[EM] Approval-Strategy article at CES website

Wed Nov 2 11:49:04 PDT 2016

(Replying farther down)

On Nov 2, 2016 11:19 AM, "Juho Laatu" <juho.laatu at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>> On 02 Nov 2016, at 19:51, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:
>>
>> Well, for the reason you describe, pre-election polls would be of
questionable value.
>
> It is hard to avoid pre-election polls since they are pretty much a norm
in modern democracies. Approval voters also need some pre-election polls to
use the normal approval strategy

(endquote)

But what I'm saying is that  "normal Approval strategy"
won't be needed unless you're voting in Utopia.

...because, if unless all the candidates qualify equally as very-best &
perfect for you, the completely easy strategy of approving your top-set
will be optimal.

Michael Ossipoff

unless having only results of the previous election, or having 0-info
available, is acceptable.
>
>> Much more reliable would be the result in the previous election. _That_
is the reliable poll. ...Even if the candidates are new, it still informs
about parties.
>
> Yes, maybe outdated, but quite sincere / reliable info. However, a total
poll ban is maybe not very probable in most countries.
>
>> Though there _might_ not be a top-set for most people, in an authentic
political system, I was mistaken to imply that there wouldn't be one:
>>
>> Even without the odious Republocrats, even no one odious to the 99%
could win, and so no one like that would be in the election, there's still
a good variety among Progressive parties & candidates.
>>
>> Probably they're all ok, but there's still likely be a subset who are
significantly closer to, perceived by you as the very best.
>>
>> So, there'd still be a top-set, even though the "bottom-set" is no
longer odious.
>>
>> But what if there weren't, because _all_ the candidates quality equally
as the very best.
>>
>> Only then will there be no top-set.
>>
>> Only then will you not have the thoroughly simple optimal strategy of
approving only your top-set.
>>
>> But the resulting strategy "dilemma" would be a pretty nice dilemma,
wouldn't you agree?
>
> If I understood you right, we are talking about a pure two-party or
two-faction system vs. a richer set of candidates. I'm used to having a
richer set of candidates, and I like that approach. But if someone strongly
wants a two-party system, that's ok too. If one wants to change the system,
there should be a wide consensus and good understanding on what the target
system should be like (e.g. a proportional multiparty system that covers
all administration and representative bodies).
>
>> You'd then have to estimate where the CWs is. Or lacking information
about that, or lacking a CWs, you'd have to estimate the expected
winner-merit, & approve down to there.
>
> Yes, and here poll strategies could be a problem in approval. That may
not be a major problem though, as I already noted. But on the other hand it
may make sense even to individual voters to follow the poll strategy that I
proposed. Maybe it would be possible to compare the poll results to the
actual election results and roughly estimate how many voters used
strategies in the polls.
>
> Juho
>
>> But my point here is that you have a top-set, & the thoroughly easy
simple strategy of approving (only) that top-set, unless it's the utopianly
happy circumstance of all the candidates qualifying as "very best" and
equally being just what you most want.
>>
>>
>> ...& when that's so, choosing among them would be a very nice dilemma.
>>
>> Michael Ossipoff
>>
>> On Nov 2, 2016 10:09 AM, "Juho Laatu" <juho.laatu at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>> On 02 Nov 2016, at 18:13, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 3:27 AM, Juho Laatu <juho.laatu at gmail.com>
wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Since educated approval voting is based on voting strategically
(constructively, not maliciously) so that each voter tries to make a
difference between some leading candidates, approval is more vulnerable to
deceptive poll information than many other methods. Most voters are
expected to vote strategically, and voting strategy will be derived from
the available poll information. This strategic vulnerability applies to all
polls, not only approval based polls.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It depends on what you mean by "strategically". You mean electing the
best candidate you can, which amounts to identiflying the CWs & approving
down to hir.
>>>
>>>
>>> Here "strategically" means setting your approval threshold so that your
vote is likely to have maximum impact on the results. That typically means
approving at least one of the frontrunners, and not approving at least one
of them. That's the normal approval voting "strategy". (In the polls I
assumed a different strategy than this "normal" strategy to be applied.)
