[EM] 19) APR: Steve's 19th dialogue with Richard Fobes

[Richard Fobes]

On 6/30/2015 7:39 PM, steve bosworth wrote:
 > ...
 >  >>>S: I accept that your method might mathematically at most provide
 > 'nearly full proportionality'. However, APR offers the advantage of
 > 'full proportionality'. Do you dispute this?

Yes I dispute this.  As I have said before (and I think someone else 
made a similar point), your APR method does not achieve full 
proportionality.  Specifically, with APR, not every voter is represented 
by hisher first choice.

No method can achieve 100% percent proportionality.  If you want to say 
that APR gets as close as is easily possible, then I'll agree with that 
on the condition that you also acknowledge that VoteFair ranking also 
can (if desired) achieve that same high level of proportionality.

 > ... APR also removes even the
 > small degree of gerrymandering that may continue with regard to the
 > establishment, for example, of any of your smaller than 'state wide
 > seats' for electing California's Legislative Assembly. Do you agree?

No I do not agree.

I do agree that your APR method cannot be gerrymandered.  But that 
advantage occurs at the loss of demographic proportionality.

I don't understand what you are specifically saying above in the part of 
your sentence that says:

 > ... for example, of any of your smaller than 'state wide
 > seats' for electing California's Legislative Assembly.

Regarding:

 >  >>>S: Perhaps you did not notice that Section A of each 'association's'
 > ballot would only list the candidates seeking to represent that 
association.

If plurality is replaced, lots and lots of citizens will want to jump 
into politics to fix what's wrong.  I don't see where the initial number 
of candidates will be anything but large.

 >  > R: Remember that debates between dozens of candidates become 
impractical.
 >
 >  >>>S: As with every electoral system, candidates will debate with
 > whichever other candidates they choose. APR has the advantage of
 > prompting citizens to observe, study, and rank as few or as many of all
 > the candidates running in the state or nation as they wish.

You seem to say, on the one hand, that APR imposes no limits on the 
number of candidates, yet on the other hand you say that comparing those 
many candidates will not be a problem.

How do you envision voters finding the time to compare even more 
candidates than currently?  Getting specific, the U.S. presidential 
election currently has more than 20 candidates.  In APR there is only 
one chance to rank candidates (because there is nothing like a primary 
election), so how do people choose which candidates to focus on learning 
more about in order to rank them?

 >  > I'll argue that VoteFair ranking greatly reduces the effectiveness of
 >  > campaign contributions compared to most other election methods.
 >
 >  >>>S: You have frequently asserted this but I have not yet seen that
 > you have 'argued' for this yet, especially in preference to APR.

What?  In multiple messages I have described multiple ways in which APR 
is vulnerable to manipulation through the use of money.

In addition, "Ending The Hidden Unfairness In U.S. Elections" explains 
in detail how money is currently used to influence election results, and 
your APR method is vulnerable to some of the same tactics, plus APR is 
vulnerable to new tactics that I have previously explained in earlier 
messages to you.

 >  >>>S: Equally, I do not yet see that you have addressed my following
 > claims in our 18^th dialogue:
 >
 >  >> Aside from these important relative weaknesses of VoteFair when 
compared
 >  > > to APR for electing an assembly, I see VoteFair's greater 
mathematical
 >  > > complexity, its remaining arbitrariness in determining its electoral
 >  > > districts, and its still wasting some votes (for example by its
 > offering
 >  > > a more limited choice of candidates for electors) as seeming to 
make it
 >  > > less likely (and less worthy than APR) to replace the existing
 > system in
 >  > > California. More Californians would understand APR.

Repeating myself, yes more voters/citizens would understand APR's 
counting method.

Yet from a voter's perspective, marking ballots would be much simpler 
using VoteFair ranking.  Only the calculations done on a computer are 
"complex" in terms of VoteFair ranking not being simple to understand.

In contrast, figuring out how to mark an APR ballot is complex.  It is 
APR's counting method that is simpler.

Why do you regard "remaining arbitrariness in determining its electoral 
districts" as a disadvantage?  The best defense against gerrymandering 
is to ensure that gerrymandering is not possible.

