[EM] (20) APR: Steve's 20th dialogue with Richard Fobes

[Richard Fobes]

On 7/16/2015 4:15 PM, steve bosworth wrote:
 > .... I see this as 'full' both because [APR], unlike VoteFair, allows
 > for no votes to be wasted, and gives each citizen's vote to a names rep
 > who she has directly or indirectly favored. In this sense only, APR
 > offers '100% percent proportionality'. As far as I understand it, your
 > 'VoteFair ranking' will still waste some vote and cannot guarantee that
 > each vote that counts will be added to the weighted vote of the rep each
 > citizen has directly or indirectly favored. Please correct me if I am
 > mistaken about this.

Apparently you don't yet understand VoteFair Ranking.  If a voter does 
not support the winner of the first seat within a district, then that 
voter's influence shifts to help choose the winner of the second seat 
within that district.  If that voter also does not like the winner of 
the second seat, then that voter's first-party preference shifts to 
determine the number of winning candidates from that political party.

As another clarification, if a voter supports a very popular winner of 
the first seat within the district, then some of the "surplus" influence 
from this voter shifts to help choose the winner of the second seat.

In other words VoteFair Ranking does not "waste" any votes.

 > ....  Did you intend 'demographic' only
 > to mean 'geographic'? ....

Oops, yes, I intended to use the word geographic rather than demographic.

 > ...

 > This results from my understanding that your VoteFair proposal
 > for California included both a number of individual voting districts, as
 > well a number of state-wide districts. If so, each individual district
 > could result from some gerrymandering. Am I mistaken?

Yes, you are mistaken.  Regardless of where the boundaries are drawn, 
the results would not change in any significant way (assuming that each 
district has the same number of voters).

 > ... please note that my new Endnote 8 in my article
 > explains that the number of candidates would be somewhat limited
 > in practice both by the rules for selecting candidates which would have
 > been pre-declared by each association, and by the countrywide rule that
 > each must provide and returnable deposit of $10,000 or a sufficiently
 > long list of registered supports.

Thank you for listening to feedback and adjusting your method to prevent 
an excessive number of unpopular candidates.

 > .... APR has the advantage of
 > prompting citizens to observe, study, and rank as few or as many of all
 > the candidates running in the state or nation as they wish.

This "advantage" applies to any good voting method.

 > ...Please remember the different but related pre-selection role that
 > APR's own primary would play.

In a different message you seem to suggest that these primary elections 
would be held privately, instead of being administered by the 
government.  That approach would never be acceptable in U.S. elections. 
  (From what I understand, Canada does have such an approach, and also 
requires money to participate in that nomination process, but that 
unfairness in Canadian elections is well-known.)

I'm pleased that you finally recognize the need for primary elections.

 >  > >R: I'll argue that VoteFair ranking greatly reduces the 
effectiveness of
 >  > > > campaign contributions compared to most other election methods.
 >  > >

 > You have frequently asserted this but I have not yet seen that
 > you have 'argued' for this yet, especially in preference to APR,
 > i.e. how would VoteFair reduce the effectiveness of these contributions
 > more than APR would?

Again I'll refer you to our earlier discussions in this thread, where I 
described vulnerabilities that apply to your APR method.  Those 
vulnerabilities do not apply to VoteFair Ranking -- for the reasons 
explained in my book.

If I had lots of time I would point to the specific messages, but alas 
my time is quite limited.

 >  > In addition, "Ending The Hidden Unfairness In U.S. Elections" explains
 >  > in detail how money is currently used to influence election 
results, and
 >  > your APR method is vulnerable to some of the same tactics, ...

 > Yes, but still no explanation of how APR is more vulnerable than
 > VoteFair in this regard.

What?  My book clearly explains the vulnerabilities, and explains how 
VoteFair ranking is not vulnerable to these weaknesses.  Again, please 
refer to earlier messages in this thread regarding which vulnerabilities 
apply to APR, why they apply, and unfair strategies that can take 
advantage of those vulnerabilities.

 > Only if a voter chooses to use Section B of the APR ballot might
 > it be a little more complex than the VoteFair ballot. ....

I disagree.

Just the fact that a voter must choose between filling out section A or 
section B is a very significant barrier for many voters, and would be 
the source of lots of confusion.

 >  > Why do you regard "remaining arbitrariness in determining its 
electoral
 >  > districts" as a disadvantage? The best defense against gerrymandering
 >  > is to ensure that gerrymandering is not possible.

 > Yes, and APR does make it 'impossible', not VoteFair.

I disagree.  Please refer to my explanation above about how a voter's 
influence shifts in ways that ensure the vote is not "wasted".

 > Please note that APR does not ' impose any limit on the number of
 > candidates' in the general election. This is when each APR citizen is
 > actually determining which individual candidates she favors. This degree
 > of ranking of choice is not offered in the general election of VoteFair.