>>>
>>>>
>>>> But,a s I've been repeatedly saying, for progressiive voters, in this
country there is a clear & obvious top-set: The progressive candidates.
(I've also told why it's in the interest of a big majority of the
population to elect a progressive government).
>>>>
>>>> So, for progressives, which means for pretty much anyone who knows
what's in their best interest, it's a top-set/bottom-set election.
>>>>
>>>> For such an election, the kind of strategy you're talking about is
entirely irrelevant. The optimal strategy is simple: Approve (only) your
top-set.
>>>
>>>
>>> Did you refer here to the normal approval strategy in the elections, or
to the different (more deceptive) strategy in the polls? My intention was
to say that in the polls one could use some other strategy than the normal
approval strategy, but in the actual approval election the normal approval
strategy would apply (but with falsified input information).
>>>
>>> (I may not be completely familiar with all the details of the
progressives vs. others set-up in the U.S. elections.)
>>>
>>>>
>>>> In a different & better society, with honest elections and media,
maybe the candidates of progressives' bottom-set would be so unwinnable
that they'd no longer be in the elections. ...and it would no longer be a
top-set/bottom-set election. But then, with the combination of honest
elections and honest, open media, it would also be a lot more obvious who's
the CWs.  Absent a top-set, the best strategy is to approve down to the
CWs, if s/he's identifiable.  ...and s/he likely would be, then.
>>>>
>>>> Without a top-set/bottom-set situation, and if the CWs weren't
identifiable, or if there weren't one, then a 0-info expectation-maximizing
strategy would be the next best.  ...approving down to the expected
winner-merit.
>>>
>>>
>>> The poll strategy that I proposed was aimed at hiding the CWs
(Condorcet winner in sincere opinions) and/or strongest approval candidates
from the voters. That way you can make the voters base their (normal
approval) strategy on misinformation. In the example that made B the winner
instead of the majority favourite (and CWs) A. We thus didn't have 0-info,
but some insincere poll information instead.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> I've been discussing ways of estimating that.
>>>>
>>>> Forest mentioned something that shows that there's a sense in which no
election is really 0-info:
>>>>
>>>> The 0-info strategies for expectation-maximization all assume some
knowledge of at least the range of where the voters are, inferred from the
range of where the candidates are. But,ito the extent that you know that
range, is it really 0-info?
>>>>
>>>> Forest pointed out that the middle of the distribution is going to be
less than halfway to the far end of it, from wherever you are in it.
>>>>
>>>> That gives you at least some estimate-information about where the
voter-median is.   ...where the CWs is.
>>>>
>>>> So that would suggest that, whatever the dimensionality, one shouldn't
approve past the candidate midrange, and should, in fact, approve only down
to some unknown distance short of it.
>>>
>>>
>>> My example was a pure one dimensional example. But the same strategy
can work also in some more complex opinion spaces. The intended winner must
however be to some extent centrist, since the strategy requires some other
candidate(s) to be more disliked (than the planned strategic winner) to the
voter group(s) whose voting strategy (or actually the input parameters of
the voting strategy, namely the perceived CWs and/or approval forerunners)
the strategy tries to modify.
>>>
>>> The intended strategic winner should thus have each set of voters (to
be fooled) on one side, and a false potential winner on the opposite side.
One can not use very many dimensions / directions / target groups since one
can not promote candidates that are close to the target voter groups groups
(in the polls). It may however often be sufficient and most efficient to
fool only one or two groups of voters to win the election.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> My suggestion to approve past that midrange, by an amount that
increases with the dimenaionality, even if all the candidates are in the
same general direction from you, makes the questionable assumption that,
even from there, the voter-distribution will likely take the shape of a
section of a circle or sphere centered where you are.
>>>>
>>>> So that questionable assumption explains the contradiction between my
suggestion to approve past the midrange when the dimensionality is greater
than 1, vs what Forest pointed out...that the voter-median, the CWs, can be
expected to be closer than the candidate/voter midrange.
>>>>
>>>> But all this has nothing to do with our current (supposed) political
system, in which there's a clear, definite & obvious top-set for anyone who
wants the country to be better for the 99%.
