[EM] Voting Benchmark
Marijn Stollenga
m.stollenga at gmail.com
Thu Oct 1 02:21:53 PDT 2015
Yes, actually my main motivation was the strange properties in Schulze
that I didn't like.
Firstly, the propagation of votes through beaten path sounds
interesting, but it is also pretty strange. By voting a dominance of A
over B, you might end up voting for C if some large other group votes C
over A a lot, even if you don't like C at all. This leads to some
complex tactical voting.
Secondly, the votes only flow if A over B has more votes than B over A
say. On first sight this sounds good but introduces a sensitivity in the
method that can completely flip results with a small change of votes,
also leading to possible loss of votes and tactical voting. Why can't
votes simply flow both directions? In my implementation I tried it and
it still led to dominant results in my experiments, but I guess it's
needed for certain properties?
Any thoughts?
Marijn
On 30/09/15 14:40, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Hi Marijn,
>
> I think you might start with the criteria that motivated Schulze, or
> criteria that differentiate popular methods.
>
> For instance:
> Schulze: clone independence, monotonicity (mono-raise), Condorcet,
> Schwartz
> IRV: clone independence, later-no-harm, later-no-help
> Approval: participation, favorite betrayal (FBC)
>
> Unfortunately it's not necessarily straightforward to demonstrate that
> a new method satisfies or doesn't satisfy some criterion.
>
> Some of us have simulations to attempt to gauge the incentives to use
> specific strategies (e.g. compromise, truncation, burial). But since
> simulations are based on the programmer's assumptions, nothing is
> standardized.
>
> My hunch (based on my own experiments from 10+ years ago) is that if
> Schulze is your original inspiration or standard, and you make your
> own rank method, you may make something that gives similar results to
> Schulze, but most likely it won't satisfy all of Schulze's technical
> criteria.
>
> Kevin
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *De :* Marijn Stollenga <m.stollenga at gmail.com>
> *À :* "election-methods at lists.electorama.com"
> <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
> *Envoyé le :* Mercredi 30 septembre 2015 4h12
> *Objet :* [EM] Voting Benchmark
>
> Hello,
>
> I am implementing a new election method, after initially playing with
> Schulze voting. In the process I really want to compare my method to
> Schulze and other methods according to several types of quality. Is
> there a good benchmark currently, that I can start from?
>
> Marijn
>
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>
>
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