[EM] Approval-Strategy article at CES website

Tue Nov 1 22:29:26 PDT 2016

Ok, now I get it. Sure, that's the trouble with a pre-election poll to get
information for voting. Deceptive insincere voting in the informational
poll.

That's a nagging doubt that probably is felt by everyone who suggests such
pre-election informational polls.

Thanks for bringing it up, and for clarifying it for me. I guess I missed
the fact that you were talking about voting in the poll, and were
discussing that deceptive poll-voting problem.

On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 2:36 PM, Juho Laatu <juho.laatu at gmail.com> wrote:

>
> On 01 Nov 2016, at 20:07, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> B, as a 2nd choice, is at the borderline for approval, if the ">"  have
> uniform magnitude for a particular faction.
>
> I didn't assume anything very specific on the strength of the preferences
> in the sincere preferences. Unless the preference strengths are not totally
> radical (e.g. A>>>>>>>>>>>>B>C), B can be presented to the A supporters as
> an acceptable compromise candidate (when compared to the even worse C).
>
> Approving hir or not is ok.
>
> I don't understand why you say that the B voters shouldn't approve B.
>
> That's because A supporters should be made not to think that A and B are
> the leading candidates (as they are based on the sincere preferences), but
> that A and C are the leading candidates. If A supporters believe that A and
> C are the leading candidates (because of the strategic answers to the
> approval polls), some of them will approve also B, and with good
> probability that makes B the winner in the actual approval election
> (although A supporters have 51% majority and they would win if all of them
> simply bullet voted).
>
> The strategic plan is thus to hide the fact that in sincere opinions A and
> B are clearly the two leading candidates, and make the A supporters think
> that C is the second strongest candidate. That's why it makes sense not to
> approve one's favourite (B) in the approval polls. In the actual approval
> election B supporters will naturally all approve B.
>
> Juho
>
> Michael Ossipoff
> On Nov 1, 2016 1:41 AM, "Juho Laatu" <juho.laatu at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> I generated one example of strategic polling in approval elections with
>> approval polls. No specific claims included. Just some food for your
>> thoughts.
>>
>> Sincere preferences:
>>
>> 51: A>B>C
>> 49-c: B>C>A
>> c: C>B>A
>>
>> Approval poll results:
>>
>> 51-ab: {A}
>> ab: {A, B}
>> 49-c-x: {B, C}    (strategic, see Note 1)
>> x: {C}             (strategic and insincere, see Note 2)
>> c-cb: {C}
>> cb: {C, B}
>>
>> Note 1: All B supporters should approve C.
>> Note 2: Some B supporters should possibly not approve B. The intention is
>> to keep the approval level of B (49-x+cb) high enough to make B look like a
>> credible potential winner, but not as high as the approval level of C.
>>
>> Approval election results:
>>
>> 51-ab': {A}
>> ab': {A, B}
>> 49-c-bc: {B}    (can be sincere)
>> bc: {B, C}    (can be sincere)
>> c-cb': {C}
>> cb': {C, B}
>>
>> The strategic target of B supporters is to keep ab' and cb' as large as
>> possible. The A supporters should approve also B as a lesser evil, to avoid
>> C that seems to be very popular in the polls. The C supporters should
>> approve also B as a lesser evil, to avoid A that seems to be very popular
>> in the polls. Preferably ab' > ab, and cb' > cb.
>>
>> Most voters know that (in sincere preferences) B is some sort of a middle
>> candidate between A and C.
>>
>> The best strategy (that we know but voters do not) of the A supporters
>> would be to bullet vote, but some are likely to approve also B. The best
>> strategy of the C supporters is to approve also B.
>>
>> This example says that approval polls may be used as a strategic tool,
>> but I don't claim that approval polls would be worse (in approval
>> elections) from this point of view than some other kind of polls.
>>
>> Juho
>>
>>
>>
>> On 31 Oct 2016, at 01:11, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> I'd like to comment on the article's strategy-suggestions. My comments
>> will be interspersed below,  demarkated  above & below by a line of
>> "&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&"
>>
>> Introduction
>>
>> Tactical voting is when voters don’t cast purely honest ballots. While
>> voters do this to a limited extent with approval voting (link is
>> external) <http://approval-voting/>, the voting system still behaves
>> remarkably well. For instance, voters can always express their honest
>> favorite. And choosing just one candidate (bullet voting) only occurs in
>> limited situations.
>>
>> Below is how approval voting strategy is likely to play out in a variety
>> of common scenarios.
>> Polling Assumption
>>
>> Since there’d be approval voting, there’d also be approval polling. It
>> would make no sense to do polling framed in plurality when a different
>> system is used; it would cease to be informative.
>> Utility Assumption for Hypotheticals
>>
>> In these cases, let’s assume you hate Candidate Awful, are okay with
>> Candidate Better, and love Candidate Classy. Let’s give them honest utility
>> values (we’re rating them on a 0-10 scale):
>>
>>    - Awful: 0
>>    - Better: 6
>>    - Classy: 10
>>
>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>
>> {Classy, Better} is a top-set, for you.
>>
>> You should approve both.
>>
>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>
>> Polling Assumption
>>
>> Since there’d be approval voting, there’d also be approval polling. It
>> would make no sense to do polling framed in plurality when a different
>> system is used; it would cease to be informative.
>>
>>
>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>
>> I don't agree. Either Brams or Fishburn or both wrote a paper suggesting
>> an Approval-poll to provide tactical informaton. But such information could
>> only come from a poll that asked people to indicate their favorite, or
>> better-yet,their merit-ranking.
>>
>> The 2nd election, the binding one, is, by assumption, intended to benefit
>> from the information from the first poll. But the 1st poll, if by Approval,
>> is either 0-info, or has ulnreliable, guessed, predictive information. Then
