[EM] Approval-Strategy article at CES website

Tue Nov 1 11:07:26 PDT 2016

B, as a 2nd choice, is at the borderline for approval, if the ">"  have
uniform magnitude for a particular faction.

Approving hir or not is ok.

I don't understand why you say that the B voters shouldn't approve B.

Michael Ossipoff
On Nov 1, 2016 1:41 AM, "Juho Laatu" <juho.laatu at gmail.com> wrote:

> I generated one example of strategic polling in approval elections with
> approval polls. No specific claims included. Just some food for your
> thoughts.
>
> Sincere preferences:
>
> 51: A>B>C
> 49-c: B>C>A
> c: C>B>A
>
> Approval poll results:
>
> 51-ab: {A}
> ab: {A, B}
> 49-c-x: {B, C}    (strategic, see Note 1)
> x: {C}             (strategic and insincere, see Note 2)
> c-cb: {C}
> cb: {C, B}
>
> Note 1: All B supporters should approve C.
> Note 2: Some B supporters should possibly not approve B. The intention is
> to keep the approval level of B (49-x+cb) high enough to make B look like a
> credible potential winner, but not as high as the approval level of C.
>
> Approval election results:
>
> 51-ab': {A}
> ab': {A, B}
> 49-c-bc: {B}    (can be sincere)
> bc: {B, C}    (can be sincere)
> c-cb': {C}
> cb': {C, B}
>
> The strategic target of B supporters is to keep ab' and cb' as large as
> possible. The A supporters should approve also B as a lesser evil, to avoid
> C that seems to be very popular in the polls. The C supporters should
> approve also B as a lesser evil, to avoid A that seems to be very popular
> in the polls. Preferably ab' > ab, and cb' > cb.
>
> Most voters know that (in sincere preferences) B is some sort of a middle
> candidate between A and C.
>
> The best strategy (that we know but voters do not) of the A supporters
> would be to bullet vote, but some are likely to approve also B. The best
> strategy of the C supporters is to approve also B.
>
> This example says that approval polls may be used as a strategic tool, but
> I don't claim that approval polls would be worse (in approval elections)
> from this point of view than some other kind of polls.
>
> Juho
>
>
>
> On 31 Oct 2016, at 01:11, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> I'd like to comment on the article's strategy-suggestions. My comments
> will be interspersed below,  demarkated  above & below by a line of
> "&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&"
>
> Introduction
>
> Tactical voting is when voters don’t cast purely honest ballots. While
> voters do this to a limited extent with approval voting (link is external)
> <http://approval-voting/>, the voting system still behaves remarkably
> well. For instance, voters can always express their honest favorite. And
> choosing just one candidate (bullet voting) only occurs in limited
> situations.
>
> Below is how approval voting strategy is likely to play out in a variety
> of common scenarios.
> Polling Assumption
>
> Since there’d be approval voting, there’d also be approval polling. It
> would make no sense to do polling framed in plurality when a different
> system is used; it would cease to be informative.
> Utility Assumption for Hypotheticals
>
> In these cases, let’s assume you hate Candidate Awful, are okay with
> Candidate Better, and love Candidate Classy. Let’s give them honest utility
> values (we’re rating them on a 0-10 scale):
>
>    - Awful: 0
>    - Better: 6
>    - Classy: 10
>
> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>
> {Classy, Better} is a top-set, for you.
>
> You should approve both.
>
> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>
> Polling Assumption
>
> Since there’d be approval voting, there’d also be approval polling. It
> would make no sense to do polling framed in plurality when a different
> system is used; it would cease to be informative.
>
>
> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>
> I don't agree. Either Brams or Fishburn or both wrote a paper suggesting
> an Approval-poll to provide tactical informaton. But such information could
> only come from a poll that asked people to indicate their favorite, or
> better-yet,their merit-ranking.
>
> The 2nd election, the binding one, is, by assumption, intended to benefit
> from the information from the first poll. But the 1st poll, if by Approval,
> is either 0-info, or has ulnreliable, guessed, predictive information. Then
> why would it indicate winnability in the 2nd vote?
>
> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>
>
> Approval Voting Example #1
>
> If approval polls:
>
>    - Awful: 50%
>    - Better: 50%
>    - Classy: 30%
>
> You want to vote for Better and Classy here.
>
>
> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>
> Yes.
>
> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>
>
> You vote for Better because you want Better to beat Awful. Classy doesn’t
> have a shot, but you vote for her anyway to show your support and give her
> ideas more legitimacy.
> Approval Voting Example #2
>
> If approval polls:
>
>    - Awful: 50%
>    - Better: 50%
>    - Classy: 50%
>
> You still vote for Better and Classy.
>
> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>
> Yes.
>
> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>
>
>
