[EM] Bucklin/IRV hybrid? Motivated by MSV strategy

[Michael Ossipoff]

Yes of course 3-Slot ICT should be offered as a backup proposal, in case
people don't want MMPO.

3-Slot ICT gives an easier chicken dilemma solution than that of Approval,
meets Weak & Strong CD, if you're willing to leave the distrusted faction's
candidate without protection from pairwise-count's offensive strategies, &
from innocent truncation. Those things might well not happen.

Michael Ossipoff
On Oct 31, 2016 11:06 PM, "C.Benham" <cbenham at adam.com.au> wrote:

> On 10/31/2016 7:48 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
> Of course at EM we discuss two completely separate and different method
> proposal choices:
>
> 1. Proposals to electorates who have only had Plurality.
>
> 2. Later proposals to replace one better voting system with another.
>
> If we're talking about #1, then there are only a few to choose from:
>
> Approval, Score, and Bucklin.
>
>
> Mike,
>
> A short time ago you were in favour of CD methods (and even crafted the
> criterion) and said that your
> favourite method is ICT  (aka 3-slot TTR, Top Ratings).
>
> So what happened to it?    You even seemed ready to tolerate the non-FBC
> CD methods Benham and IRV.
>
> For #2, it really takes something with a lot of valuable &
> otherwise-unobtainable properties, to justify replacing Approval, Score or
> Bucklin with it.
>
> I suggest that only Plain MMPO qualifies.
>
>
> Say you ask people who are used to and/or like any of  Approval, Score,
> Bucklin,  or  plurality (aka FPP) or Top-Two Runoff or IRV or Benham:
>
> (a) Would you accept a method that in a 3-candidate election with 20
> million voters can elect a candidate that is voted above equal-bottom
> on only two ballots?
>
> x: A
> 1: C=A
> 1: C=B
> x: B
>
> x = any number greater than 1.   MMPO  elects C.
>
> (b) Do you think it is fair and sensible that a voter who is only
> interested in getting their favourite elected can increase the chance of
> that
> happening by fully ranking (below top) all the other candidates at
> random?
>
> What response do you think you will get?
>
> I don't live in the US, but I would think that most people wouldn't even
> believe that question (a) is serious, and that anyone who tries to
> tell them that that example only "looks bad" would blow their credibility.
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
>
>
> Jameson--
>
>
> On Sat, Oct 29, 2016 at 11:16 AM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>> ....Here's my "ideal characteristics" for a political single-winner
>> election system, more or less in descending order of importance:
>>
>>    1. FBC
>>
>>
> Yes, I consider FBC to be #!.
>
>
>>
>>    1.
>>    2. Handles center squeeze (ie, some form of weakened Condorcet
>>    guarantee that's compatible with FBC)
>>
>> But maybe the goal of electing the CWs unnecessarily complicates votiing.
> Maybe someday, there won't be a bottom set, for most voters, and, with
> honest elections & honest, open media, it will be clear who's the CWs. But
> now, Approval's best strategy doesn't require that. Brams pointed out that
> Approval's results can be better than the CWs.
>
> But, when it's desirable to elect the CWs, and it isn't obvious who's the
> CWs, then the wv methods, and methods with wv-like strategy (such as MMPO),
> are the methods that make it easiest to protect the CWs.
>
> Also, it should be noted that you can't be sure how often there will be a
> CWs, under different and better conditions.
>
>
>>
>>    1.
>>    2. Relatively simple to explain
>>
>>
> Approval & Score are easy to explain. I've had conversations in which only
> Approval & Score were accepted as being plain & un-elaborate enough to be
> acceptable..
>
> You know that SARA & XA are complicated and not easy to explain. I've
> tried explaining them.
>
> MMPO?:
>
> "The winner is the candidate who has fewest people voting someone else
> over hir."
>
> {...some same other candidate)
>
>>
>>    1.
>>    2. Minimal strategic burden
>>
>>
> We often hear it said that Approval has a large strategic burden, but, for
> most people, with our current candidate-lineup, there's nothing difficult
> about it: Approve (only) the progressive candidates. That's optimal for
> most people.
>
> And if the time comes when, for most people, there isn't a bottom-set,
> then that will be a happy circumstance, in which it doesn't matter terribly
> anyway, which candidate wins.
>
> In such conditions, with honest elections and honest, open media, it will
> likely be pretty obvious who's the CWs, and, in the absence of
> tep-set/bottom-set, the best strategy will be to just approve down to the
> CWs.
>
> And, if there were no bottom-set, and if it happened that it _wasn't_
> clear who the CWs was, and it was 0-info, then it would just be a matter of
> approving down to the expected winning merit-level. Maybe, under those
> conditions, that would be the candidate-mean.  Or maybe (as now)  the
> estimated mean merit of what voters want (which can be estimated by the
> candidates' merit-midrange, if the election is 1D.  ....but it might not
> remain 1D under different and better conditions).
>
> ..but I repeat that, with only your former top-set remaining as winnable
> candidates, it won't make as much difference which one wins anyway.
>
> People often consider Approval voting more difficult than it is.
>
>
>
>>
>>    1. Summable (ideally O(N), no worse than O(N²) in practice, though I
>>    might accept some special pleading for the use of prior polling to reduce
>>    to O(N²).)
>>    2. Handles CD, or at least, CD offensive strategies don't in practice
>>    mess up the center squeeze properties.
>>
>>
> MMPO meets Weak CD.
>
>
>>
>>    1.
>>    2. Some arguable track record
>>
>>
> Of course at EM we discuss two completely separate and different method
> proposal choices:
>
> 1. Proposals to electorates who have only had Plurality.
>
> 2. Later proposals to replace one better voting system with another.
>
> If we're talking about #1, then there are only a few to choose from:
>
> Approval, Score, and Bucklin.
>
>
> I suggest that all 3 of those should be offered to initiative-proposal
> committees, and that the public should be polled, or consulted in
> "focus-groups", regarding which of those 3 methods they'd  accept
>
>
> For #2, it really takes something with a lot of valuable &
> otherwise-unobtainable properties, to justify replacing Approval, Score or
> Bucklin with it.
>
> I suggest that only Plain MMPO qualifies.
>
>
>
>
>>    1.
>>
>>  Approval does well on 1,3,4, and 6, is OK on 2, and bad on 4 and 5.
>>
>
>
> No. Contrary to what we so often hear, Approval doesn't have a high
> strategic burden, as I discussed above.
>
> Other than MMPO's CD, improvements over Approval by more complicated
> methods are illusory.
>
> And your standard #5 was summability and count-complexity. Approval is
> precinct-summable, and its count is the easiest and least
> computation-intensive, among voting-systems.
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ----
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>
>
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