2. woodall
3. IRV
4. MDDTR
5. Methods combining Approval with pairwise-count
6. ER Bucklin/MJ
7. Score
8. Approval

I still personally prefer Approval, or maybe MDDTR, when used as Approval
with 2nd-ranking as a defection-deterrent. But this suggested merit-order
is for electorates who want &/or need rankings.

On pure merit, Woodall seems a bit better than Benham, because it's more
particular which Smith-set member it elects. But Benham is much briefer to
define, not needing to define or mention the Smith-set, and that makes a
big difference in proposability, which outweighs the small merit-difference.

I don't know the merit-order among the methods that combine Approval with
pairwise-count.

Maybe the ones that start with Approval are better than the ones that start
with pairwise-count.

Among those, Brams' PAV is vulnerable to truncation, where MAMPO isn't.

But maybe that's a good thing, if the majority CWs among the
majority-approved candidates isn't in your strong top-set.

A proposal that the Greens upgrade from IRV to Benham seems reasonably
proposable.

Though Benham & Woodall are vulnerable to burial & truncation, the worst
that can result from those strategies is the same as what IRV would have
done anyway.

Michael Ossipoff

On Thu, Nov 17, 2016 at 9:05 AM, C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au> wrote:

> On 11/17/2016 9:00 AM, Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> Here's a simple method that is essentially Smith//Approval without having
> to mention the Smith set:
>
> List the candidates in order of approval, highest to lowest, top to
> bottom.  While any candidate pairwise beats an adjacent candidate higher in
> the list, switch places of the two lowest out of order adjacent members.
>
> When there remains no out of order adjacent pair, elect the candidate at
> the top of the list.
>
>
> Forest,
>
> I like Smith//Approval  and your usually equivalent Max Covered Approval
> method.
>
> But in this version, the stipulation that we  "switch places of the two
> *lowest* out of order adjacent members" could look a bit arbitrary and
> less smooth
> than Margins-Sorted Approval.
>
> BTW, it seems to me that both this and  Smith//Approval  can handle the
> Chicken Dilemma situation quite well if we use ranked ballots with
> approval cut-offs.
>
> (Or ratings ballots with many  slots that register approval and as many
> (or maybe as few as only 2) that register unapproval.)
>
> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Approval_Sorted_Margins
>
> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Approval_Cutoff
>
> And here's another smooth Condorcet method that should do as well:
>
> *Voters  score the candidates on some scale that allows large and varied
> gaps between the candidates: say 0-100.
> Elect the CW if there is one.
>
> Otherwise compress the 1-point gaps (if any) on all ballots into
> zero-point gaps (so that those ballots abandon their original pairwise
> preference for any
> X originally scored only one point more than any Y).
>
> Based on the thus modified ballot information, elect the CW if there is
> one.
>
> Otherwise compress the 2-point gaps (if any) on all ballots into
> zero-point gaps (so that those ballots abandon their original pairwise
> preference for any
> X originally scored two points more than any Y).
>
> Based on the thus modified ballot information, elect the CW if there is
> one.
>
> And so on, as gradually as possible compressing larger and larger gaps
> until we have a pairwise beats-all winner.*
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
>
> On 11/17/2016 9:00 AM, Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> Here's a simple method that is essentially Smith//Approval without having
> to mention the Smith set:
>
> List the candidates in order of approval, highest to lowest, top to
> bottom.  While any candidate pairwise beats an adjacent candidate higher in
> the list, switch places of the two lowest out of order adjacent members.
>
> When there remains no out of order adjacent pair, elect the candidate at
> the top of the list.
>
> Note that the winner will automatically be a member of the top cycle, and
> if it is a cycle of three, it will be the most approved member of the cycle.
>
> Also notice that it yields an unambiguous social order, and that there can
> be no second place complaint.
>
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Nov 15, 2016 at 5:19 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> When I started my current EM participation, I was saying that 3-Slot ICT
>> was my favorite method.
>>
>> That doesn't conflict with saying that I consider Approval the best,
>> because I regard 3-Slot ICT, or unlimited-rankings ICT (when used
>> approval-like) as an Approval version without chicken-dilemma.
