[EM] Voting-System Choice for Polls (Just one more thing I want to say)

[Michael Ossipoff]

[Replying farther down] :

On Wed, Dec 21, 2016 at 4:36 AM, Juho Laatu <juho.laatu at gmail.com> wrote:

> On 21 Dec 2016, at 05:21, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> Ok, MAM is a quite decent method. If strategic voting is minimal, I guess
>> you pick the method that gives best results with sincere votes. I'm still
>> lacking good understanding of why exactly MAM would produce best winners
>> with sincere votes.
>>
>
> MAM is the ideal, among the methods that look only at pairwise-defeats and
> their strengths, and that comes from MAM's definition:
>
> MAM:
>
> A pairwise defeat is affirmed if it isn't the weakest defeat in a cycle
> whose other defeats are affirmed.
>
> A alternative wins if it doesn't have an affirmed defeat.
>
> [end of MAM definition]
>
> It couldn't get any more minimal & ideal than that. MAM (unlike Beatpath,
> etc.) never unnecessarily disregards a pairwise defeat (by electing someone
> who has the defeat).
>
> In a method based only on pairwise defeats & their strengths, the only
> thing that should nullify a defeat would be if that defeat is the weakest
> in a cycle, and if the other defeats in that cycle aren't nullified in that
> way.
>
>
> I look at the world from a somewhat different angle here. I don't see what
> the relevance of beatpaths is in real life.
>

Beatpath, not MAM, is defined in terms of beatpaths.

But maybe you just mean that a cycle can be called a pair of beatpaths in
both directions between 2 candidates.

The "relevance of cycles in real life?

I'll say it again (but I won't continue to keep saying it):

A pairwise-defeat is voted public preference.

A cycle renders meaningless the defeats in the cycle. Therefore cycles have
relevance.


> I mean that I can not see what difference it makes to the society if there
> is a chain of defeats with certain strengths, if the target is to elect the
> best leader or best some other alternative.
>

You keep repeating that. And then, of course I keep repeating my answer to
it (but I won't continue doing so):

Sure, likely the Approval winner is better than the winner by a
pairwise-count method.

There are 2 reasons to consider a rank-method:

1. It's possible for a ranking method to provide a convenient, easy &
reliable means for avoiding chicken-dilemma.

2. Many people have a psychological need for rankings.

Some people think that they need to elect the CWs, which is easier with a
pairwise-count rank method. Some overcompromisers or rival parties would
avoid or soften their voting-errors, when voting with rankings.

3. Finding the CWs, via a poll, can be important, because the CWs is
typically the best candidate that people can get?

Is there something familiar about this? Oh yes, that's it: This is the same
thing that we've both been saying over and over again. But I'm not going to
continue doing so.


> Beatpaths
>

....by which you mean cycles, because you presumably want to call a cycle a
pair of opposite-direction beatpaths between 2 candidates.


> seem to serve the need to linearize the opinions of the group
>

No. Cycles are relevant if pairwise defeats are of interest. A pairwise
defeat is a voted public preference.


> , or to "break cycles", which I think is not in the requirements list of
> an election or poll.
>

Nonsense. Defeats in a cycle aren't saying anything about public wishes.
Should an election or poll reflect public wishes? :^) There are voting
systems that look only at pairwise preferences. MAM is one of them. MAM,
for example, has many desirable properties.

But I have no idea what your "reqirements list is (or what is the "best
winner" that you keep talking about). But that's ok. It's your business.
Far be it for me to tell you what your "requirements list" or "best winner"
should be.

Quite possibly your requirements list and your best winner aren't gotten by
pairwise-count methods. Fine. You've still got Approval, Score, and
Bucklin, all good methods.


> That is more like an aesthetic preference, or a mistaken idea that group
> opinions should be straightened to linear opinions.
>

If you say so.



> I agree that MAM could be seen as aesthetically beautiful, but I thus fail
> to see the connection to the targets of the election / poll (to find the
> best winner with sincere votes).
>

That would depend on your (often referred to but never stated) opinion
about what is the target of the election or the best winner.

You (presumably) know what your target for the election/poll is, and what
your best winner would be. By all means feel free to implement your
opinions, when you choose a voting system!

Or do we all have to abide by your target and your best winner? :^)



> In comparison for example the target of minmax is much clearer - elect a
> candidate that people will not oppose too much while he is in office,
> measured as strength of interest to change him to one of the competitors in
> opposition.
>

MinMax has, for years, been widely-regarded as not doing as well as MAM, in
a number of ways. But if you like it better, then use it next time you do a
poll, or advocate it for electing officeholders where you live.

You have a right to do those things!

Go for it!



> Also approval and range are easy to explain from the "possible needs of
> the society" perspective.
>

So very true.



>
> Additionally, MAM has excellent burial-deterrence & thwarting. That's why
> I use MAM, in Pairwise-Winner(MAM,  Smith,MMPO).  ...for MAM's
> burial-deterrence. But MMPO, & not MAM, is chicken-dilemma defection-proof,
> which is why I like to combine both of their strategic advantages, in
> P(MAM,  Smith,MMPO), for polls with possibly offensive-strategic voters.
>
>
> This is about strategic voting
>


Are you sure?  :^)



> , not about which method is best with sincere votes.
>

I said that P(MAM,   Smith,MMPO) is for electorates in which offensive
strategy would be particularly likely, unless deterred or at least thwarted.

