[EM] UK electoral systems "post mortem" discussion on radio
Fred Gohlke
fredgohlke at verizon.net
Wed Jun 24 08:34:40 PDT 2015
Good Morning, Kristofer
re: "Ideally, proportionality *would* be internal. If it
were, we could use single-winner methods to elect a
large group of centrists, and each centrist would be
internally proportional, being rather more like a judge
than an advocate for his position. Each centrist would
be able to consider all sides of an issue, weighing the
different sides as the people would, and then come to a
conclusion."
The designation as centrist is valid as long as we recognize that what
is centric under one set of time and circumstances is not necessarily
what will be centric under a different set of time and circumstances.
I'm not sure that it's necessary to characterize the centrists as
judges, except to the extent we all act in accordance with our own judgment.
As you say, such an arrangement would be ideal. To date, we do not have
a process for seeking such people and raising them to public office.
re: First, there's a matter of skill in itself. Being a
balanced judge-representative requires considerable
ability on part of the representative - moreso the fewer
representatives there are on the council. They'd have to
both be balanced, and to retain that balance in the face
of corruption by power.
Organizing a large number of people in a way that lets them select the
best of their number as their representative(s) requires a progressive
selection that constantly narrows the field. Those who advance are
necessarily those with the greatest ability. Whether or not they are
balanced is a subjective issue; they will reflect the biases of those
who selected them.
The corruption by power is limited by several factors:
1) Electees are individuals, not members of a voting bloc. Their
power is limited to their ability to influence other members
of the body to which they were elected.
2) Corruption takes time and the selection process repeats.
Given the size of the electorate, repeated selection will not
be common.
3) Selection is face-to-face, so there is no need for the immense
amounts of campaign money that corrupts party-based systems.
re: Second, election methods provide their own selection
pressure.
The selection pressure in party-based systems starts long before the
election. Candidates cannot mount a viable campaign without party
sponsorship. They obtain sponsorship by agreeing to support the party.
The party, assured of the loyalty of its candidates, attracts donors
because it can promise that its candidates will support the objectives
of the donors who supply the immense amounts of money the party needs to
sell their candidate to the people. As has always been the case, He Who
Pays The Piper Calls The Tune. Thus, those who supply the money dictate
the laws that burden the people.
re: Plurality selects the largest sufficiently cohesive
group (the representative with a plurality). IRV
usually chooses from the strongest wing (the strongest
individuals of the collectively strongest group by
Plurality metrics); a similar logic holds for DAC and
DSC.
That may be true, but each case assumes a party-based system. When we
learn to organize a community in a way that lets every person in the
community participate in the political process to the full extent of
each individual's desire and ability, regardless of the strength or
inclination of their views, parties can (and should) influence the
process but they will not control it. The "largest sufficiently
cohesive group" will be the people, not a biased subset of the people.
re: I might be wrong, but if I'm not, then external PR
methods will at least ensure some measure of
proportionality ...
I believe you are right. External PR methods do, at least, ensure some
measure of proportionality. The problem is the proportionality is made
up of factions that are necessarily confrontational. There is no
rational attempt to address the issues facing the people. There is no
advocate of the common interest, only multiple advocates of competing
interests.
In this connection, I should note that the political process in Frome is
an extension of this problem. It appears they have formed a new party -
the no-party party - that suffers all the ills of party politics. It is
my hope that the IfF (Independents for Frome) group's democratic ideals
extend to devising a way for every member of the community to
participate in the political process, regardless their of partisan
inclinations.
re: ... getting internal proportionality in the sense I
mentioned above would then require a more nonstandard
system, not just a change of election methods.
and
As an example of a nonstandard system, consider a form
of election by lot ...
Election by lot or sortition suffer because they make no attempt to seek
out and elevate the most competent members of the community. Ability
and integrity are distributed throughout society. We have a duty to
ourselves and our progeny to devise a method, however nonstandard it may
be, that sifts through the entire electorate to seek out those
individuals with the qualities needed to meet contemporary challenges
and raise them to leadership positions.
re: (the confrontational nature of proportionality as an
external quality) "... might be an artifact of the
current systems. Or, rather, even if we want external
proportionality, we can make it a lot less
confrontational with the right methods.
That is probably true, but wouldn't it make more sense to apply our
intellect to curing the disease rather than treating its symptoms?
(I apologize for the delay in preparing and posting this. Private
matters intervened.)
Fred Gohlke
More information about the Election-Methods
mailing list