[EM] Approval-Strategy article at CES website

Wed Nov 2 10:51:18 PDT 2016

Well, for the reason you describe, pre-election polls would be of
questionable value.

Much more reliable would be the result in the previous election. _That_ is
the reliable poll. ...Even if the candidates are new, it still informs
about parties.

Though there _might_ not be a top-set for most people, in an authentic
political system, I was mistaken to imply that there wouldn't be one:

Even without the odious Republocrats, even no one odious to the 99% could
win, and so no one like that would be in the election, there's still a good
variety among Progressive parties & candidates.

Probably they're all ok, but there's still likely be a subset who are
significantly closer to, perceived by you as the very best.

So, there'd still be a top-set, even though the "bottom-set" is no longer
odious.

But what if there weren't, because _all_ the candidates quality equally as
the very best.

Only then will there be no top-set.

Only then will you not have the thoroughly simple optimal strategy of
approving only your top-set.

But the resulting strategy "dilemma" would be a pretty nice dilemma,
wouldn't you agree?

You'd then have to estimate where the CWs is. Or lacking information about
that, or lacking a CWs, you'd have to estimate the expected winner-merit, &
approve down to there.

But my point here is that you have a top-set, & the thoroughly easy simple
strategy of approving (only) that top-set, unless it's the utopianly happy
circumstance of all the candidates qualifying as "very best" and equally
being just what you most want.

...& when that's so, choosing among them would be a very nice dilemma.

Michael Ossipoff

On Nov 2, 2016 10:09 AM, "Juho Laatu" <juho.laatu at gmail.com> wrote:

