[EM] (23) APR: Steve's 23rd dialogue with Richard Fobes

[steve bosworth]

[EM]
(23) APR: Steve's 23rd  dialogue with Richard Fobes

 

>
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 2015 09:54:43 -0800

> From: VoteFair <ElectionMethods at VoteFair.org>

> To: "election-methods at lists.electorama.com"

> <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>

> Cc: steve bosworth <stevebosworth at hotmail.com>

> Subject: Re: [EM] (22) APR: Steve's 22th dialogue with Richard Fobes

> Message-ID: <5650AFE3.9090503 at VoteFair.org>

> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1254; format=flowed

>  

R:> Steve, you don't seem to be carefully reading what I write. As an 

> example, I wrote:

> 

> > R: > VoteFair ranking is intentionally designed to limit the
number of

> >> political parties who actually get their candidates elected. But
it

> >> does this in a way that lists a greater number of minor political

> >> parties on the ballot.

>


> Your reply was:

> 

> > S: Limiting the number of political parties arbitrarily is not a
virtue

> > when this prevents some citizens from being represented most

> > faithfully. APR only limits the number of ?associations? (e.g 

> parties) to the number that have received sufficient support during APR?s
primary

> > election.

> 

> VoteFair ranking does not "arbitrarily" limit the number of
parties.

> 

> Please re-read the chapter titled "It's Party Time!: Voting For
Parties 

> And Keeping Ballots Short" (in "Ending The Hidden Unfairness In
U.S. 

> Elections"). It explains how VoteFair party ranking carefully(!) 

> identifies which political parties deserve to have candidates on the 

> ballot. (And it explains how the method prevents large parties from 

> having "shadow" parties whose purpose would be to reduce the
number of 

> candidates from small parties.)



S:  Yes, I do accept that your VoteFair ranking
is “intentionally designed to limit the number of political parties [….] in a
way that lists a greater number of minor political parties on the ballot” than
the existing system.  Also, it was an
exaggeration for me to call this design “arbitrary” since you do outline the
method by which this “limit” is to be determined.  

 

However,
my criticism remains that, in contrast to APR, it limits both the number of
parties on the ballot, and the degree to which each of these parties will be represented
in the assembly more than is necessary. 
Remember that you seem quite happy with your system not allowing any
representation to one of your parties that had received support from 10% of the
electorate in the electoral district.

 

This
contrasts with APR, which in theory, would allow citizens in its primary to
require candidates to run to represent up to 435 parties (“associations”) to
appear on the country wide USA general election ballots for congresspersons.  Also, any such party whose candidates
collectively received 10% of citizens’ votes in the country would command 10%
of the weighted votes in the House of Representatives.  Also, on average, each elected APR
congressperson would have received between 0.2% and 0.3% of the votes from the
American electorate.

 

Thus,
in contrast to APR, VoteFair needlessly wastes some votes both qualitatively
and quantitatively.

 

R:> Steve, another pattern in your messages is that you repeatedly claim 

> advantages for your APR method as if they apply to a comparison with 

> VoteFair ranking, even though they are really just advantages over 

> current voting methods. (By current methods I mean the ones commonly 

> used in the U.S. and Europe.)

> 

> Specifically, your following claims for APR also apply to VoteFair 

> ranking (if the word "association" is replaced by
"party")

[….]

>


R: > All of these claimed advantages also apply to VoteFair ranking.

> 

> Yes, these claims are valid advantages for your APR method compared to 

> existing voting methods. But you have been stating that you want to 

> compare your APR method to VoteFair ranking, so please do not imply that 

> these advantages are relevant in comparing your APR method with VoteFair 

> ranking.



S:  Yes, I do accept that the advantages of APR
repeated below also apply to VoteFair, but only to a smaller degree.  This follows both from the above fact that
you say VoteFair,

1)     
would allow some parties who have
received even 10% support from the electorate not to be representation in the
assembly, and 

2)     
VoteFair is designed to allow fewer
parties (associations) and fewer candidates than APR allows, from which each
citizen can select the one who seems most accurately to represent her own hopes
and fears:

>


R:> > S: .... a foundation for the growth of this qualitative

> > advantage would have been provided earlier by the way [the method] 

> recruits its

> > candidates.

> 

> > .... [the] primary election discovers the ... organizations in

> > the country that are Smost trusted by its citizens.

> 

> > ... should

> > stimulate more attractive candidates ...

> 

> > ... [the] election of the

> > most favored of these better candidates would seem also to combine to

> > raise the average quality of representation in the assembly ....

> 

> > ... closer bonds between citizens and their

> > representatives ...