>>>>
>>>> Just approve your top-set, the progressive candidates.
>>>>
>>>> Michael Ossipoff
>>>
>>>
>>> I guess in the U.S. the political set-up is so well known that the
proposed strategy would not work very well right after changing the
election method from the current one to approval. I mean that it would not
be credible to market one of the two strong candidates as a weak candidate
in the hope of making the opposite side approve also him/her in the hope of
not electing some even worse extreme candidate. But maybe in time, after
also other candidates will be seen as potential winners, the situation
would change, and approval polling strategies could be successfully used.
>>>
>>> Juho
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On the other hand, although this vulnerability is very obvious and
easy to apply in theory, I lean in the direction that in typical public
elections strategic voting or strategic polling is not as big of a problem
as one might think based on all the theoretical threat scenarios that are
often discussed on this list. In all elections voters are likely to have
also incentives to vote sincerely. In the mentioned example many B
supporters may prefer to always approve B (also in the polls, not only in
the actual election), and B supporters may not like approving also C in the
polls, just to make it sure that B will be seen as a more popular candidate
than C. Such tendencies to promote one's true favourite are related also to
longer term developments, like keeping the number of votes up also in the
following elections, and trying give as much positive push as possible to
one's favourite party, current representatives and candidates even if they
are not elected this time.
>>>>>
>>>>> In real life TTR elections I have not observed any strong tendency to
vote strategically at the first round. Some probably do vote strategically
(one of the potential winners), but I guess it is more typical to just vote
sincerely at the first round. Also in plurality elections, where strategic
voting (of one of the two leading candidates) is often the only rational
thing to do (from a theoretical point of view, if one's only goal is to win
this particular election), many people still prefer to vote sincerely.
>>>>>
>>>>> I would expect these sincere tendencies to apply also in approval
elections. I.e. poll strategies would not be so strong that they would in
practice lead to such rampant strategic behaviour in the polls that would
have a serious impact on voting behaviour in the actual election. This
applies even more to other relatively strategy free methods like Condorcet.
I believe strategic voting would not be a problem in typical large public
Condorcet elections. As I have mentioned a few times, I'm still waiting for
someone to present some practical strategic voting guidance that could be
applied in typical large public Condorcet elections. So far there is none.
The existence of such valid strategic voting guidance depends also on how
strongly the public approves / rejects strategic behaviour. But as said, I
have not seen any good guidance that would work even in the most strategy
friendly societies (where voters are happy to vote as told by the party
strategists, and where people who do not use all available deceptive
strategies are considered to be fools).
>>>>>
>>>>> Juho
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 02 Nov 2016, at 07:29, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Ok, now I get it. Sure, that's the trouble with a pre-election poll
to get information for voting. Deceptive insincere voting in the
informational poll.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That's a nagging doubt that probably is felt by everyone who
suggests such pre-election informational polls.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks for bringing it up, and for clarifying it for me. I guess I
missed the fact that you were talking about voting in the poll, and were
discussing that deceptive poll-voting problem.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 2:36 PM, Juho Laatu <juho.laatu at gmail.com>
wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 01 Nov 2016, at 20:07, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> B, as a 2nd choice, is at the borderline for approval, if the ">"
have uniform magnitude for a particular faction.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I didn't assume anything very specific on the strength of the
preferences in the sincere preferences. Unless the preference strengths are
not totally radical (e.g. A>>>>>>>>>>>>B>C), B can be presented to the A
supporters as an acceptable compromise candidate (when compared to the even
worse C).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Approving hir or not is ok.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I don't understand why you say that the B voters shouldn't approve
B.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That's because A supporters should be made not to think that A and
B are the leading candidates (as they are based on the sincere
preferences), but that A and C are the leading candidates. If A supporters
believe that A and C are the leading candidates (because of the strategic
answers to the approval polls), some of them will approve also B, and with
good probability that makes B the winner in the actual approval election
(although A supporters have 51% majority and they would win if all of them
simply bullet voted).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The strategic plan is thus to hide the fact that in sincere
opinions A and B are clearly the two leading candidates, and make the A
supporters think that C is the second strongest candidate. That's why it
makes sense not to approve one's favourite (B) in the approval polls. In
the actual approval election B supporters will naturally all approve B.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Juho
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Michael Ossipoff
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Nov 1, 2016 1:41 AM, "Juho Laatu" <juho.laatu at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I generated one example of strategic polling in approval
elections with approval polls. No specific claims included. Just some food
for your thoughts.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Sincere preferences:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> 51: A>B>C
>>>>>>>>> 49-c: B>C>A
>>>>>>>>> c: C>B>A
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Approval poll results:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> 51-ab: {A}
>>>>>>>>> ab: {A, B}
>>>>>>>>> 49-c-x: {B, C}    (strategic, see Note 1)
>>>>>>>>> x: {C}             (strategic and insincere, see Note 2)
>>>>>>>>> c-cb: {C}
>>>>>>>>> cb: {C, B}
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Note 1: All B supporters should approve C.
