[EM] Approval Strategy, SODA, SARA, etc.

[Michael Ossipoff]

,
Yes, for drawing the Approval cutoff in the uncertain zone, this is a good
way to estimate where the expected winner-merit is, using only an estimate
of the relative win-probabilities of the definite top-set & the definite
bottom-set. And the only distribution-assumption is within the uncertain
region, instead of a global distribution assumption.

The estimate about the relative win-probabilites of the definite top &
bottom sets makes it unnecessary to make estimates about wider-scale
distribution, and is arguably a more reliable thing to estimate.

But of course, as you know, if these are official public elections, then
we're talking about elections in a better future, like what I call "the
Green scenario", not the questionably-valid current political system, in
which it's in the 99%'s interest to use the completely easy & simple
strategy of approving only their top-set, the progressive candidates, in an
Approval election.

Michael Ossipoff
















On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 6:35 PM, Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu> wrote:

> The inspiration for Yes/NoCandidateProxy, SODA, MAS, SARA, etc. was
> fundamentally this:
>
> Approval voters tend to have a top set that they definitely approve, and a
> bottom set that they definitely disapprove.  The question is what to do
> with the rest, the "indefinite set" between Top and Bottom.
>
> As Michael has pointed out there are various strategies that work in
> various contexts, and the current USA context would not require anything
> sophisticated.
>
> Here's a strategy that I have been thinking about that could be automated
> as a DSV system, but is simple enough that it could be recommended for use
> by the man (or woman) behind the plough (as Charles Dodgson put it).
>
> The context is an Approval election with partial but not too reliable
> information about winning probabilities.
>
> 1.  Approve all candidates that you definitely approve, i.e. all
> candidates in your "top set."
>
> 2.  Leave unapproved all of the candidates in your "bottom set."
>
> 3.  Approve p percent of the remaining indefinite set, where p is given by
> the formula  (1 + pB - pT)/2 , where pB is your subjective estimate of the
> pobability that someone from your bottom set will be elected, and pT is the
> probability that someone from your Top set will be elected.
>
> So if pB=pT, the formula recommends that you approve half of the remaining
> candidates.   If pB>pT you will approve more than half of the remaining
> candidates.  If pB<pT you will approve fewer than half of the remaining
> candidates. If pB=0, and pT = 1,then it recommends that you approve none of
> the remaining candidates   If pB=1 and pT=0, it recommends that you approve
> all of the remaining candidates.
>
> This formula follows from the "approve above expected merit" method in the
> context where the candidates in the indefinite category are distributed
> uniformly between zero and one in merit.  But it is so robust that it
> should give good results even if that assumption is only approximately
> true.
>
> One can always follow one's gut feeling when in doubt.  If the method
> recommends that you approve seven candidates and you are feeling doubtful
> about the worst of the seven, then by all means (and medians) leave that
> one unapproved.
>
> Other guidlines that involve a sense of who the CWs is, or which candidate
> are below the merit midrange can help inform borderline cases.
>
> Of course, if you have enough information to know that the distribution of
> merit among the indefinite candidates is no where near uniform, then you
> have enough information to use a better decision method, like approve above
> expected merit.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Forest
>
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