> 

> > ... It asks citizens to start to

> > familiarize themselves with the existing members, officials, and
other

> > potential candidates of their preferred organizations months before
each

> > voter has to finalize her ranking of candidates during the general

> > election.

> 

> > ... [time] would allow each association, its candidates and

> > its registered voters to coordinate their thinking and planning about

> > how best to run their common campaign in the coming general election.

> 

> > ... This closer bond between each rep and his electorate would also 

> seem to

> > make each congressperson’s work in the assembly more focused and
known

> > to be backed by his association and his electors.

> 

> > ... more likely to produce, on average, a

> > closer ideological fit between each citizen and her congressperson
...

> 

> > ... more likely to help solve the real problems facing the

> > country. They are more likely to do this because of the greater

> > expectation on the part of their different electorates that progress

> > must actually be made with respect to the goals of each of the

> > ideological different electorates who elected them.

> 

> > .... this ideological bond between each citizen

> > and her rep would seem more likely to provide the kind of

> > congresspersons to engage in the kind of productive debates and

> > negotiations in the House to [...] help solve the

> > real problems facing the country.

> 

> > ... Consequently, an assembly composed of such able,

> > different, well informed, clashing, and focused reps would seem to

> > provide an optimal debating and negotiating chamber for the
production

> > of creative and evidence based solutions to common problems. The
wisdom

> > of any decisions resulting from this deliberative process is also likely

> > to be aided by the simple fact that it would take place in an
assembly

> > whose composition most accurately reflects the real variety and

> > intensity of the concerns of all citizens.

> 

> > ... [an elected representative] would seem to be both more able and 

> more likely to

> > negotiate solutions to common problems together with fellow but

> > ideologically different congresspersons. This is because each 

> [representative]

> > would probably enjoy more trust from his electorate.

[….] 

R:> Now let's look at some other advantages you claim for APR.

> 

> Your latest message (copied below) also claims some advantages that I 

> did not include above. That's because they involve your words
"largely 

> homogeneous electorate" and "coalition," which suggest a
possible 

> misunderstanding.

> 

> >S:  Because an APR
congressperson would be more clearly expected to work and

> > vote to promote the scale of values he shares with his largely

> > homogeneous electorate, ....

> 

R: > A "largely homogeneous electorate" is exactly the opposite of
the 

> concept that politics is multi-dimensional. I explained this concept in 

> my last message, but I don't think you fully understand what I'm 

> writing, so, let's consider an example.

> 

> Expanding on the California example from last time, consider a female 

> latina voter who votes for a female latina representative even though 

> that representative has the opposite preference for whether to build a 

> wall between California and Mexico. In your APR claims you imply that 

> this won't happen. I do not make such a claim about VoteFair ranking.

 

S:
No, I only say that it is less likely to happen with APR because it provides
her with more candidates from which to choose, i.e. to find the ones that more
completely possess the appropriate combination of all the “multi-dimensional”
concerns she cares about.  In any case,
each citizen must have the freedom to these judgments for themselves.

> 

R:> You said you agree that politics in the U.S. and Europe is 

> multi-dimensional. So how can you claim that a representative who is 

> elected using your APR method can possibly fully -- in all dimensions -- 

> represent the tens of thousands of voters who elected that representative?

> 

S:
I do not claim that APR guarantees that all the dimensions cared about by each
citizen will be “fully” represented by the congressperson to whom her vote is
added.  I only see APR as structurally
making it more likely both that, on average, each will be represented in this
way as closely as possible, and that more of the competing value systems (each
containing many dimensions and held by the whole electorate) will be
proportionately represented in the assembly.



R:> Now let's consider your use of the words "coalition" and
"working majority."

> 

R:> >S: The extra ability with which APR reps would seem to be able to
negotiate

> > compromises, would also seem to make it more likely that APR

> > congresspersons would respond to the imperative to form a working

> > majority in the assembly. Without such a majority coalition, any wise

> > legislative solutions to problems that such rational deliberations
might

> > have discovered could not be passed into law. Each APR rep is more 

> likely to see that if he is not a part of the majority that will shape the

> > assembly’s binding decisions, his own agenda, and that of his

> > electorate, will not be advanced.

> 

R:> The basis of this forum is to focus on claims that are backed up by 

> mathematics, so let's get mathematical.

 

S:  I assume this forum also wants to consider
any claims supported by non-mathematical “reasoning”.

> 

R: > A coalition or working majority usually constitutes 51 percent to about


> 65 percent, and that coalition can pass laws without compromising with 

> the other 49 percent to 35 percent of the representatives.

