[EM] Symmetric ICT reformulation and exploration

[Michael Ossipoff]

Yes, if it's freely negotiated by the candidates, then there wouldn't be
that vulnerability to strategic voters.

Michael Ossipoff

On Tue, Nov 15, 2016 at 7:39 PM, Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu> wrote:

> It's not really clear to me; it seems like it depends on the dynamics of
> the candidate withdrawals when no candidate is forced to withdraw until
> they think it is safe to do so.  There might be some bluffing and
> standoffs, so it would depend on the negotiation skills of the candidates.
> Especially if they are allowed to decide on the fly whom to transfer the
> unspecified choices to.
>
> On Tue, Nov 15, 2016 at 2:58 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> But, if that will elect the CWs, with sincere voting, then isn't there
>> still an incentive and vulnerability for some faction to falsify
>> preferences to make a strategic cycle that they might win, if they don't
>> like the likely CWs?
>>
>> Michael Ossipoff
>>
>> On Tue, Nov 15, 2016 at 3:10 PM, Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu> wrote:
>>
>>> Combining Candidate Withdrawal with Candidate Transfer:
>>>
>>> When a candidate withdraws, hir votes are distributed in accordance with
>>> the additional preferences of hir supporters.  When no additional
>>> preferences are specified, it is assumed that the voter supports the
>>> preference order of the withdrawing candidate.
>>>
>>> Voters may place NOTB (none of the below) above their truncated
>>> candidates.  If at any stage the NOTB candidate accumulates more than
>>> two-thirds (say) of the votes, the election is scuttled and new candidates
>>> must be nominated.
>>>
>>> On Mon, Nov 14, 2016 at 9:55 PM, Michael Ossipoff <
>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> But, even if that rule were extended to rescue a CWv that's farther
>>>> down in the rankings  I guess that would just be like having a rule to
>>>> elect the CWv if there is one, and otherwise to do IRV, which would be a
>>>> less-good relative of Benham & Woodall.
>>>>
>>>> And of course a rule to elect  the CWv is always vulnerable to
>>>> strategic falsification of preferences to make a strategic cycle, with the
>>>> problems that go with that.
>>>>
>>>> In fact, I guess that the candidate-withdrawal option, Steve Eppley's
>>>> original proposal, would, as well, be vulnerable to a faction making a
>>>> strategic cycle, to avoid a result in which the election of the CWv is
>>>> inevitable due to the candidate-withdrawal that will happen if ordinary IRV
>>>> doesn't elect the CWv..
>>>>
>>>> Oh well, so much for that possibility :^)
>>>>
>>>> Michael Ossipoff
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Nov 14, 2016 at 10:47 PM, Michael Ossipoff <
>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Speaking of candidate-participation methods, Steve Eppley proposed the
>>>>> simplest one: the Candidate Withdrawal option.
>>>>>
>>>>> When the count result is announced, any candidate has 24 hours in
>>>>> which to announce hir withdrawal from the election, and call for a re-count
>>>>> with hir deleted from the ballots.
>>>>>
>>>>> An IRVist objected to that, because withdrawal betrays the candidate's
>>>>> voters.  Ok, then add a rule that a winning candidate can't withdraw :^)
>>>>>
>>>>> The candidate withdrawal option would completely save IRV from its
>>>>> problem. Candidate-withdrawal should be offered as an amendment to IRV
>>>>> proposals, and also to already-enacted IRV.
>>>>>
>>>>> But, just looking at IRV, the circumstances for wanting to withdraw
>>>>> (Your voters let the CWv get eliminated, by ranking hir 2nd instead of 1st,
>>>>> and hir votes transferred the other way) seem so well-defined and specific
>>>>> as to suggested an automated candidate-withdrawal, built into the IRV
>>>>> count-rule.
>>>>>
>>>>> How about saying that, when that happens, the count rule will delete
>>>>> the 1st choice that is in the way of the eliminated CWv being at the top of
>>>>> the rankings that didn't help CWv because they ranked hir 2nd, and their
>>>>> vote never got to hir?   ...followed by a 2nd count without the deleted 1st
>>>>> choice?
>>>>>
>>>>> ...or it could be an option for the voter to choose if s/he wants that
>>>>> deletion and re-count to occur if hir 1st choice eliminates a CWv,
>>>>> resulting the election of someone over whom you ranked the CWv.   ...where,
>>>>> without that 1st choice, the CWv would have won.
>>>>>
>>>>> That option would only apply to the first election result, and not to
>>>>> subsequent ones.
>>>>>
>>>>> The method could be called "Automatic Strategic Dropping"
>>>>>
>>>>> Or, IRV with that option could be called "Auto-Revotable IRV".
>>>>>
>>>>> I don't like the name IRV. Its meaning isn't a good description. RCV
>>>>> is even worse, because _every_ rank-balloting method is RCV.
>>>>>
>>>>> I'd like to rename IRV as "Delete Least Favorite", "Delete Least Top",
>>>>> "Eliminate Least Favorite" or "Eliminate Least Top".
>>>>>
>>>>> That would be DLF, DLT, ELF, or ELT.  How about ELF?
>>>>>
>>>>> That name goes with my brief definition of the IRV count:
>>>>>
>>>>> Repeatedly, delete from the rankings the candidate currently topping
>>>>> fewest rankings.
>>>>>
>>>>> [end of definition of ELF definition]
>>>>>
>>>>> If that action is repeated, it will eventually leave only one
>>>>> un-deleted candidate.
>>>>>
>>>>> So "Auto-Revotable Eliminate Least Favorite"?
>>>>>
>>>>> Michael Ossipoff
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mon, Nov 14, 2016 at 6:57 PM, Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Sat, Nov 12, 2016 at 9:29 PM, Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Yes, it would make sense, and be interesting for a voting-system
>>>>>>> reform proposal to include CVT in its list of offered methods. Offer a
>>>>>>> complete variety, and let the initiative committee &/or the public choose.
>>>>>>> The addition of CVT would greatly broaden the variety. So the list could be:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Approval
>>>>>>> Score
>>>>>>> Bucklin
>>>>>>> MDDTR
>>>>>>> CVT
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Actually, it might be best to include IRV, with a fair assessment of
>>>>>>> its advantages & disadvantages, so that people won't think that IRV is
>>>>>>> being prejudcially ignored, and so as to answer, in advance, any arguments
>>>>>>> from FairVote.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Michael Ossipoff
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I agree, IRV should be included for the reasons you suggest.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Also, I think that the inclusion of a NOTA (none of the above) option
>>>>>> on the ballot should be a part of the CTV suggestion:  If NOTA gets the
>>>>>> highest total it means that too few of the voters trust the competence and
>>>>>> integrity of their favorites to act as proxies for them.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20161115/9d8b1606/attachment.htm>