> You don’t vote for Classy alone because you have a strong preference for
> Better against Awful. By only voting for Better or Classy, you risk Awful
> winning against both of them.
> Approval Voting Example #3
>
> If approval polls:
>
>    - Awful: 30%
>    - Better: 50%
>    - Classy: 50%
>
> You actually only vote for Classy here.
>
>
> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>
> I disagree.
>
>
> {Classy, Better} is your top-set. Electing from that set matters more than
> the matter of _which_ of is members wins.
>
> In fact, Awful's win-probability is 60% as great as those of Better &
> Classy.  You don't want to take that chance of Awful outpolling Classy. So
> you approve your top-set.
>
> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>
>
> When Awful is enough out of the race, you can narrow your sights against
> Better and show your support for Classy.
>
>
> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>
> But Awful isn't fully out of the race.
>
> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>
>
> When exactly do you only vote for Classy? It depends on how far out of the
> competition Better is. And it depends on how much you dislike Better along
> with how likable Better is compared to Awful. If Awful and Better are
> similarly unlikable (you’re indifferent to which one wins), a voter may be
> more inclined to vote for Classy alone when she is closer to winning.
>
>
> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>
> Of course. That's why you wouldn't approve Hillary if we were holding the
> November 2016 election by Approval.
>
> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>
>
> Approval Voting Example #4
>
> If approval polls:
>
>    - Awful: 50%
>    - Better: 30%
>    - Classy: 50%
>
> Again, your only vote is for Classy here.
>
> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>
> Disagree.
>
> Awful has a 50% chance of outpolling Classy, and, even if Better's
> win-probability is slightly less than that of Awful & Classy, you should
> still approve (only) your entire top-set, which is {Classy, Better}.
>
> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>
>
> It’s not Better that’s giving competition to Awful anymore; it’s Classy
> competing against Awful. Whether you include Better in the vote would
> depend on how much you actually supported Better's views. Like in the first
> example where Classy had 30% and was a token vote, support for Better in
> this case is also a token vote because it likely won’t change the outcome.
> So, if you wanted to give support for Better because of some view he had
> that you liked, then you could get away with supporting him and Classy.
> [...]
> Conclusion
>
> These examples remove the argument that approval voting regresses to
> plurality voting (via bullet voting).
>
>
> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>
> Of course.
>
> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>
>
> There are numerous scenarios (as shown above) when bullet voting simply
> makes no strategic sense. But notice that when you do only vote for one
> candidate, it’s done in a way that’s not damaging to the outcome. Also,
> factoring in who is likely to win is something we do anyway when
> considering what to do under plurality voting. But with approval voting, we
> just have more options on what we can do with that information. Also note
> that it was always to your advantage to vote your favorite. That will
> ALWAYS be true with approval voting.
>
> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>
> Disregard who you think is likely to win. Nearly everyone's "information"
> about that comes from disinformational, wealthy-agenda media, and should be
> completely disregarded.
>
> Though honest Internet polls give us a hint about who's the CWs (Jill
> Stein), for nearly everyone, it's a 0-info election. Anyway, as i've
> mentioned elsewhere, in our distorted electoral-system, voters who want
> something better instead of the Republocrat status-quo have a top-set & a
> bottom-set. When you do, you should approve (only) your top-set.
>
> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>
>
> Also, when there are more candidates, there are more variations on what to
> do. Though the concepts are the same. Expectantly, with more candidates,
> voters will also approve of more candidates on average.  There may also be
> cross-support from multiple independents/third parties that share certain
> views.
>
>
> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>
> Yes.
>
> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>
>
> Finally, even with “tactical” voting, approval voting will nearly always
> choose the candidate that can beat everyone in a head-to-head race. This is
> called a Condorcet winner. Approval voting does not achieve this
> flawlessly, but it does an excellent job nonetheless. It is also argued
> that when approval voting doesn’t select the Condorcet winner, it does so
> for good reason.
>
>
> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>
> Yes.
>
> &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
>
>
> More on this topic here.
> Topic:
> Tactical Voting <https://electology.org/topic/tactical-voting>
>
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