As for "[limiting the] choice of candidates for electors," the 
voters/electors are the ones who do that limiting in the primary 
election.  (In the primary election, VoteFair ranking does not need to 
impose any limit on the number of candidates.)

As for worthiness for use in California, you are the person who is 
promoting APR for use there.  VoteFair ranking would be a better choice. 
  Yet the reality is that election reform in California is a very long 
way into the future.

If I have missed answering any of your latest questions, please note 
that your non-standard way of marking your most recent 
comments/questions is difficult to follow (as someone else has also 
pointed out).

As you may have noticed, I haven't had lots of time lately.  (I'm 
writing this in haste.)  Yet if you do have specific questions, and they 
are not repeats of questions I've already answered, please do ask.

Thank you for taking the time to better understand election-method 
complexities.

Richard Fobes


On 6/30/2015 7:39 PM, steve bosworth wrote:
>
> (19) APR: Steve's 19th dialogue with Richard Fobes
>
>  > Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2015 15:21:19 -0700
>  > From: ElectionMethods at VoteFair.org
>  > To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
>  > CC: stevebosworth at hotmail.com
>  > Subject: Re: (18) APR: Steve's 18th dialogue with Richard Fobes
>  >
>  > On 6/15/2015 1:56 PM, steve bosworth wrote:
>
>
>  > > Yes, as a result of reading your book ("Ending The Hidden
> Unfairness…”),
>  > > I think I do understand how both VoteFair popularity and representation
>  > > rankings could work. [...]
>  > > However, I still see it as offering less proportionality and
>  > > representativeness than APR for electing a legislative assembly. In
>  > > fact, you seem to acknowledge this APR advantage below:
>  > >
>  > > You explicitly say that you do not “dispute” the fact that “these
>  > > VoteFair-based linkages between a specific ballot and a specific
>  > >representative are not as obvious as … in your APR method”.
>  > >
>  > > “I do not dispute your claim that your APR method has the advantage
> that
>  > > a voter can directly associate their vote with a particular elected
>  > > representative's voting influence. …
>  >
>  > R: My comments about your APR method being relatively easy to use, and
>  > relatively easy to understand, have nothing to do with degree of
>  > proportionality.
>  >
>  > You don't mention VoteFair partial proportional ranking, so please read
>  > or reread, the chapter titled "It's Party Time!" (in my book "Ending the
>  > Hidden Unfairness in U.S. Elections"). And note that this method can
>  > implement nearly full proportional ranking simply by increasing the
>  > number of "statewide seats."
>
>
>  >>>S: I accept that your method might mathematically at most provide
> 'nearly full proportionality'. However, APR offers the advantage of
> 'full proportionality'. Do you dispute this? APR also removes even the
> small degree of gerrymandering that may continue with regard to the
> establishment, for example, of any of your smaller than 'state wide
> seats' for electing California's Legislative Assembly. Do you agree?
>  >
>  > > ... I see VoteFair's ... remaining arbitrariness in determining its
>  > electoral districts ...
>  >
>  > R: The best election methods cannot be gerrymandered, which means that
>  > district boundaries can be adjusted in nearly any way
>
>
>  >>>S: This is one of the reasons I see APR as offering the 'best
> method'. It removes all the anti-democratic influence of gerrymandered
> boundaries, as well as any districts that have produced safe-seats by
> chance.
>
>  > [….]
>  > >S: ... still wasting some votes (for example by its offering
>  > > a more limited choice of candidates for electors)
>  >
>  > R: This is the flip side of your method's disadvantage that a ballot
> would
>  > list too many candidates.
>
>
>  >>>S: Perhaps you did not notice that Section A of each 'association's'
> ballot would only list the candidates seeking to represent that association.
>
>
>  > R: Remember that debates between dozens of candidates become impractical.
>
>
>  >>>S: As with every electoral system, candidates will debate with
> whichever other candidates they choose. APR has the advantage of
> prompting citizens to observe, study, and rank as few or as many of all
> the candidates running in the state or nation as they wish.
>  >
>  > > S: However, against this APR advantage you again claim that it is more
>  > > vulnerable to money corruption. Several times before you have suggested
>  > > that APR would be more vulnerable in this regard but I still have not