>
> On 02 Nov 2016, at 18:13, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 3:27 AM, Juho Laatu <juho.laatu at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Since educated approval voting is based on voting strategically
>> (constructively, not maliciously) so that each voter tries to make a
>> difference between some leading candidates, approval is more vulnerable to
>> deceptive poll information than many other methods. Most voters are
>> expected to vote strategically, and voting strategy will be derived from
>> the available poll information. This strategic vulnerability applies to all
>> polls, not only approval based polls.
>>
>
> It depends on what you mean by "strategically". You mean electing the best
> candidate you can, which amounts to identiflying the CWs & approving down
> to hir.
>
>
> Here "strategically" means setting your approval threshold so that your
> vote is likely to have maximum impact on the results. That typically means
> approving at least one of the frontrunners, and not approving at least one
> of them. That's the normal approval voting "strategy". (In the polls I
> assumed a different strategy than this "normal" strategy to be applied.)
>
>
> But,a s I've been repeatedly saying, for progressiive voters, in this
> country there is a clear & obvious top-set: The progressive candidates.
> (I've also told why it's in the interest of a big majority of the
> population to elect a progressive government).
>
> So, for progressives, which means for pretty much anyone who knows what's
> in their best interest, it's a top-set/bottom-set election.
>
> For such an election, the kind of strategy you're talking about is
> entirely irrelevant. The optimal strategy is simple: Approve (only) your
> top-set.
>
>
> Did you refer here to the normal approval strategy in the elections, or to
> the different (more deceptive) strategy in the polls? My intention was to
> say that in the polls one could use some other strategy than the normal
> approval strategy, but in the actual approval election the normal approval
> strategy would apply (but with falsified input information).
>
> (I may not be completely familiar with all the details of the progressives
> vs. others set-up in the U.S. elections.)
>
>
> In a different & better society, with honest elections and media, maybe
> the candidates of progressives' bottom-set would be so unwinnable that
> they'd no longer be in the elections. ...and it would no longer be a
> top-set/bottom-set election. But then, with the combination of honest
> elections and honest, open media, it would also be a lot more obvious who's
> the CWs.  Absent a top-set, the best strategy is to approve down to the
> CWs, if s/he's identifiable.  ...and s/he likely would be, then.
>
> Without a top-set/bottom-set situation, and if the CWs weren't
> identifiable, or if there weren't one, then a 0-info expectation-maximizing
> strategy would be the next best.  ...approving down to the expected
> winner-merit.
>
>
> The poll strategy that I proposed was aimed at hiding the CWs (Condorcet
> winner in sincere opinions) and/or strongest approval candidates from the
> voters. That way you can make the voters base their (normal approval)
> strategy on misinformation. In the example that made B the winner instead
> of the majority favourite (and CWs) A. We thus didn't have 0-info, but some
> insincere poll information instead.
>
>
> I've been discussing ways of estimating that.
>
> Forest mentioned something that shows that there's a sense in which no
> election is really 0-info:
>
> The 0-info strategies for expectation-maximization all assume some
> knowledge of at least the range of where the voters are, inferred from the
> range of where the candidates are. But,ito the extent that you know that
> range, is it really 0-info?
>
> Forest pointed out that the middle of the distribution is going to be less
> than halfway to the far end of it, from wherever you are in it.
>
> That gives you at least some estimate-information about where the
> voter-median is.   ...where the CWs is.
>
> So that would suggest that, whatever the dimensionality, one shouldn't
> approve past the candidate midrange, and should, in fact, approve only down
> to some unknown distance short of it.
>
>
> My example was a pure one dimensional example. But the same strategy can
> work also in some more complex opinion spaces. The intended winner must
> however be to some extent centrist, since the strategy requires some other
> candidate(s) to be more disliked (than the planned strategic winner) to the
> voter group(s) whose voting strategy (or actually the input parameters of
> the voting strategy, namely the perceived CWs and/or approval forerunners)
> the strategy tries to modify.
>
> The intended strategic winner should thus have each set of voters (to be
> fooled) on one side, and a false potential winner on the opposite side. One
> can not use very many dimensions / directions / target groups since one can
> not promote candidates that are close to the target voter groups groups (in
> the polls). It may however often be sufficient and most efficient to fool
> only one or two groups of voters to win the election.
>
>
> My suggestion to approve past that midrange, by an amount that increases
> with the dimenaionality, even if all the candidates are in the same general
> direction from you, makes the questionable assumption that, even from
> there, the voter-distribution will likely take the shape of a section of a
> circle or sphere centered where you are.
>
> So that questionable assumption explains the contradiction between my
> suggestion to approve past the midrange when the dimensionality is greater