>>>>>>>>> Note 2: Some B supporters should possibly not approve B. The
intention is to keep the approval level of B (49-x+cb) high enough to make
B look like a credible potential winner, but not as high as the approval
level of C.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Approval election results:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> 51-ab': {A}
>>>>>>>>> ab': {A, B}
>>>>>>>>> 49-c-bc: {B}    (can be sincere)
>>>>>>>>> bc: {B, C}    (can be sincere)
>>>>>>>>> c-cb': {C}
>>>>>>>>> cb': {C, B}
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The strategic target of B supporters is to keep ab' and cb' as
large as possible. The A supporters should approve also B as a lesser evil,
to avoid C that seems to be very popular in the polls. The C supporters
should approve also B as a lesser evil, to avoid A that seems to be very
popular in the polls. Preferably ab' > ab, and cb' > cb.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Most voters know that (in sincere preferences) B is some sort of
a middle candidate between A and C.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The best strategy (that we know but voters do not) of the A
supporters would be to bullet vote, but some are likely to approve also B.
The best strategy of the C supporters is to approve also B.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> This example says that approval polls may be used as a strategic
tool, but I don't claim that approval polls would be worse (in approval
elections) from this point of view than some other kind of polls.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Juho
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On 31 Oct 2016, at 01:11, Michael Ossipoff <
email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I'd like to comment on the article's strategy-suggestions. My
comments will be interspersed below,  demarkated  above & below by a line
of "&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&"
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Introduction
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Tactical voting is when voters don’t cast purely honest ballots.
While voters do this to a limited extent with approval voting (link is
external), the voting system still behaves remarkably well. For instance,
voters can always express their honest favorite. And choosing just one
candidate (bullet voting) only occurs in limited situations.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Below is how approval voting strategy is likely to play out in a
variety of common scenarios.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Polling Assumption
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Since there’d be approval voting, there’d also be approval
polling. It would make no sense to do polling framed in plurality when a
different system is used; it would cease to be informative.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Utility Assumption for Hypotheticals
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> In these cases, let’s assume you hate Candidate Awful, are okay
with Candidate Better, and love Candidate Classy. Let’s give them honest
utility values (we’re rating them on a 0-10 scale):
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Awful: 0
>>>>>>>>>> Better: 6
>>>>>>>>>> Classy: 10
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> {Classy, Better} is a top-set, for you.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> You should approve both.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Polling Assumption
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Since there’d be approval voting, there’d also be approval
polling. It would make no sense to do polling framed in plurality when a
different system is used; it would cease to be informative.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I don't agree. Either Brams or Fishburn or both wrote a paper
suggesting an Approval-poll to provide tactical informaton. But such
information could only come from a poll that asked people to indicate their
favorite, or better-yet,their merit-ranking.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The 2nd election, the binding one, is, by assumption, intended
to benefit from the information from the first poll. But the 1st poll, if
by Approval, is either 0-info, or has ulnreliable, guessed, predictive
information. Then why would it indicate winnability in the 2nd vote?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Approval Voting Example #1
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> If approval polls:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Awful: 50%
>>>>>>>>>> Better: 50%
>>>>>>>>>> Classy: 30%
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> You want to vote for Better and Classy here.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Yes.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> You vote for Better because you want Better to beat Awful.
