[EM] Holy grail: PAR with FBC?

[Jameson Quinn]

In the case that Juho discusses, PAR is designed to disqualify/eliminate
the minor candidates X, Y, Z, etc. due to the fact that they will have
under 25% first preferences. The theory is that any candidate X with over
25% first preferences will be getting enough attention so that voters who
don't like X, and who explicitly reject at least one candidate, will take
the trouble to explicitly reject X.

2016-11-11 11:05 GMT-05:00 Juho Laatu <juho.laatu at gmail.com>:

> Negative votes and default votes that are not bottom votes are often
> problematic. There can be some problems also with rule "default is accept
> for voters who do explicitly reject some candidates".
>
> Candidates A and B are considered to be the strongest potential winners.
> Their first preference support is about 45% and 45%. Candidates from C to Z
> have much less first preference support.
>
> It makes sense to A supporters to reject B (hoping that rule 2 will
> eliminate B, even if B would have more support than A). B supporters will
> do the same to A. It is thus possible (or even probable in this scenario,
> if the election is competitive) that the leading candidates will be
> eliminated.
>
> Let's assume that there are no obvious compromise candidates that would be
> preferred over B by A supporters, and vice versa. Some of the other (than A
> and B) candidates might be rejected too (those that many enough voters
> bother to reject sincerely). As a result the winner will be someone that
> could be quite disliked among both A and B supporters.
>
> A linear opinion space might look like this: D - [C] - [A] - [B] - [E] - F
> - [G] - ... - X - Y - Z where square brackets point out the eliminated
> candidates. D and F are maybe the most likely winners, but surprises are
> possible if many A and B supporters explicitly reject (sincerely but
> incompletely) only few smaller candidates (e.g. D, C, E, F, G) and thereby
> give default accept to all the others (e.g. X, Y, Z). If candidate Y has
> more first preference support than other minor candidates, and some support
> from X and Z supporters, he/she might win.
>
> If this is of concern, the easiest fix is of course to use reject as
> default value in all ballots.
>
> BR, Juho
>
>
> On 10 Nov 2016, at 17:39, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> 2016-11-10 9:04 GMT-05:00 C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au>:
>
>> 1. Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate. Default is Accept.
>>
>>
>> This seems to assume that all the voters are interested in all the
>> candidates and like checking boxes, whereas
>> I should think that a lot of voters would be only interested in their
>> favourite and content to keep voting the
>> way they did under plurality (and would presumably continue to do so
>> under Approval).
>>
>> They should be allowed to continue giving the most effective vote
>> possible by simply giving a "Prefer" rating to their
>> favourite.  In-effect penalising such voters for forgetting to also give
>> "Rejects"  to all their non-favourites is unfair
>> and dumb.
>>
>> It will give voters who aren't fans of the new method extra reason to
>> resent it.  Suppose that a strong candidate
>> from an established party very narrowly loses just because some of
>> his/her supporters forgot to give out "Rejects".
>> Don't you think that might fuel a movement to dump the method?
>>
>
> My thinking was that in most real-world situations, you'd only have to
> check one prefer and one reject to get maximum effectiveness, and it would
> be obvious which to reject.
>
> But I see your point. So I'm changing the method to: "Default is reject
> for voters who do not explicitly reject any candidates, or accept for those
> who do."
>
>>
>> 2.Candidates with a majority of Reject, or with under 25% Prefer, are
>> eliminated, unless that would eliminate all candidates.
>>
>>
>>
>
>
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