> than 1, vs what Forest pointed out...that the voter-median, the CWs, can be
> expected to be closer than the candidate/voter midrange.
>
> But all this has nothing to do with our current (supposed) political
> system, in which there's a clear, definite & obvious top-set for anyone who
> wants the country to be better for the 99%.
>
> Just approve your top-set, the progressive candidates.
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
>
> I guess in the U.S. the political set-up is so well known that the
> proposed strategy would not work very well right after changing the
> election method from the current one to approval. I mean that it would not
> be credible to market one of the two strong candidates as a weak candidate
> in the hope of making the opposite side approve also him/her in the hope of
> not electing some even worse extreme candidate. But maybe in time, after
> also other candidates will be seen as potential winners, the situation
> would change, and approval polling strategies could be successfully used.
>
> Juho
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>> On the other hand, although this vulnerability is very obvious and easy
>> to apply in theory, I lean in the direction that in typical public
>> elections strategic voting or strategic polling is not as big of a problem
>> as one might think based on all the theoretical threat scenarios that are
>> often discussed on this list. In all elections voters are likely to have
>> also incentives to vote sincerely. In the mentioned example many B
>> supporters may prefer to always approve B (also in the polls, not only in
>> the actual election), and B supporters may not like approving also C in the
>> polls, just to make it sure that B will be seen as a more popular candidate
>> than C. Such tendencies to promote one's true favourite are related also to
>> longer term developments, like keeping the number of votes up also in the
>> following elections, and trying give as much positive push as possible to
>> one's favourite party, current representatives and candidates even if they
>> are not elected this time.
>>
>> In real life TTR elections I have not observed any strong tendency to
>> vote strategically at the first round. Some probably do vote strategically
>> (one of the potential winners), but I guess it is more typical to just vote
>> sincerely at the first round. Also in plurality elections, where strategic
>> voting (of one of the two leading candidates) is often the only rational
>> thing to do (from a theoretical point of view, if one's only goal is to win
>> this particular election), many people still prefer to vote sincerely.
>>
>> I would expect these sincere tendencies to apply also in approval
>> elections. I.e. poll strategies would not be so strong that they would in
>> practice lead to such rampant strategic behaviour in the polls that would
>> have a serious impact on voting behaviour in the actual election. This
>> applies even more to other relatively strategy free methods like Condorcet.
>> I believe strategic voting would not be a problem in typical large public
>> Condorcet elections. As I have mentioned a few times, I'm still waiting for
>> someone to present some practical strategic voting guidance that could be
>> applied in typical large public Condorcet elections. So far there is none.
>> The existence of such valid strategic voting guidance depends also on how
>> strongly the public approves / rejects strategic behaviour. But as said, I
>> have not seen any good guidance that would work even in the most strategy
>> friendly societies (where voters are happy to vote as told by the party
>> strategists, and where people who do not use all available deceptive
>> strategies are considered to be fools).
>>
>> Juho
>>
>>
>> On 02 Nov 2016, at 07:29, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Ok, now I get it. Sure, that's the trouble with a pre-election poll to
>> get information for voting. Deceptive insincere voting in the informational
>> poll.
>>
>> That's a nagging doubt that probably is felt by everyone who suggests
>> such pre-election informational polls.
>>
>> Thanks for bringing it up, and for clarifying it for me. I guess I missed
>> the fact that you were talking about voting in the poll, and were
>> discussing that deceptive poll-voting problem.
>>
>> On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 2:36 PM, Juho Laatu <juho.laatu at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 01 Nov 2016, at 20:07, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> B, as a 2nd choice, is at the borderline for approval, if the ">"  have
>>> uniform magnitude for a particular faction.
>>>
>>> I didn't assume anything very specific on the strength of the
>>> preferences in the sincere preferences. Unless the preference strengths are
>>> not totally radical (e.g. A>>>>>>>>>>>>B>C), B can be presented to the A
>>> supporters as an acceptable compromise candidate (when compared to the even
>>> worse C).
>>>
>>> Approving hir or not is ok.
>>>
>>> I don't understand why you say that the B voters shouldn't approve B.
>>>
>>> That's because A supporters should be made not to think that A and B are
>>> the leading candidates (as they are based on the sincere preferences), but
>>> that A and C are the leading candidates. If A supporters believe that A and
>>> C are the leading candidates (because of the strategic answers to the
>>> approval polls), some of them will approve also B, and with good
>>> probability that makes B the winner in the actual approval election
>>> (although A supporters have 51% majority and they would win if all of them