Have we established that yet?

MAM is also very good with sincere voting. MAM is a component of
P(MAM,  Smith,MMPO).


> Not to be counted in favour of MAM in this branch of discussion.
>

That MAM is good with sincere votes is to be counted in MAM's favor.


[Replying farther down] :


>
> I can't say why it's important to guarantee that the winner is in the
>> voted Smith-set, other than that it confers compliance with various
>> criteria, including Mutual-Majority.
>>
>>
>> That's a good answer since there are situations where one can justify
>> electing from a Smith set that consists of very similar minded clones. The
>> top cycle can be sincere or strategic. The same matrix can however probably
>> be also a result of sincere votes where the Smith set candidates are not
>> clones but a much more competitive group. In such cases it could make sense
>> to elect outside the Smith set. One key point here is that information in
>> the matrix is limited, and it is impossible to say if there are clones, and
>> which preferences are strong and which ones weak.
>>
>
> But, with pairwise-count methods, the number of people voting a preference
> stands-in as an indication of its importance, imperfect though that may be.
>
> It's important to find out the CWs, because that's the best that anyone
> can expect to get. Truncation-proof MAM & MMPO still elect the CWs when
> someone truncates it. MAM's deterrence of burial, improves the likelihood
> of electing the CWs if there is one--& there usually is one.
>
>
> Yes. I think in this discussion we focus solely on methods where CWs is
> considered to be the ideal winner, and preference is measured solely as
> pairwise comparisons, that in most methods are derived from the pairwise
> matrix.
>

That's because, as I've already said many, many times, this thread
originated about polls that I conduct with the purpose of finding the CWs.



> And I claim that under these assumptions some methods can easily justify
> selecting the winner also outside the Smith set.
>

...because that will make the method more likely to choose the CWs when
there is one?  :^)

But, as I said, I cordially invite you to use the methods of your choice,
for polls, and for your proposals for how to elect officeholders where you
reside.

[Replying farther down] :


>
> But, because one member of the voted Smith set will be the CWs, if
>> truncation or burial is being attempted against it (neuter gender because
>> I'm talking about poll-alternatives) then that means that disqualifying
>> non-members of the voted Smith-set narrows the field in a way favorable to
>> the CWs.
>>
>>
>> It is not possible to tell if there was a CWs.
>>
>
> True, but if there is one, then it will win even if there's a
> truncation-caused cycle.
>
>
> Also some other member of the Smith set might win.
>

No kidding?

More likely with some methods than others. Choose the manner of selecting
from the Smith set accordingly.

But, primarily, do what *you* want.


> And the CWs could be also outside of the Smith set as a result of
> strategic voting.
>

No.

Truncation or burial against the CWs will result in a top-cycle that
includes the CWs.




>
> Truncation-proofness is important, even in a sincere electorate, because
> truncation can be non-strategic (lazy, hurried, principled, etc.).
>
>
> Here my medicine would be to educate voters to cast fuller votes (to rank
> at least the potential winners).
>

If you mean "Try to rank down to the CWs", then that's valid strategy for
trying to get the best you can (if that's your goal). You could also say
"Rank the best candidates.", or "Rank only your strong top-set."


> If they truncate for non-strategic reasons, we must assume that their
> preferences are flat with the rest of the candidates.
>

No. Maybe they're in a hurry. Maybe they don't want to bother or take the
time, even though they have lower preferences too.

But there's no point in assuming what you said, because your "If" is,
itself, an unsupported assumption. You don't know that they truncated for
nonstrategic reasons.



> It is not possible to tell which voters did that on purpose and which ones
> by mistake or laziness.
>

Quite.



>
> The top loop can be sincere as well (or a result of various good and bad
>> strategies). And the best sincere winner might be also outside the Smith
>> set.
>>
>
> Certainly, because it would be possible for the alternative satisfactory
> to the most people to be outside the Smith set. But probably it will
> usually be the CWs, or in the sincere Smith set if there isn't a CWs.
>
>
> I wouldn't assume anything on the probability of finding the best winner
> within or outside the Smith set.
>

Suit yourself.

In all of our EM polls, Approval, Score elected Condorcet's CWv.

[Replying farther down] :


> With sincere votes that depends on what our criteria for the best winner
> are (when there is no CWs). With all kind of strategic and lazy votes, the
> location of the best winner is even more difficult to guess (it is e.g.
> possible that multiple groups try to bury the CWs).
>
> Note that electing outside the Smith set may sometimes also help us, e.g.
>>> by making strategic plans void by not electing the (possibly strongly
>>> top-looped) favourite of the strategists.
>>>
>>
>> Maybe, but, by pairwise-count standards, electing from the Smith set
>> keeps the winner among the pairwise publicly-favored candidates.
>>
>>
>> I don't understand your definition of "pairwise publicly-favored
>> candidates". Why can't candidates outside the Smith set be such candidates?
>>
>
> Because, pairwise is what the Smith set is about. Something outside the
> Smith set might be more approved than the Smith set members, but it won't
> be pairwise publicly preferred to them.
>
>
> I claim that with some pairwise preference based criteria of best winner,
> the best winner could be outside of the Smith set.
>

Yes, evidently some pairwise preference based criteria that aren't about
pairwise defeats or their strength. Fine. You have a right to value
whatever standards you want to, and use whatever polling methods you want
to.