 

S:
At the same time, any legislation is likely to have resulted from many compromises
that were made between the members who formed the relevant legislating
majority.

> 

R:> Yet you say about APR:

> 

> >S: ... [the elected representative] would seem to be both more able
and 

> likely to

> > negotiate solutions to common problems together with fellow but

> > ideologically different congresspersons.

> 

R:> If your APR method were used in California, the
"conservatives" and 

> "liberals" would compete, and whichever side has the majority of
elected 

> representatives would pass laws without regard for the other side. That 

> is not true negotiation.

 

S:
This is a possible result for a majority elected by any method, including
VoteFair.  However, since APR allows more
accurate multi-dimensional representation to take place, this may, in effect,
remove the dominance of the simplistic categories of “conservatives” vs.
“liberals”.

> 

R: > In order to get true negotiation between the majority and the minority 

> (of legislators), the legislature would have to adopt fairer voting 

> methods within the legislature.

> 

> My interactive website at www.NegotiationTool.com demonstrates how that 



S:
Thank you for directing me to this tool much earlier during our discussion.
After studying it, my response was to agree with you that that tool would help
any assembly to arrive at decisions that would be most agreeable to the
assembly, including an APR assembly.  Still,
I see that any specific legislation that might be tentatively proposed as a
result of using this too, should need finally to be confirmed only by a straight
forward majority of the APR assembly’s “weighted votes”.  This would be needed to make it clear to all which
reps are responsible for the new law 

 

However,
the usefulness of this tool is irrelevant to the question of whether a VoteFair
assembly or an APR assembly would be more representative of a country’s
citizens.  I believe that the above
arguments have already shown that APR is more like to produce the most
representative assembly.

> 

R:> Electing representative who better represent the voters is only the 

> first step toward the kind of problem-solving, compromise-seeking 

> negotiations that voters want. Using better voting methods within a 

> legislature is the next step.

 

S:
I agree.

> 

R:> Your APR method involves the first step of improving -- over current 

> methods -- the election process. However, your APR method would not 

> necessarily lead to the problem-solving, compromise-seeking negotiations 

> that you idealize.

 

S:
I did not claim that APR would “necessarily lead to the problem-solving, etc.”,
only that its more exact representativeness would make such “problem-solving”
more likely.

> 

R:> Yes, getting better elected officials -- who represent the voters 

> instead of the biggest campaign contributors -- would improve 

> negotiations within a legislature, but VoteFair ranking would also 

> provide the same benefit.

 

S:
No, given that VoteFair wastes some votes and its representativeness is less
exact than APR’s, it is less likely to provide this “benefit” as fully.

> 

R:> Remember that in your APR method it is easy for only 51 percent of the 

> voters to be represented when a law is passed. That easily leads to 

> oppression of the minority of voters -- namely the
"associations" that 

> comprise the other 49 percent.

 

S:
Currently, I assume that we agree, 

1)     
that by “oppression” we mean any state
action that violates the “human rights” of any members of its population;

2)     
that, unless it is specially defined, a
“majority” is anything over 50%;

3)     
that the very concept of a
representative “democracy” expects a majority of citizens indirectly (i.e.
through its elected reps) to rule the whole population against the will of the
minority when this is judged to be necessary by that majority; and

4)     
that both VoteFair and APR are attempts
better to serve “democracy” by electing more representative members of the
assembly.  

In
this context, it is worth noting that one obligation imposed upon by a
universal respect for “human rights” is for us to give each person equal
consideration.  I see this moral
obligation as specifically requiring that each adult’s vote be treated
equally.  If so, no citizen’s vote should
needlessly be given more weight than another, e.g. none should be wasted as
VoteFair wasted the above 10%.

 

Also,
I accept that a “majority” in states that call themselves democracies may still
sometimes “oppress” sections of their populations.  This possibility would not be necessarily
excluded even if their assemblies were elected by APR or VoteFair.  In any case, I see no reason to assume such
oppression always is “easy”. Still, a ruling minority is even more likely to
“oppress” larger sections of its population. 
This is why, other things being equal, we prefer “democracy”.

 

At
the same time, I see an APR majority as less likely than a VoteFair majority to
oppress sections of its population.  This
is because an APR majority is structurally more likely to be composed of
congresspersons both who represent a unity of a greater number of dimensions
and who are supported by a larger percent of its population. In contrast to
APR, VoteFair both wastes some votes and elects each rep with a scale of values,
which on average, will be less clearly aligned with the hopes and fears of his
or her electorate. 

> 

R: > The moment you refer to one elected politician as representing tens of 

> thousands of citizens, you are overlooking that the similarity of those 

> citizens ?- as measured as members of one of your associations -? have 

> to be one-dimensional.