>> why would it indicate winnability in the 2nd vote?
>>
>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>
>>
>> Approval Voting Example #1
>>
>> If approval polls:
>>
>>    - Awful: 50%
>>    - Better: 50%
>>    - Classy: 30%
>>
>> You want to vote for Better and Classy here.
>>
>>
>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>
>> Yes.
>>
>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>
>>
>> You vote for Better because you want Better to beat Awful. Classy doesn’t
>> have a shot, but you vote for her anyway to show your support and give her
>> ideas more legitimacy.
>> Approval Voting Example #2
>>
>> If approval polls:
>>
>>    - Awful: 50%
>>    - Better: 50%
>>    - Classy: 50%
>>
>> You still vote for Better and Classy.
>>
>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>
>> Yes.
>>
>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>
>>
>>
>> You don’t vote for Classy alone because you have a strong preference for
>> Better against Awful. By only voting for Better or Classy, you risk Awful
>> winning against both of them.
>> Approval Voting Example #3
>>
>> If approval polls:
>>
>>    - Awful: 30%
>>    - Better: 50%
>>    - Classy: 50%
>>
>> You actually only vote for Classy here.
>>
>>
>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>
>> I disagree.
>>
>>
>> {Classy, Better} is your top-set. Electing from that set matters more
>> than the matter of _which_ of is members wins.
>>
>> In fact, Awful's win-probability is 60% as great as those of Better &
>> Classy.  You don't want to take that chance of Awful outpolling Classy. So
>> you approve your top-set.
>>
>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>
>>
>> When Awful is enough out of the race, you can narrow your sights against
>> Better and show your support for Classy.
>>
>>
>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>
>> But Awful isn't fully out of the race.
>>
>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>
>>
>> When exactly do you only vote for Classy? It depends on how far out of
>> the competition Better is. And it depends on how much you dislike Better
>> along with how likable Better is compared to Awful. If Awful and Better are
>> similarly unlikable (you’re indifferent to which one wins), a voter may be
>> more inclined to vote for Classy alone when she is closer to winning.
>>
>>
>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>
>> Of course. That's why you wouldn't approve Hillary if we were holding the
>> November 2016 election by Approval.
>>
>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>
>>
>> Approval Voting Example #4
>>
>> If approval polls:
>>
>>    - Awful: 50%
>>    - Better: 30%
>>    - Classy: 50%
>>
>> Again, your only vote is for Classy here.
>>
>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>
>> Disagree.
>>
>> Awful has a 50% chance of outpolling Classy, and, even if Better's
>> win-probability is slightly less than that of Awful & Classy, you should
>> still approve (only) your entire top-set, which is {Classy, Better}.
>>
>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>
>>
>> It’s not Better that’s giving competition to Awful anymore; it’s Classy
>> competing against Awful. Whether you include Better in the vote would
>> depend on how much you actually supported Better's views. Like in the first
>> example where Classy had 30% and was a token vote, support for Better in
>> this case is also a token vote because it likely won’t change the outcome.
>> So, if you wanted to give support for Better because of some view he had
>> that you liked, then you could get away with supporting him and Classy.
>> [...]
>> Conclusion
>>
>> These examples remove the argument that approval voting regresses to
>> plurality voting (via bullet voting).
>>
>>
>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>
>> Of course.
>>
>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>
>>
>> There are numerous scenarios (as shown above) when bullet voting simply
>> makes no strategic sense. But notice that when you do only vote for one
>> candidate, it’s done in a way that’s not damaging to the outcome. Also,
>> factoring in who is likely to win is something we do anyway when
>> considering what to do under plurality voting. But with approval voting, we
>> just have more options on what we can do with that information. Also note
>> that it was always to your advantage to vote your favorite. That will
>> ALWAYS be true with approval voting.
>>
>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>
>> Disregard who you think is likely to win. Nearly everyone's "information"
>> about that comes from disinformational, wealthy-agenda media, and should be
>> completely disregarded.
>>
>> Though honest Internet polls give us a hint about who's the CWs (Jill
>> Stein), for nearly everyone, it's a 0-info election. Anyway, as i've
>> mentioned elsewhere, in our distorted electoral-system, voters who want
>> something better instead of the Republocrat status-quo have a top-set & a
>> bottom-set. When you do, you should approve (only) your top-set.
>>
>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>
>>
>> Also, when there are more candidates, there are more variations on what
>> to do. Though the concepts are the same. Expectantly, with more candidates,
>> voters will also approve of more candidates on average.  There may also be
>> cross-support from multiple independents/third parties that share certain
>> views.
>>
>>
>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>
>> Yes.
>>
>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>
>>
>> Finally, even with “tactical” voting, approval voting will nearly always
>> choose the candidate that can beat everyone in a head-to-head race. This is
>> called a Condorcet winner. Approval voting does not achieve this
>> flawlessly, but it does an excellent job nonetheless. It is also argued
>> that when approval voting doesn’t select the Condorcet winner, it does so
>> for good reason.
>>
>>
>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>
>> Yes.
>>
>> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>>
>>
>> More on this topic here.
>> Topic:
>> Tactical Voting <https://electology.org/topic/tactical-voting>
>>
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