Yes, VoteFair Ranking excludes political parties that are not popular 
enough to justify offering candidates that have no chance of winning.

 >  >R: [….] If I have missed answering any of your latest questions, 
please note
 >  > that your non-standard way of marking your most recent
 >  > comments/questions is difficult to follow (as someone else has also
 >  > pointed out).

 >  I hope my 'way of marking my most recent comments' now conforms
 > to Kristofer's suggestions.

You are getting closer.  Notice that your most recent content should not 
be preceded by any angle brackets.  Expressed another way, the comments 
with the most angle brackets are the oldest, and the comments without 
any angle brackets are the newest.

Thank you for your continued interest in my opinions.

Richard Fobes


On 7/16/2015 4:15 PM, steve bosworth wrote:
>
> Re: (20) APR: Steve's 20^th dialogue with Richard Fobes
>
>  > Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2015 21:05:23 -0700
>  > From: ElectionMethods at VoteFair.org
>  > To: election-methods at electorama.com
>  > CC: stevebosworth at hotmail.com
>  > Subject: Re: 19) APR: Steve's 19th dialogue with Richard Fobes
>  >
>  > On 6/30/2015 7:39 PM, steve bosworth wrote:
>  > > ...
>  > > >>>S: I accept that your method might mathematically at most provide
>  > > 'nearly full proportionality'. However, APR offers the advantage of
>  > > 'full proportionality'. Do you dispute this?
>  >
>  > R: Yes I dispute this. As I have said before (and I think someone else
>  > made a similar point), your APR method does not achieve full
>  > proportionality. Specifically, with APR, not every voter is represented
>  > by her first choice.
>
>
>
>
>  >>>S: I have never claimed the impossible, i.e. that APR guarantees
> that each voter's 'first choice' candidate will be elected. If this is
> not what I mean by 'full proportionality'. APR only allows each citizen
> to guarantee that her vote will be added to the weighted vote of the
> elected candidate (i.e. the rep) she ranked higher than the others, or
> which her first choice but eliminated candidate ranks higher than the
> others. I see this as 'full' both because it, unlike VoteFair, allows
> for no votes to be wasted, and gives each citizen's vote to a names rep
> who she has directly or indirectly favored. In this sense only, APR
> offers '100% percent proportionality'. As far as I understand it, your
> 'VoteFair ranking' will still waste some vote and cannot guarantee that
> each vote that counts will be added to the weighted vote of the rep each
> citizen has directly or indirectly favored. Please correct me if I am
> mistaken about this.
>  >
>  > >S: ... APR also removes even the,
>  > > small degree of gerrymandering that may continue with regard to the
>  > > establishment, for example, of any of your smaller than 'state wide
>  > > seats' for electing California's Legislative Assembly. Do you agree?
>  >
>  >R: No I do not agree.
>  >
>  > I do agree that your APR method cannot be gerrymandered. But that
>  > advantage occurs at the loss of demographic proportionality.
>
>
>
>
>  >>>S: I understand 'demography' to be focused on populations. APR
> allows each self-identified section of the citizen population to
> guarantee that each citizen (and association) will be mathematically
> represented in the assembly through the weighted vote of her favored rep
> from the association she favors. This also includes all the
> geographically defined associations. Did you intend 'demographic' only
> to mean 'geographic'? What do you think?
>  >
>  > R: I don't understand what you are specifically saying above in the
> part of
>  > your sentence that says:
>  >
>  > > ... for example, of any of your smaller than 'state wide
>  > > seats' for electing California's Legislative Assembly.
>
>
>
>
>  >>>S: This results from my understanding that your VoteFair proposal
> for California included both a number of individual voting districts, as
> well a number of state-wide districts. If so, each individual district
> could result from some gerrymandering. Am I mistaken?
>
>
>
>  >>S: Perhaps you did not notice that Section A of each 'association's'
>  > > ballot would only list the candidates seeking to represent that
>  > association.
>  >
>  >R: If plurality is replaced, lots and lots of citizens will want to jump
>  > into politics to fix what's wrong. I don't see where the initial number
>  > of candidates will be anything but large.
>
>
>
>
>  >>>S: Yes, quite possibly, but surely this would be a good thing, other
> things being equal. Also, please note that my new Endnote 8 in my
> article explains that the number of candidates would be somewhat limited
> in practice both by the rules for selecting candidates which would have
> been pre-declared by each association, and by the countrywide rule that
> each must provide and returnable deposit of $10,000 or a sufficiently
> long list of registered supports.
>
>
>
>  > > R: Remember that debates between dozens of candidates become
>  > impractical.
>  > >
>
>  >R: You seem to say, on the one hand, that APR imposes no limits on the