>>
>> Later I realized that MDDTR is better than ICT, because it gives better
>> protection to middle candidates.
>>
>> I measure that protection by how well they'd be protected if they were
>> CWs.  ...what it would take to protect their win, and how well it's
>> protected.
>>
>> I define "middle candidates" as candidates you rank or rate below top and
>> above bottom.
>>
>> ICT gives no protection to middle candidates, against burial, or even
>> against innocent, non-strategic truncation--the two things that threaten a
>> CWs in pairwise-c0unt methods.
>>
>> MDDTR gives full truncation-proofness to middle candidates, but (contrary
>> to what I earlier believed), its protection of middle candidates against
>> burial can only be called "shabby".
>>
>> By the way, I no longer think that ICT or MDDTR needs to be 3-slot.
>> 3-Slot would be fine with me, because I believe that ICT or MDDTR should be
>> used as Approval, and that middle rating or ranking should only be used
>> when seriously needed to deter chicken-dilemma defection. When middle is
>> used in an unlimited-ranking MDDTR or ICT, it should probably consist of
>> 2nd-place ranking, if you want to give the demoted candidates the best
>> protection.   ...but maybe you'd rather rank them with respect to
>> eachother, at different middle levels, as I probably sometimes would.
>>
>> But, as I've been saying, activists & organizations seem to like
>> rankings, and some people--overcompromisers & rival parties--might very
>> well need rankings to soften their voting errors.
>>
>> And it seems to me that there's no particular reason not to rank, in
>> order of preference, your middle candidates, if some of them are better
>> than others, or if the voters of some of them are less trustworthy than
>> others.
>>
>> So, that's if you want CD, in addition to FBC, and good protection for
>> middle candidates
>>
>> Even if you're using the method as Approval, you still want your demoted
>> candidate(s) to be well protected. Just because you don't trust hir voters
>> doesn't mean you want to throw her to the hounds and thereby lower Pt, the
>> probability of electing from your strong top-set.
>>
>> Anyway, so far, this is all referring to CD methods.
>>
>> Of those, I like MDDTR best. As a rank method, it (as i said) gives only
>> shabby burial-protection to a middle candidate. But evidently (please tell
>> me it isn't so) you can't have FBC, CD, and good protection of middle
>> candidates.
>>
>> I consider CD more important to how well protected middle candidates are.
>> Yes, FBC + CD give poor protection to middle candidates, and that lessens
>> the value of their CD. But non-CD methods don't have CD at all, and that's
>> worse.
>>
>> So I prefer MDDTR to methods that give better protection to middle
>> candidates, but don't have CD.
>>
>> So, where I used to say that my favorite method is 3-Slot ICT, now I say
>> that my favorite method is MDDTR. Preferably with unlimited rankings.
>> (Though one could use only the 1st, 2nd, & bottom positions if one chose
>> to).   ...regardable as a chicken-dilemma-free version of Approval.
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> Non-CD methods with better "middle-strategy" than CD methods:
>>
>> But, in an election, I'm just one voter, and so, how well-suited the
>> method is to me is less important, and won't affect the outcome as much, in
>> comparison to how well-suited the method is to lots of progressives.
>>
>> So, what if most progressives would rather have a method that's really
>> good as a rank method, a method that has good "middle strategy" (strategy
>> for protecting a middle candidate's win if s/he's CWs).
>>
>> That would be important if you knew that all or nearly all, or even most
>> of them were going to use the method purely as a rank method.
>>
>> Bucklin is the traditional FBC rankings-method.
>>
>> I distinguish 2 kinds of middle strategy merit:
>>
>> 1. How well the method protects top-ranked candidates against
>> middle-ranked candidates. I call that "Middle1"
>>
>> 2. How well the lmethod  protects a middle-ranked candidate against any
>> candidate you rank lower than hir. I call that "Middle2".
>>
>> So, how to get the best middle strategy, with the main goal still being
>> keeping a good probability, Pt, of electing from your strong top-set?
>>
>> MDDTR's middle1 seems better than that of Bucklin. In MDDTR, you're
>> voting to contribute to a majority for your top against your middle. In
>> Bucklin, you can protect top against middle by skipping some rating-levels
>> above the middle candidates. In that way, you can give the top candidates
>> time to receive the coalescing lower-choice votes that they'll get from the
>> preferrers of other candidates, before giving anything to the middle