In polling, my purpose is finding the CWs (there usually is one).

But you're free to have entirely different goals & purposes. Go for it!

[Replyng farther down] :



> No references to approval or range style thinking needed. The simplest
> example is minmax (seen as a definition of the ideal winner). See comments
> above.
>
> I mean situations where the leading candidate outside the Smith set could
>> lose by one vote to all the Smith set members. Losing only marginally to
>> many candidates could be a better result than losing a lot to fewer
>> candidates.
>>
>
> Sure, that could be argued on ethical grounds. But pairwise defeats are
> what's important if you want to avoid an angry majority who prefer someone
> else to the winner.
>
> And the CWs is important to find, in polls, because it's the best that
> anyone can get (unless they're a good offensive strategist, in an election
> or poll using a method vulnerable to that strategy).
>
>
> Yes, pairwise preferences and CWs are the norm in this discussion. See
> above.
>
> Of course, in an election, when Approval elects the candidate approved,
>> considered satisfactory by the most people, is probably more important than
>> electing the CWs or from the sincere Smith-set.
>>
>>
>> Also pairwise comparisons can sometimes lead to situations where best
>> candidate (based on those pairwise comparisons) is found outside the Smith
>> set. (see the marginal loss example above)
>>
>
> Yes. looking at the strength of pairwise oppositions instead of at
> pairwise defeats. But the pairwise defeats have great importance in regards
> to finding the best that we can get.
>
>
> The simplest is pairwise margins. You could elect the candidate whose
> worst pairwise margin is least bad, and that candidate could be outside of
> the Smith set.
>

You could do whatever you want to. whatever you think is best.

Not everyone would agree with you about the merits of margins. But don't
worry about that. Do it the way that *you* want to.



> Note that I see minmax not only as one of the methods but also as one
> possible definition of ideal winner with sincere votes (for some society
> with some set of needs).
>
> Many voters would vote sincerely since that's what they believe is the
>> right thing to do.
>>
>
> Voting in way that's more likely to elect someone who won't hurt a lot of
> people is hardly unethical.
>
>
> But a society where nobody cheats is highly ethical :-).
>

Offensive strategy isn't cheating. It complies fully with the voting-rules.

All that you've been saying here suggests that you'd be happier with
Approval, Score, or Bucklin.  As I said, they're fine methods.


>
> Burying someone in your strong bottom-set doesn't need good predictive
> information.
>
>
> This sounds like you are talking about a society that has been living too
> long under a two-party rule
>

1. The Democrats & Repugnicans aren't two parties. They're one party with
two right wings.

2. Parties don't rule in a democracy. The public rule, by electing whom
they want to. Of course we don't have democracy. If that's what you meant,
then you're quite right. But still, the Democrats & Repubnicans don't
"rule". They're pseudodemocratic charade-theater. If you want to find out
who rules, then search Google for "Who Rules America, by G. William
Domhoff".

Better idea: Just be glad if you have legitimate democracy.


> , and where things are either black or white,
>

You haven't a clue what you're talking about. I reside here. You don't.

Progressives vs Repubugnocrats? It doesn't get any more stark "black or
white" than that. But you can't be expected to know that.So maybe you
shouldn't be telling me about how it really is  :^)


> and where people hate to give up that way of thinking
>

You're completely unclear regarding what "way of thinking" you're talking
about. The stark difference between progressive candidates, vs
Repugnocratic candidates has nothing to do with "way of thinking". It's
simple plain fact. But, again, you can't be expected to know that.

Maybe you need to not be explaining to me about the country in which I
reside. Does it occur to you that that's more than a little pretentious,
presumptuous & egotistical on your part?



> , and where people therefore will use also more civilised methods like
> ranked methods as if there were only black and white candidates
>

It's ridiculous to say that ranked methods are "more civilized".

As for the candidates here, the Repugnocrats are remarkably consistently
uniform in regards to moral character & honesty. The distinction between
the progressives & the Repugnocrats is remarkably sharp and
...well...distinct.

"...as if..." ?

It really couldn't be any more starkly "black & white" than it is.

>
> Strategy can't do any significant harm if the CWs is in your strong
> bottom-set.
>
>
> True for any method when the sincere winner is in the bottom-set.
>

Quite.

But, as I've said, I doubt that the CWs would be a bottom-set candidate for
the 99%.

As I said, in Internet polls, the CWv is usually someone like Jill or
Bernie, or Nader.

Now, I'd say that we've both said what we have to say on this matter. I say
that, because we've been saying the same things over & over again.


Michael Ossipoff

>
> BR, Juho
>
>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>
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