Classy doesn’t have a shot, but you vote for her anyway to show your
support and give her ideas more legitimacy.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Approval Voting Example #2
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> If approval polls:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Awful: 50%
>>>>>>>>>> Better: 50%
>>>>>>>>>> Classy: 50%
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> You still vote for Better and Classy.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Yes.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> You don’t vote for Classy alone because you have a strong
preference for Better against Awful. By only voting for Better or Classy,
you risk Awful winning against both of them.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Approval Voting Example #3
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> If approval polls:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Awful: 30%
>>>>>>>>>> Better: 50%
>>>>>>>>>> Classy: 50%
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> You actually only vote for Classy here.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I disagree.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> {Classy, Better} is your top-set. Electing from that set matters
more than the matter of _which_ of is members wins.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> In fact, Awful's win-probability is 60% as great as those of
Better & Classy.  You don't want to take that chance of Awful outpolling
Classy. So you approve your top-set.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> When Awful is enough out of the race, you can narrow your sights
against Better and show your support for Classy.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> But Awful isn't fully out of the race.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> When exactly do you only vote for Classy? It depends on how far
out of the competition Better is. And it depends on how much you dislike
Better along with how likable Better is compared to Awful. If Awful and
Better are similarly unlikable (you’re indifferent to which one wins), a
voter may be more inclined to vote for Classy alone when she is closer to
winning.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Of course. That's why you wouldn't approve Hillary if we were
holding the November 2016 election by Approval.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Approval Voting Example #4
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> If approval polls:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Awful: 50%
>>>>>>>>>> Better: 30%
>>>>>>>>>> Classy: 50%
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Again, your only vote is for Classy here.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Disagree.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Awful has a 50% chance of outpolling Classy, and, even if
Better's win-probability is slightly less than that of Awful & Classy, you
should still approve (only) your entire top-set, which is {Classy, Better}.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It’s not Better that’s giving competition to Awful anymore; it’s
Classy competing against Awful. Whether you include Better in the vote
would depend on how much you actually supported Better's views. Like in the
first example where Classy had 30% and was a token vote, support for Better
in this case is also a token vote because it likely won’t change the
outcome. So, if you wanted to give support for Better because of some view
he had that you liked, then you could get away with supporting him and
Classy.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> [...]
>>>>>>>>>> Conclusion
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> These examples remove the argument that approval voting
regresses to plurality voting (via bullet voting).
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Of course.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> There are numerous scenarios (as shown above) when bullet voting
simply makes no strategic sense. But notice that when you do only vote for
one candidate, it’s done in a way that’s not damaging to the outcome. Also,
factoring in who is likely to win is something we do anyway when
considering what to do under plurality voting. But with approval voting, we
just have more options on what we can do with that information. Also note
that it was always to your advantage to vote your favorite. That will
ALWAYS be true with approval voting.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Disregard who you think is likely to win. Nearly everyone's
"information" about that comes from disinformational, wealthy-agenda media,
and should be completely disregarded.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Though honest Internet polls give us a hint about who's the CWs
(Jill Stein), for nearly everyone, it's a 0-info election. Anyway, as i've
mentioned elsewhere, in our distorted electoral-system, voters who want
something better instead of the Republocrat status-quo have a top-set & a
bottom-set. When you do, you should approve (only) your top-set.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Also, when there are more candidates, there are more variations
on what to do. Though the concepts are the same. Expectantly, with more
candidates, voters will also approve of more candidates on average.  There
may also be cross-support from multiple independents/third parties that
share certain views.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Yes.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Finally, even with “tactical” voting, approval voting will
nearly always choose the candidate that can beat everyone in a head-to-head
race. This is called a Condorcet winner. Approval voting does not achieve
this flawlessly, but it does an excellent job nonetheless. It is also
argued that when approval voting doesn’t select the Condorcet winner, it
does so for good reason.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Yes.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> More on this topic here.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Topic:
>>>>>>>>>> Tactical Voting
>>>>>>>>>>
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list info
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
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>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
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>>>>>>
>>>>>
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