>  > > seen your exact reasons for believing this. Please try again to specify
>  > > the nature of the extra vulnerability you see APR having in this
> regard.
>  >
>  > R: Once again you claim that you do not understand how your APR
> method is
>  > vulnerable to strategies that involve money. Rather than repeating the
>  > reasons I've already explained, I'll explain yet another reason for its
>  > vulnerability.
>  >
>  > You seem to be assuming that an interest group can shift from [being] a
>  > nonpolitical organization to a political organization without
>  > corruption. The reality is that the moment an organization gains
>  > significant influence in politics, (outside) money is used to pay
>  > (inside) individuals to shift their opinions in ways that the financial
>  > contributors desire.
>  >
>  > As a simple example in the United States, the organization named the
>  > Sierra Club became so popular that it begin to have an influence on
>  > politics. As a result, money was used to entice top leaders to support
>  > positions that were not consistent with environmental protection, which
>  > was a core priority for most Sierra Club members.
>  >
>  > I suspect that Green parties in Europe have experienced something
>  > similar, namely a shift in priorities as a result of monetary influence.
>  >
>  > The point is that an organization that was previously trusted becomes at
>  > least partially corrupt when enough money is supplied to influence key
>  > members in the organization. Note that money will be supplied in
>  > proportion to the organization's influence on politics -- or more
>  > specifically in proportion to the effectiveness of those contributions.
>
>
>  > I'll argue that VoteFair ranking greatly reduces the effectiveness of
>  > campaign contributions compared to most other election methods.
>
>
>  >>>S: You have frequently asserted this but I have not yet seen that
> you have 'argued' for this yet, especially in preference to APR. Of
> course, I believe that every system (including APR) is somewhat
> vulnerable to the corruptions you mention. But you seem not yet to have
> explained why you think APR in more vulnerable than is your VoteFair
> ranking proposal. In this connection, neither have you as yet also
> explained why you doubt the validity of my explanation of how APR should
> be less vulnerable for the reasons given at the end of my contribution
> to 18^th dialogue, the contribution that ended with the following paragraph:
>
>  > > APR’s primary elections and associations should also help to reduce the
>  > > sometimes anti-democratic power of great wealth, celebrity, and the
> mass
>  > > media. I see this as likely given the extent to which APR’s
>  > > ‘associations’ would emerge from previously existing voluntary
>  > > organizations in society. These associations could benefit from the
>  > > loyalties among the population such organizations had enjoyed prior to
>  > > them being recognized as 'associations'. Presumably, many of these
>  > > organizations would already have some communication and mobilization
>  > > resources that are entirely independent of celebrity, the richest
>  > > sections of society, and the mass media. Thus, the adoption of APR
> would
>  > > probably help to reduce the relative power of these sometimes
>  > > anti-democratic forces in determining how people and their
>  > > representatives vote. APR’s official political recognition of these
>  > > voluntary organizations would seem to assist many citizens more firmly,
>  > > securely, and independently to see that their own abiding interests are
>  > > best promoted and protected through the associational and
>  > > representational connections validated by APR.
>
>  >>>S: Equally, I do not yet see that you have addressed my following
> claims in our 18^th dialogue:
>
>  >> Aside from these important relative weaknesses of VoteFair when compared
>  > > to APR for electing an assembly, I see VoteFair's greater mathematical
>  > > complexity, its remaining arbitrariness in determining its electoral
>  > > districts, and its still wasting some votes (for example by its
> offering
>  > > a more limited choice of candidates for electors) as seeming to make it
>  > > less likely (and less worthy than APR) to replace the existing
> system in
>  > > California. More Californians would understand APR.
>  > >
>  >
>  > R: I think these are the main answers to your latest questions.
>  >
>  > If you should want further details about how (the full system of)
>  > VoteFair ranking achieves proportional results, please ask.
>  >
>  > I continue to appreciate your progress in better understanding
>  > election-method complexities.
>  >
>  > Richard
>