[EM] MDDA & MDDAsc

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Fri Dec 9 08:46:07 PST 2016


I said this, buried in a long discussion-post, but I'd like to also say it
in a post labeled with this topic:

It seems to me that MDDA & MDDAsc are the methods that best deliver on the
advantages & properties that can be available with rank-balloting.

Those properties include FBC, avoiding chicken-dilemma, and solid
protection of a majority's ranked candidates against their unranked ones.

Their protection of candidates ranked & approved by a majority,  against
other candidates is positive and solid, in contrast to the way burial &
truncation can sometimes succeed in MMPOsc or the way burial could succeed
in IC,MMPO.

There's a tradeoff with those MMPO methods, because, with them, burial and
truncation are deterred as well as foiled, because, though those offensive
strategies can sometimes succeed, they're penalized when they fail.

But that deterrence, too, is a bit iffy, because, if the CWs is in
someone's strong bottom-set, then that person has little or no reason to
not risk burial.  ...and the perpetual burial fiasco ensues, with always a
chance that the burial could succeed..

That's why I say that MDDA's & MDDAsc's protection is more solid and
positive.

Before, I'd felt that compulsory approval of all ranked candidates in MDDA
was necessary in order to thwart burial. Before Forest Simmons pointed out
that that isn't so, that hadn't occurred to me, and I hadn't heard anyone
else say that, or the anti-chicken-dilemma value of _optional_ approval in
MDDA.

But now that it's mentioned, of course a majority's approval-set are
protected just as well in MDDA with optional approval, as they would be in
ordinary Approval.

Whether or not he preferrers of your unapproved candidates approve your
approved ones, the approvals that they get from a majority will make them
beat that majority's unapproved candidates.

It would be nice, but not necessary, to have the added burial-resistance
that compulsory approval would briing, but that compulsory approval would
lose the chicken-dilemma protection that MDDA can have.

Of course MDDA, MMPO, & IC,MMPO are all from Kevin Venzke, but the fact
that MDDA doesn't need compulsory approval of ranked candidates, and the
fact that, without that compulsory approval, MDDA provides a way to avoid
chicken-dilemmma--Those are things that I first heard from Forest Simmons.
...along with the use of symmetrical completion to meet Mono-Add-Plump.

So, not just MDDAsc, but also MDDA with the option to not approve all
ranked candidates, for chicken-dilemma protection, is probably something
that was a new suggestion from Forest.

Michael Ossipoff
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