[EM] Approval ballots. Two to elect. Best method? (Andy Jennings)

[Forest Simmons]

How about thie following ideas?

Elect the pair that covers the most voters (i.e. that leaves the fewest
voters with nobody that they approved elected).  In case of ties, among
tied pairs elect the one whose weaker member has the most approval.

Or this variant:  If no pair covers more than 70 percent of the voters,
elect the pair that covers the greatest number of voters.  Otherwise
consider all pairs that cover at least 70 percent of the voters to be
tied.  Then among tied pairs, elect the one whose weaker member has the
greatest approval.


From: Andy Jennings <elections at jenningsstory.com>
> To: Election Methods <election-methods at electorama.com>
> Subject: [EM] Approval ballots. Two to elect. Best method?
>
> SPAV?
> 1. Candidate with most approvals wins.
> 2. That candidate's voters have their voting weight halved (or multiplied
> by 1/3).
> 3. Remaining candidate with most points wins.
>
> STV-like?
> 1. Choose quota Q = one-third (or one half) of voters.
> 2. Candidate with most approvals wins.  (T = # of approvals)
> 3. That candidate's voters have their voting weight multiplied by
> max(1-(Q/T), 0)
> 4. Remaining candidate with most points wins.
>
> Monroe-like?
> 1. For each pair of candidates, find the voter-assignment which maximizes
> the number of voters assigned to a candidate they approved, such that no
> more than half the voters are assigned to one candidate.
> 2. Elect the pair which satisfies the most voters.
>
> Others?  Toby, what are your favorite PR methods at the moment?  Can you
> give a short explanation of how Phragmen/Ebert would work with only two to
> elect?
>
>
>
> Specifically, I'm worried that in practically every approval-ballot PR
> method, if there is a candidate you really like, but are sure that she can
> get elected without your vote, you gain an advantage by not approving
> them.  Is there any method that minimizes that incentive?
>
> ~ Andy
>
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