>  > number of candidates, yet on the other hand you say that comparing those
>  > many candidates will not be a problem.
>  >
>  > How do you envision voters finding the time to compare even more
>  > candidates than currently? Getting specific, the U.S. presidential
>  > election currently has more than 20 candidates. In APR there is only
>  > one chance to rank candidates (because there is nothing like a primary
>  > election), so how do people choose which candidates to focus on learning
>  > more about in order to rank them?
>
>
>
>
>  > > >>>S: Again, as with every electoral system, candidates will debate
> with
>  > > whichever other candidates they choose. APR has the advantage of
>  > > prompting citizens to observe, study, and rank as few or as many of all
>  > > the candidates running in the state or nation as they wish.
>
>
>
>  >>>S: Please remember the different but related pre-selection role that
> APR's own primary would play.
>
>
>  >
>  > >R: I'll argue that VoteFair ranking greatly reduces the effectiveness of
>  > > > campaign contributions compared to most other election methods.
>  > >
>  > > >>>S: You have frequently asserted this but I have not yet seen that
>  > > you have 'argued' for this yet, especially in preference to APR,
> i.e. how would VoteFair reduce the effectiveness of these contributions
> more than APR would?
>  >
>  > What? In multiple messages I have described multiple ways in which APR
>  > is vulnerable to manipulation through the use of money.
>  >
>  > In addition, "Ending The Hidden Unfairness In U.S. Elections" explains
>  > in detail how money is currently used to influence election results, and
>  > your APR method is vulnerable to some of the same tactics, ...
>
>
>
>
>  >>>S: Yes, but still no explanation of how APR is more vulnerable than
> VoteFair in this regard.
>
>
>
>
>
>  >>R: ... plus APR is vulnerable to new tactics that I have previously
> explained in earlier
>  > messages to you.
>
>
>
>
> S: I still have not seen these extra vulnerabilities.
>  >
>  > > >>>S: Equally, I do not yet see that you have addressed my following
>  > claims in our 18^th dialogue:
>  >
>  > Aside from these important relative weaknesses of VoteFair when
>  > compared to APR for electing an assembly, I see VoteFair's greater
>  > mathematical complexity, its remaining arbitrariness in determining
> its electoral
>  > districts, and its still wasting some votes (for example by its
> offering a more limited choice of candidates for electors) as seeming to
> make it less likely (and less worthy than APR) to replace the existing
> system in California. More Californians would understand APR.
>  >
>  >>R: Repeating myself, yes more voters/citizens would understand APR's
>  > counting method.
>  >
>  > Yet from a voter's perspective, marking ballots would be much simpler
>  > using VoteFair ranking. Only the calculations done on a computer are
>  > "complex" in terms of VoteFair ranking not being simple to understand.
>  >
>  > In contrast, figuring out how to mark an APR ballot is complex.
>
>
>
>
>  >>>S: Only if a voter chooses to use Section B of the APR ballot might
> it be a little more complex than the VoteFair ballot. At the same time,
> Section B has the advantage of allowing a citizen also to rank any
> number of candidates seeking to represent any other associations in the
> country.
>
>
>
>  >R: APR's counting method [...] is simpler.
>  >
>  > Why do you regard "remaining arbitrariness in determining its electoral
>  > districts" as a disadvantage? The best defense against gerrymandering
>  > is to ensure that gerrymandering is not possible.
>
>
>
>
>  >>>S: Yes, and APR does make it 'impossible', not VoteFair.
>  >
>  >> R: As for "[limiting the] choice of candidates for electors," the
> [VoteFaier]
>  > voters/electors are the ones who do that limiting in the primary
>  > election. (In the primary election, VoteFair ranking does not need to
>  > impose any limit on the number of candidates.)
>
>
>
>
>  >>>S: Please note that APR does not ' impose any limit on the number of
> candidates' in the general election. This is when each APR citizen is
> actually determining which individual candidates she favors. This degree
> of ranking of choice is not offered in the general election of VoteFair.
>  >
>  >R: [….] If I have missed answering any of your latest questions,
> please note
>  > that your non-standard way of marking your most recent
>  > comments/questions is difficult to follow (as someone else has also
>  > pointed out).
>  >
>  >>>S: I hope my 'way of marking my most recent comments' now conforms
> to Kristofer's suggestions.
>
>
>
>
>  >>R: As you may have noticed, I haven't had lots of time lately. (I'm
>  > writing this in haste.) Yet if you do have specific questions, and they
>  > are not repeats of questions I've already answered, please do ask.
>  >
>  > Thank you for taking the time to better understand election-method
>  > complexities.
>  >
>  > Richard Fobes
>
>
>  > >>S: What do you think?
>
>
> I look forward to your replies.
>
>
>
>
> Steve