[EM] Approval Voting and Long-term effects of voting systems

[robert bristow-johnson]

---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------

Subject: Re: [EM] Approval Voting and Long-term effects of voting systems

From: "Daniel LaLiberte" <daniel.laliberte at gmail.com>

Date: Tue, December 6, 2016 1:21 am

To: "Kristofer Munsterhjelm" <km_elmet at t-online.de>

Cc: "EM" <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>

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> On Wed, Nov 30, 2016 at 5:51 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <

> km_elmet at t-online.de> wrote:

>
...
>

> So in this "cheat", the decision making and strategizing still exist among

> the electors, so it is not really any different regarding the kind of

> strategizing that is necessary based on the voting system the electors are

> inclined to use.

 
i think we all agree with Arrow that every system has flaws.
...
> IRV is Borda with instant run-off, correct?
no.
 
>> Approval seems to do the

>> impossible, but on a second look, even it has strategy: it consists of

>> having to decide which particular sincere vote you should submit.

>>

>

> Yes, but I find that the strategy required for Approval is in your face, up

> front and honest about it. Meanwhile, you don't get to strategize about

> which ordering of weightings or preferences might work out better. And for

> many ranking systems, you might not even be aware that there are many

> strategic decisions you ought to make, and maybe many voters default to

> being honest just because it is too complex to be strategic.

>

> With Approval Voting, there is really only one bit of strategy, where to

> draw the line between approval and disapproval, and you have no choice but

> to make that decision.
and with RCV, there is no strategy "in your face".
who is your favorite?  who is your contingent candidate?  who is your third choice?  who are the candidates you would never want elected?  this preference translates directly into
sincere rankings. and that *cannot* be said about Approval or Score voting, by their very nature.
and unless there's a Condorcet cycle, there's really no strategizing if the ranked votes are tabulated according to a Condorcet compliant method.  the election is decided exactly the same as
if the CW was up against any other candidate in a one-on-one race with a simple-majority vote and one-person-one-vote equal weighting on the votes.  it's because IRV didn't deliver on that promise for the Prog-hating GOP (who found out that simply because they ranked their favorite #1 they
*caused* the election of their most hated candidate) that people start considering if strategy would help their political interests.
but with RCV, there is no strategy "in your face" in the voting booth.  only a strategy that confronts you with a bad tabulation method such as
Borda or IRV or Bucklin.
with RCV decided according to a simple rule*** that nobody disagrees with, voters know what to do to express their political interest, and if they can have confidence that the tabulation method won't screw them, there is no esoteric need for strategizing.
 eventually the election will be decided between the two candidates with the broadest support and their preference for one of the two over the other will be treated with the same weight as with the preference of any other voter.  when there is no cycle, they can be confident that they are
treated equally with other voters and that there vote will not be misinterpreted by
***the simple rule that nobody disagrees with is: "If more voters mark their ballots that they prefer Candidate A over Candidate B than voters who mark to the contrary, then Candidate B is not
elected."
the problem with Approval is that it doesn't get enough information from voters.  in a multi-candidate race, there is no way for a single voter to express that they prefer Candidate X over Candidate Y for every {X,Y} pair combinations from the set {A, B, C, D ...}.
 either the voter has to bump up B to be as good as A, in order to make sure that B is preferred over C or the voter has to bump B down to be as bad as C in order to make sure that A is preferred over B.  that's a burden placed on the voter.  
"what to do! what to do! oh me
oh my! oh me oh my! what to do!"
and, despite the loquacity, neither you nor Michael can adequately address that concern.  you cannot simply answer "Should the voter Approve their 2nd choice or not?"  But I *can* simply answer ":How shall the voter rank their 2nd
choice?"  I have a simple answer and you do not have a simple answer for the question put to you.
but, to avoid the burden of strategizing being placed on the voter, you *must* be able to answer that question simply: Should the voter Approve their 2nd choice?  Their 3rd choice?
 Yes or no?
> The complexity comes in deciding among several
> candidates who are close to that dividing line between approval and

> disapproval, and also factor in the chances that some are more likely to

> win than others.
another goofy thing about Burlington Vermont (and surrounds) is that our State Senate district is the largest legislative district, in terms of number of at large seat holders, in the United States.  the Chittenden senate district elects 6 state senators where
everyone, regardless of party, is running against each other.  a party is allowed up to 6 nominees on the ballot.  only the Dems get 6 candidates on the ballot.  voters are allowed up to 6 votes.  in the past, because of one reliable GOP winner, it was like musical chairs for the
6 Dems, because one of them would lose.  relatively few voters voted all 6 allowed votes because there were specific favorites nearly every voter wanted to see elected.  most people voted for one or two.
we have virtually the same as Approval Voting in the 6-winner Chittenden senate
district.  everyone voting for less than 6 is voting tactically and is voting exactly as they would if it were Approval Voting. and some who *are* voting for the maximum are voting tactically.  and it's a burden.  and it's because it's a multiwinner race (6 top vote getters win) that
makes it a big clusterfuck.

--
r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
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