[EM] Highly-expressive preference voting
robert bristow-johnson
rbj at audioimagination.com
Sun Aug 30 14:07:20 PDT 2015
On 8/29/15 9:24 PM, James Kislanko wrote:
> I cannot respond to what you describe, since it has no relevance to
> what I said, which is there is no ranked ballot that can reproduce my
> pairwise preferences if I use different criteria depending upon what
> the pairs are.
>
i can't really decode this, James.
we all understand that with a population of voters, a Condorcet cycle
can possibly result (Rock>Scissors, Scissors>Paper, Paper>Rock) and then
you need to add something or have something more, in the tabulating
criteria, to determine a winner. (i actually think a cycle would be
rare in real governmental elections using a ranked ballot.) people on
this list can argue which is best. probably most agree that Schulze is
best, but i think that if the cycle contains only 3 candidates, that
Schulze and Ranked-Pairs (margins) and MinMax all pick the same winner.
Ranked-Pairs is a helluva lot easier to explain to skeptical legislators
and others i might try to convince to re-adopt the ranked ballot (but
this time *not* to go with IRV), so i have been sticking with that.
(and, as rare as a cycle might be, i think it would be even more rare
for a cycle to have more than 3 candidates in it, so the difference
between a Schulze and Ranked-Pairs might seem moot.)
but just because the collective vote totals might result in a circular
preference, that doesn't mean that it's reasonable for a single voter
to. if a voter prefers Candidate Rock over Candidate Scissors and the
same voter prefers Scissors over Paper, i cannot grok how this same
voter could possibly prefer Paper over Rock. then a single, linear,
ranked ballot works fine in recording all of the contingency vote
preferences of that voter. the rest of the problem is taking all of
this collection of ranked ballots, and with the principle of "One Person
One Vote" determining what the collective preference of candidates is
and identifying the winner. outside of a cycle, i think that Condorcet
works pretty well because, as long as there *is* a Condorcet Winner,
that choice would prevail in any hypothetical one-on-one election and
not the reverse.
people here since 2009 might remember when i joined the list and that i
lived in a municipality with a strong 3rd party (the Progressive Party
of Vermont), we had IRV for our mayoral election and, while a majority
of voters marked their ballots that they preferred Candidate A (for
Andy) over Candidate B (for Bob), nonetheless Candidate B was elected.
a year later IRV was repealed, although a wide majority of voters didn't
understand exactly what went wrong (and would dispute the problems),
enough folks knew *something* was wrong and IRV and it was repealed and
unfortunately along with it, the ranked-order ballot.
so, please elaborate on exactly what you mean.
r b-j
> On Saturday, August 29, 2015 4:46 PM, robert bristow-johnson
> <rbj at audioimagination.com> wrote:
>
>
> On 8/29/15 6:17 PM, James Kislanko wrote:
> > This example is a perfect demonstration of what I tried to describe a
> > decade or so ago.There is no way to make a linear ordering of pairwise
> > preferences if the voter uses different criteria depending upon what
> > the pair is. I'd like my contribution to the pairwise matrix be based
> > upon a ballot that gave "A or B, neither?" for every combination of
> > choices.
>
> while IRV ballots seem to prohibit marking two candidates equally
> (except for those unmarked, who are all tied for last place preference
> on that particular ballot), there's nothing in a Condorcet ranked-ballot
> to stop you from marking A and B equally, whether they be first or last.
>
> how is
>
> A = B = last place
>
> any different an expression from "neither"?
>
> ranked ballot, in which tied ranking is allowed, is the most sensible
> form of expressive preference voting. score voting requires too much
> "expression" from the voters and approval voting too little.
--
r b-j rbj at audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
More information about the Election-Methods
mailing list