>>> simply bullet voted).
>>>
>>> The strategic plan is thus to hide the fact that in sincere opinions A
>>> and B are clearly the two leading candidates, and make the A supporters
>>> think that C is the second strongest candidate. That's why it makes sense
>>> not to approve one's favourite (B) in the approval polls. In the actual
>>> approval election B supporters will naturally all approve B.
>>>
>>> Juho
>>>
>>> Michael Ossipoff
>>> On Nov 1, 2016 1:41 AM, "Juho Laatu" <juho.laatu at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I generated one example of strategic polling in approval elections with
>>>> approval polls. No specific claims included. Just some food for your
>>>> thoughts.
>>>>
>>>> Sincere preferences:
>>>>
>>>> 51: A>B>C
>>>> 49-c: B>C>A
>>>> c: C>B>A
>>>>
>>>> Approval poll results:
>>>>
>>>> 51-ab: {A}
>>>> ab: {A, B}
>>>> 49-c-x: {B, C}    (strategic, see Note 1)
>>>> x: {C}             (strategic and insincere, see Note 2)
>>>> c-cb: {C}
>>>> cb: {C, B}
>>>>
>>>> Note 1: All B supporters should approve C.
>>>> Note 2: Some B supporters should possibly not approve B. The intention
>>>> is to keep the approval level of B (49-x+cb) high enough to make B look
>>>> like a credible potential winner, but not as high as the approval level of
>>>> C.
>>>>
>>>> Approval election results:
>>>>
>>>> 51-ab': {A}
>>>> ab': {A, B}
>>>> 49-c-bc: {B}    (can be sincere)
>>>> bc: {B, C}    (can be sincere)
>>>> c-cb': {C}
>>>> cb': {C, B}
>>>>
>>>> The strategic target of B supporters is to keep ab' and cb' as large as
>>>> possible. The A supporters should approve also B as a lesser evil, to avoid
>>>> C that seems to be very popular in the polls. The C supporters should
>>>> approve also B as a lesser evil, to avoid A that seems to be very popular
>>>> in the polls. Preferably ab' > ab, and cb' > cb.
>>>>
>>>> Most voters know that (in sincere preferences) B is some sort of a
>>>> middle candidate between A and C.
>>>>
>>>> The best strategy (that we know but voters do not) of the A supporters
>>>> would be to bullet vote, but some are likely to approve also B. The best
>>>> strategy of the C supporters is to approve also B.
>>>>
>>>> This example says that approval polls may be used as a strategic tool,
>>>> but I don't claim that approval polls would be worse (in approval
>>>> elections) from this point of view than some other kind of polls.
>>>>
>>>> Juho
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 31 Oct 2016, at 01:11, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> I'd like to comment on the article's strategy-suggestions. My comments
>>>> will be interspersed below,  demarkated  above & below by a line of
>>>> "&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&"
>>>>
>>>> Introduction
>>>>
>>>> Tactical voting is when voters don’t cast purely honest ballots. While
>>>> voters do this to a limited extent with approval voting (link is
>>>> external) <http://approval-voting/>, the voting system still behaves
>>>> remarkably well. For instance, voters can always express their honest
>>>> favorite. And choosing just one candidate (bullet voting) only occurs in
>>>> limited situations.
>>>>
>>>> Below is how approval voting strategy is likely to play out in a
>>>> variety of common scenarios.
>>>> Polling Assumption
>>>>
>>>> Since there’d be approval voting, there’d also be approval polling. It
>>>> would make no sense to do polling framed in plurality when a different
>>>> system is used; it would cease to be informative.
>>>> Utility Assumption for Hypotheticals
>>>>
>>>> In these cases, let’s assume you hate Candidate Awful, are okay with
>>>> Candidate Better, and love Candidate Classy. Let’s give them honest utility
>>>> values (we’re rating them on a 0-10 scale):
>>>>
>>>>    - Awful: 0
>>>>    - Better: 6
>>>>    - Classy: 10
>>>>
>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>
>>>> {Classy, Better} is a top-set, for you.
>>>>
>>>> You should approve both.
>>>>
>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>
>>>> Polling Assumption
>>>>
>>>> Since there’d be approval voting, there’d also be approval polling. It
>>>> would make no sense to do polling framed in plurality when a different
>>>> system is used; it would cease to be informative.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>
>>>> I don't agree. Either Brams or Fishburn or both wrote a paper
>>>> suggesting an Approval-poll to provide tactical informaton. But such
>>>> information could only come from a poll that asked people to indicate their
>>>> favorite, or better-yet,their merit-ranking.
>>>>
>>>> The 2nd election, the binding one, is, by assumption, intended to
>>>> benefit from the information from the first poll. But the 1st poll, if by
>>>> Approval, is either 0-info, or has ulnreliable, guessed, predictive
>>>> information. Then why would it indicate winnability in the 2nd vote?
>>>>
>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Approval Voting Example #1
>>>>
>>>> If approval polls:
>>>>
>>>>    - Awful: 50%
>>>>    - Better: 50%
>>>>    - Classy: 30%
>>>>
>>>> You want to vote for Better and Classy here.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>
>>>> Yes.
>>>>
>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You vote for Better because you want Better to beat Awful. Classy
>>>> doesn’t have a shot, but you vote for her anyway to show your support and
>>>> give her ideas more legitimacy.
>>>> Approval Voting Example #2
>>>>
>>>> If approval polls:
>>>>
>>>>    - Awful: 50%
>>>>    - Better: 50%
>>>>    - Classy: 50%
>>>>
>>>> You still vote for Better and Classy.
>>>>
