[EM] Highly-expressive preference voting

robert bristow-johnson rbj at audioimagination.com
Sat Aug 29 15:46:42 PDT 2015


On 8/29/15 6:17 PM, James Kislanko wrote:
> This example is a perfect demonstration of what I tried to describe a 
> decade or so ago.There is no way to make a linear ordering of pairwise 
> preferences if the voter uses different criteria depending upon what 
> the pair is. I'd like my contribution to the pairwise matrix be based 
> upon a ballot that gave "A or B, neither?" for every combination of 
> choices.

while IRV ballots seem to prohibit marking two candidates equally 
(except for those unmarked, who are all tied for last place preference 
on that particular ballot), there's nothing in a Condorcet ranked-ballot 
to stop you from marking A and B equally, whether they be first or last.

how is

  A = B = last place

    any different an expression from "neither"?

ranked ballot, in which tied ranking is allowed, is the most sensible 
form of expressive preference voting.  score voting requires too much 
"expression" from the voters and approval voting too little.

-- 

r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."





More information about the Election-Methods mailing list