[EM] General PR question (from Andy Jennings in 2011)

Kathy Dopp kathy.dopp at gmail.com
Wed Oct 1 07:16:28 PDT 2014


IMO, a better measure taking your approach, would be simply the sum of
the measures of individual voters' representation and electing the set
of candidates that maximizes this sum of representation measure.  In
fact, using such a summation measure would be, IMO, a good way to
compare the satisfaction of voters with various voting methods.

The problem with STV is that it would, in circumstances where there
are three strong candidates, often result in much less satisfaction of
voters according to the sum of individual voters' representation
measure than approval voting and many other voting methods, due to the
unfair way it treats different voters' ballots unequally, counting the
2nd and 3rd choices of some voters but not others due to its
sequential consideration and elimination method.

On Tue, Sep 30, 2014 at 3:23 PM, Toby Pereira <tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
> I suppose the way I see it is that if 1000 people vote for the party A
> candidates, and 500 people vote for the party B candidates, then the result
> A1, A2, B1 is proportional because effectively each candidate represents 500
> voters. Why should a larger group have more candidates assigned to them? I'd
> argue that it's because it gives each individual the same amount of
> representation. I know the A voters actually have 2 candidates so in a sense
> have twice as much representation as the B voters, but it's shared with
> twice as many voters. So in terms of having their own unique representative,
> each voter has 1/500 of a candidate to themselves. If we look at it in terms
> of A voters having two candidates each and B voters having one candidate
> each, it just looks as though some people are getting a better deal than
> others for no particular reason.
> By separating factions into the individuals that make the factions, I think
> it becomes easier to come up with a system that can cope with voters
> partially agreeing with each other. Obviously if voters don't have agreement
> with enough other voters (say, 1/s) then they will struggle to get a
> representative. And a single individual not getting a candidate elected will
> do less harm to my squared deviation measure than a large faction. So the
> method I've described does still reward voters for being in groups and works
> like other proportional methods, but just happens not to work on the level
> of factions. STV is the same. It works on the level of individual voters
> having a single vote that can be transferred from their first choice. And
> when A1, A2 and B1 are elected, it is because 500 people are assigned to
> each candidate, not because 1000 are assigned to A1 and to A2 and just 500
> to B1. My method doesn't assign a voter to one particular candidate but
> rates their total representation from all elected candidates in a similar
> manner.
> Toby
> From: Kathy Dopp kathy.dopp at gmail.com
> I think that's stretching it to claim every single voter should have
> proportional representation. E.g. How much is 0.0005 representation
> worth?  It seems to me that, in truth, we must be part of a larger
> group of size at least 1/s to effectively influence a legislature.
> However, I'll keep an open mind and reflect on it.
> Kathy Dopp


Kathy Dopp
Town of Colonie, NY 12304
 "A little patience, and we shall see ... the people, recovering their
true sight, restore their government to its true principles." Thomas

Fundamentals of Verifiable Elections

View my working papers on my SSRN:

More information about the Election-Methods mailing list