>> candidates.
>>
>> That's a bit more work than just ranking in order of preference. It
>> requires you to judge where, and how far down in rankings, your top
>> candidates are going to receive lower-choice votes from.
>>
>> So I suggest that MDDTR does better at Middle1 than Bucklin does.
>>
>> But Bucklin does better at Middle2.
>>
>> In Bucklin, the CWs's win is protected by the people who pretty-much
>> agree with you, the people of your wing, merely not ranking down too far.
>>
>> MDDTR needs that too, but it isn't enough to give MDDTR more than shabby
>> protection.
>>
>> ...And Bucklin's Middle1, though not as convenient or easy as that of
>> MDDTR, isn't as questionable as MDDTR's Middle2.
>>
>> So, overall, I'd say that Bucklin's Middle Strategy is better than that
>> of MDDTR. So, for people who want to use the method purely as a
>> rank-method, Bucklin is better than MDDTR.
>>
>> Bucklin also has the advantage of use-precedent.  MDDT has the advantage
>> of precinct-summability,but I don't consider that essential.
>>
>> For voters using the method purely as a rank method, I'd prefer Bucklin
>> to MDDTR.
>>
>> Chicken dilemma won't happen all the time, probably won't happen often.
>> But middle-protection will always matter to people using it as a rank
>> method.
>>
>> But it seems to me that, once we give up CD (for voters who need good
>> middle strategly, because of their rank voting), then it might be possible
>> to do better than Bucklin.
>>
>> It seems to me that methods that use both Approval and pairwise-count can
>> do better than Bucklin, at middle protection.
>>
>> A lot of methods of that kind have been proposed, and I've ignored all of
>> them because they don't meet CD. But, as mentioned above, for some
>> electorates, middle strategy could be more important.
>>
>> It seems to me that MDDA (also evidently named MPOA) and Smith//Approval
>> are two methods that might be better than Bucklin at middle protection..
>>
>> Using Approval as the cycle-solution is a very powerful idea (if you're
>> willing to give up CD, for an electorate's needs). But most of you already
>> knew that, before I paid attention to it (...because I was only looking at
>> CD methods)..
>>
>> MDDA's & Smith//Approval's burial vulnerability doesn't matter much, when
>> the Approval winner wins the cycle. In fact, Smith//Approval's
>> truncation-vulnerability could even be regarded as an advantage, for when
>> your strong top-set doesn't include the CWs.
>>
>> MDDA & Smith//Approval look better to me than Bucklin.
>>
>> Simpler Middle1.
>>
>> Precinct-Summability is an added bonus.
>>
>> MDDA seems to have a briefer definition than either Bucklin or
>> Smith//Approval, and brief definition can be decisive.
>>
>> I know of Bucklin being rejected when MDDTR was accepted. MDDA would
>> almost surely have been accepted too.
>>
>> I don't  think Smith//Approval would go over well, with its need to
>> define the Smith set, which greatly lengthens the definition.
>>
>> For an electorate that need good Middle1 & Middle2 more than CD, MDDA
>> seems the winner so far.
>>
>> Smith//Approvsl of course meets Smith.  ...which of course means that it
>> fails FBC. But does it need FBC?
>>
>> It could be argued (but I don't know if it's true) that Smith//Approval
>> doesn't need FBC, because, though you don't have an efffective Approval
>> vote at the top, you still can vote Approval, with the approval-cutoff, or
>> by only ranking your strong top-set.
>>
>> So, though Compromise could become pair-beaten by Favorite because you
>> raise Favorite to top with Compromise, resulting in a cycle instead of a
>> CWv win for Favorite, the cycle will be judged by approvals, and you're
>> approved only your strong top-set.
>>
>> Of course, just because Favorite was almost the CWv doesn't necessarily
>> mean that s/he'll win the Approval count. But are you any worse off than
>> you'd have been with MDDA?
>>
>> Forest (but maybe others too) has proposed a number of methods that
>> combine pairwise-count and Approval. Do any of those beat MDDA &
>> Smith//Approval by the standards of protecting one's strong top-set, and
>> Middle1 & Middle2?
>>
>> in particular, do any of them do better than MDDA by those standards? Do
>> any do as well as MDDA by those standards and have as brief a defintion, or
>> nearly as brief a definition?
>>
>> In other words, are there methods that achieve those things better than
>> MDDA & Smith//Approval, or achieve them better than MDDA and have as brief
>> a definition?
>>
>> In fact, is there a method that meets FBC (or doesn't need it), meets CD,
>> and does as well by Middle1 & Middle2 as MDDA, Smith//Approval or Bucklin?
>>
>> Michael Ossipoff
>>
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