>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>
>>>> Yes.
>>>>
>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You don’t vote for Classy alone because you have a strong preference
>>>> for Better against Awful. By only voting for Better or Classy, you risk
>>>> Awful winning against both of them.
>>>> Approval Voting Example #3
>>>>
>>>> If approval polls:
>>>>
>>>>    - Awful: 30%
>>>>    - Better: 50%
>>>>    - Classy: 50%
>>>>
>>>> You actually only vote for Classy here.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>
>>>> I disagree.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> {Classy, Better} is your top-set. Electing from that set matters more
>>>> than the matter of _which_ of is members wins.
>>>>
>>>> In fact, Awful's win-probability is 60% as great as those of Better &
>>>> Classy.  You don't want to take that chance of Awful outpolling Classy. So
>>>> you approve your top-set.
>>>>
>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> When Awful is enough out of the race, you can narrow your sights
>>>> against Better and show your support for Classy.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>
>>>> But Awful isn't fully out of the race.
>>>>
>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> When exactly do you only vote for Classy? It depends on how far out of
>>>> the competition Better is. And it depends on how much you dislike Better
>>>> along with how likable Better is compared to Awful. If Awful and Better are
>>>> similarly unlikable (you’re indifferent to which one wins), a voter may be
>>>> more inclined to vote for Classy alone when she is closer to winning.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>
>>>> Of course. That's why you wouldn't approve Hillary if we were holding
>>>> the November 2016 election by Approval.
>>>>
>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Approval Voting Example #4
>>>>
>>>> If approval polls:
>>>>
>>>>    - Awful: 50%
>>>>    - Better: 30%
>>>>    - Classy: 50%
>>>>
>>>> Again, your only vote is for Classy here.
>>>>
>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>
>>>> Disagree.
>>>>
>>>> Awful has a 50% chance of outpolling Classy, and, even if Better's
>>>> win-probability is slightly less than that of Awful & Classy, you should
>>>> still approve (only) your entire top-set, which is {Classy, Better}.
>>>>
>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It’s not Better that’s giving competition to Awful anymore; it’s Classy
>>>> competing against Awful. Whether you include Better in the vote would
>>>> depend on how much you actually supported Better's views. Like in the first
>>>> example where Classy had 30% and was a token vote, support for Better in
>>>> this case is also a token vote because it likely won’t change the outcome.
>>>> So, if you wanted to give support for Better because of some view he had
>>>> that you liked, then you could get away with supporting him and Classy.
>>>> [...]
>>>> Conclusion
>>>>
>>>> These examples remove the argument that approval voting regresses to
>>>> plurality voting (via bullet voting).
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>
>>>> Of course.
>>>>
>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> There are numerous scenarios (as shown above) when bullet voting simply
>>>> makes no strategic sense. But notice that when you do only vote for one
>>>> candidate, it’s done in a way that’s not damaging to the outcome. Also,
>>>> factoring in who is likely to win is something we do anyway when
>>>> considering what to do under plurality voting. But with approval voting, we
>>>> just have more options on what we can do with that information. Also note
>>>> that it was always to your advantage to vote your favorite. That will
>>>> ALWAYS be true with approval voting.
>>>>
>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>
>>>> Disregard who you think is likely to win. Nearly everyone's
>>>> "information" about that comes from disinformational, wealthy-agenda media,
>>>> and should be completely disregarded.
>>>>
>>>> Though honest Internet polls give us a hint about who's the CWs (Jill
>>>> Stein), for nearly everyone, it's a 0-info election. Anyway, as i've
>>>> mentioned elsewhere, in our distorted electoral-system, voters who want
>>>> something better instead of the Republocrat status-quo have a top-set & a
>>>> bottom-set. When you do, you should approve (only) your top-set.
>>>>
>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Also, when there are more candidates, there are more variations on what
>>>> to do. Though the concepts are the same. Expectantly, with more candidates,
>>>> voters will also approve of more candidates on average.  There may also be
>>>> cross-support from multiple independents/third parties that share certain
>>>> views.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>
>>>> Yes.
>>>>
>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Finally, even with “tactical” voting, approval voting will nearly
>>>> always choose the candidate that can beat everyone in a head-to-head race.
>>>> This is called a Condorcet winner. Approval voting does not achieve this
>>>> flawlessly, but it does an excellent job nonetheless. It is also argued
>>>> that when approval voting doesn’t select the Condorcet winner, it does so
>>>> for good reason.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>
>>>> Yes.
>>>>
>>>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> More on this topic here.
>>>> Topic:
>>>> Tactical Voting <https://electology.org/topic/tactical-voting>
>>>>
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>>>>
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