 

S:  Please explain the thinking process by which
you have arrived at this conclusion.  As
yet, I see no reason to expect that the worldviews of individual APR reps of
“associations” would probably be any less multi-dimensional, on average, than
those elected by VoteFair.  In fact, it
seems to me that APR structurally makes it more likely that the range of
concerns that would be included in any majority formed by APR reps rather than
VoteFair by reps would be wider and more accurately reflect the range and
intensity of concerns held by the whole electorate.  Again remember that the perspectives present
in the votes that VoteFair would waste would be represented in the assembly
only by chance, if at all.

>[….]

>


R:> This topic leads to the issue of
understanding the difference between 

> "proportional" and "representative."

> 

> The concept of proportionality is one-dimensional, and is based on some 

> kind of measurement. And that measurement is just a single number. 

> Remember that single numbers are what your APR method uses.

 

S:
Yes, the weighted vote that each APR representative would have in the assembly
would be single number.  This single
number tells us exactly how many citizens support that congressperson’s
combination and hierarchy of dimensions (concerns) more than those held by any
one of the other 434 reps.  Thus, each
single number is a comparative measure of the degree to which citizens
currently support each of the competing multi-dimensional agendas currently
being offered by the members of the assembly.

 

I
accept that these “dimensions” will probably include many issues and question
including those related to the following ones you mentioned, e.g. “political
party affiliation, … females versus males, … religious affiliation, … financial
net worth, … or "association" ...

> […]



R:> Getting back to the general topic of VoteFair versus APR, you wrote:

> 

> > S:I hope the following last addition to this post will help to
explain

> > why I see APR as most likely to help elect a legislative assembly 

> that would

> > 1) be less corrupted by private money;

> >

> > 2) be composed of reps who could be more easily held to account by
their respective electorates,

> >

> > 3) be composed of reps more skilled at explaining the merits of their
own

> > agendas to their fellow reps, and more determined to form the
alliances

> > and to make the compromises necessary so as to be an essential part
of a

> > majority that can legislate at least part of their own respective

> > agendas; and thus

> >

> > 4) an assembly that would be more likely to make rational and
evidence

> > based laws.

> 

> VoteFair ranking would also produce these same advantages.

 

S:
Yes, but I think to a lesser extent for the reason given above.

> 

> > S: I assume we agree that when a citizen sees a member of the

> > assembly as speaking and acting in the ways entirely approved by that

> > citizen, then we would say that that member represents that citizen
as

> > completely as possible. As you know, APR allows each citizen to

> > guarantee this by adding her vote to the ?weighted vote? of the
member

> > she most trusts to speak and act in this way. VoteFair does not do
this

> > as efficiently.

> 

R:> I disagree.

> 

> You have worded the above paragraph in a convoluted way, so I have to 

> clarify:

> 

> * I do agree that "when a citizen sees a member of the [legislature]
as 

> speaking and acting in the ways entirely approved by that citizen, then 

> we would say that that member represents that citizen as completely as 

> possible."

> 

> * My statement "I disagree" regards the word "this" in
"VoteFair does 

> not do this as efficiently" as referring to the first sentence about 

> representation.

 

S:
Do you still believe that VoteFair does this as “efficiently” in the light of
my contributions to this post?  If so,
please explain why.

> 

R:> * I am not commenting on your second sentence, which refers to an 

> APR-specific feature. This feature is a characteristic of the APR 

> method, but it does not imply full representation.

 

S:  Again, I am not claiming that APR guarantees
“full” representation.  I have only
argued that it seems to provide more complete, proportional, and exact
representation than any other system of which I am aware (including VoteFair
for multi-winner elections).

> 

R:> To be clear, you have not yet provided evidence, either mathematical or 

> otherwise, that supports your claim that your APR method would produce 

> better representation than what VoteFair ranking would produce.

 

S:  In that case,

1)     
how do you guarantee that the citizens
whose votes are wasted by VoteFair will be represented at all in the assembly?  

2)     
Given that APR allows each citizen to
give their vote to the congressperson of the 435 she judges will best reflect
her own hopes and concerns, how can you maintain that a VoteFair voter, on
average, will have an equally exact quality of representation when she only has
the opportunity of ranking a relatively small number of local candidates?  



R:> Please continue to ask questions because I'm assuming that our 

> discussion is helping readers of this forum better understand subtle yet 

> important aspects of voting.

S:  Thank you for your responses and I
look forward to the continuation of our dialogue. 



> Richard Fobes



Steve
Bosworth

 

 		 	   		  
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