[EM] new simple legal strategy to get IRV

robert bristow-johnson rbj at audioimagination.com
Sat Oct 10 14:36:55 PDT 2015


On 10/9/15 6:43 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> On 10/09/2015 10:08 AM, Clinton Mead wrote:
>> How did the 2009 Burlington Vermont Mayoral "fail"?

this sends me back to 2010 when i first joined this list.  i will try to 
itemize the basic items below.

>>   It was one of the rare cases where it didn't elect the Condorcet winner,

well, it was the second time IRV was used.  perhaps a fluke but one 
might think that the method is problematic with a higher probability 
than "fluke" if it breaks down on the 2nd try.

>>   but
>> unlike plurality, at least it didn't elect the Condorcet loser out of
>> the three strongest candidates. IRV in this case gave a more
>> representative result than would have been the case with plurality.

but it *still* elected a candidate (with a 252 vote margin) when 587 
**more** voters expressed on their ballots that they preferred someone 
else.  that is simply a failure to elect the majority voter preference.

>>   And in almost all cases IRV does this.
> I'd say it didn't go far enough. IRV works like a patch on Plurality
> that lets it discard fringe parties that can't win anyway. But when you
> get multiple large parties, the patch isn't sufficient and weird
> behavior like center squeeze happens.

exactly.   the Vermont Progressive Party was literally founded by Bernie 
Sanders (ever hear of him on the east side of the pond?) even though 
Bernie continued to identify himself as "Independent".  it's funny now 
that he's running against Hillary for the Democratic party nomination.

anyway, the Vermont Progs have at least a dozen people elected to the 
State House and a half-dozen councilors elected to the Burlington city 
council (besides having two Burlington mayors elected since Bernie).

IRV is more likely to fail when we get closer to the ideal (at least my 
ideal) of multiple *viable* parties and of *viable* independent 
candidates.  that's what happened in Burlington in 2009.


> But that's me :-)
>
> Perhaps there's a more strategic explanation for the repeal itself. IRV
> clearly wouldn't have pleased the Plurality supporters; they'd have
> preferred seeing Wright win. And IRV wouldn't have pleased those who
> found its outcome counterintuitive in the other direction; they'd have
> preferred seeing Montroll win.

it's because 587 more voters marked their ballots that they preferred 
Montroll over Kiss than there were voters that preferred the oppoisite.

and Montroll really beat Wright by 930 votes (but Kurt just does not get 
it and still calls Andy a "weak candidate").

>   IRV might have held against either side,
> but it couldn't hold against both at the same time.
>
> I'd like to emphasize that I'm speculating, though. I don't live in
> Burlington; someone who does would probably know the situation better
> than I do.

it is true that many people in Burlington did not understand exactly 
what went wrong in 2009, but they knew something was wrong.


here are my concise reasons for why IRV failed.  first here are the 
reasons we adopted IRV in the first place:


1.If a majority (not just a mere plurality) of voters agree that 
candidate A is better than candidate B, then candidate B should not be 
elected.

2.The relative merit of candidates A and B is not affected by the 
presence of a third candidate C.If a majority (not just a mere 
plurality) of voters agree that candidate A is better than B, whether 
candidate C enters the race or not, indeed whether candidate C is better 
(in the minds of voters) than either candidates A or B (or both or 
neither), it does not reverse the preference of candidate A over 
candidate B.If that relative preference of candidate is not affected 
among voters, then the relative outcome of the election should not be 
affected (candidate B winning over candidate A).In the converse, this 
means that by removing *any*loser from the race and from all ballots, 
that this should not alter who the winner is.

3.Voters should not be called upon to do “strategic voting”.Voters 
should feel free to simply vote their conscience and vote for the 
candidates they like best, without worrying about whom that they think 
is most electable.Voters should be able to vote for the candidate of 
their choosing (e.g. Perot in 1992 or Nader in 2000) without risk of 
contributing to the election of the candidate they *least*prefer 
(perhaps Clinton in 1992 or Bush in 2000).They should not have to 
sacrifice their vote for their ideal choice because they are concerned 
about “wasting” their vote and helping elect the candidate they dislike 
the most.An ancillary concern; a candidate should not have to worry 
about electing his/her most strident opponent by choosing to run against 
another more acceptable opponent.

4.Election policy that decreases convenience for voters will decrease 
voter participation.Having to vote once for your preferred candidate, 
and then being called on to return to the polls at a later date and vote 
again for your preferred candidate (if he/she makes it to the run-off) 
is decidedly less convenient and we must expect that significantly fewer 
voters will show up for the run-off.Electing candidates with decreased 
legitimate voter participation cannot be considered as democratic or as 
indicative of the will of the people, as electing candidates with higher 
voter participation.This is in keeping with the same motivation as 
“Motor Voter” and voter registration efforts; increasing voter 
participation and giving more citizens a stake in who is elected to office.



IRV in Burlington 2009 failed criteria #1, #2, and #3.  because there 
was no runoff, i guess it satisfied criterion #4.

even though this was not listed, IRV in Burlington 2009 failed 
Monotonicity and IRV *never* satisfies "Precinct Summability" which i 
consider important for transparency and election integrity.  as 
elections get larger (like statewide or nationwide), this Precinct 
Summability becomes even more important.

-- 

r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."





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