[EM] Steve's Formatting corrections to Topic 3: Digest, Vol 125, Issue 2, Topic 3
stevebosworth at hotmail.com
Sun Nov 2 05:16:25 PST 2014
Steve's formatting corrections only to Topic 3 below:
> From: election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com
> Subject: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 125, Issue 2
> To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> Date: Sun, 2 Nov 2014 03:58:07 -0800
........................> Today's Topics:
> 1. Re: Associational Proportional Representation (APR)
> (Kristofer Munsterhjelm) 26 (Forest Simmons)
> 2. Re: Sincere Range and Approval (Forest Simmons)
> 3. Steve's response to Richard Fobes in Election-Methods Digest,
> Vol 124, Issue 28 (steve bosworth)
> Message: 3
> Date: Sun, 2 Nov 2014 11:58:04 +0000
> From: steve bosworth <stevebosworth at hotmail.com>
> To: "election-methods at lists.electorama.com"
> <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
> Subject: [EM] Steve's response to Richard Fobes in Election-Methods
> Digest, Vol 124, Issue 28
> Message-ID: <DUB115-W7324CCAC0131C32E753305B6980 at phx.gbl>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1254"
> > From: election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com
> > Subject: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 124, Issue 28
> > To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> > Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2014 12:02:36 -0700
> ..........................................................> > > Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 13:23:38 -0700
> > From: Richard Fobes <ElectionMethods at VoteFair.org>
> > To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> > Subject: Re: [EM] Associational Proportional Representation (APR)
> > Message-ID: <54514CCA.9060701 at VoteFair.org>
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed
> > Today's Topics:
> > 1. Re: Associational Proportional Representation (APR)
> > (Richard Fobes)
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > On 10/27/2014 9:12 AM, steve bosworth wrote:
> > > Hi Richard,(from >>>Steve: S:):
> > > ...
> > >S: I have attached PDF versions of all the attachments you wished not to
> > > open because of anti-virus reason.
> > >
> > > I look forward to our continued dialogue.
> > Steve, the following comments are based on reading the PDF file that
> > describes your method. (Thank you for sending a PDF version.)
> > Yes, you are correct in saying that improved primary elections would
> > yield more-representative candidates for the general election.
> > The simplest way to improve primary elections is to use approval voting. > >>S: Perhaps you did not notice that APR's 'primary' election is different from the ones currently used in the US. It does not decide which one of the several candidates will represent a party in the final election. Instead, it allows citizens to rank as many of the applicant organizations that wish to elect at least one rep to the legislative assembly. These rankings determine through which 'electoral association' each citizen will be an official elector during the general election. Presumably, each citizen would give his top-rank to the organization he believes will field the most attractive candidates from his point of view. These APR rankings do not use 'approval voting' but a modified form of STV. >>>S: As EM has not yet had the time to decide whether or not to add the content of my draft article describing how APR would work (?Positive Voting Guaranteed?), I would be happy to send it to any reader who requests it (stevebosworth at hotmail.com).
> > This means just changing the instructions to allow more than one
> > candidate's name to be marked. (I don't support the use of approval
> > voting in general elections, but I would be happy to see it used in U.S.
> > primary elections.)
> > Your suggested ballot is way too complicated! >>>S: Please suggest how it could be made simpler. At the same time, please note that it currently allows an elector simply to rank one candidate if they do not want to rank more. Even in this case, APR allows this elector's vote to continue to count in the legislative assembly even if his chosen candidate is not elected. It would be added to the 'weighted vote' of the rep who is the top-choice of this eliminated but chosen candidate. This is one way that APR also uses "Asset Voting". >>Also, the marked ballots
> > would not be machine-readable. I can see ways to overcome these
> > barriers, and still collect the information you want. (The
> > cross-district votes can be handled like write-in options within a
> > fill-in-the-oval 1-2-3 ballot; you don't need a separate section for
> > "bullet" voting [for just one choice].)
> >>S: Thank you.
> > Yet the counting method you recommend has serious shortcomings.
> > Your counting method definitely has the focus-on-the-current-top-choice
> > "blinder" approach that I've already described. >>>S: I don't remember seeing this earlier description. Please, could you explain it again?
> > The reason you didn't understand my reference to "rounding" is that I
> > chose an analogy that was not different enough from the topic. So,
> > please ignore my "rounding" analogy.
> > You offer a definition of a "wasted vote" and then claim that your
> > method is the best way to eliminate wasted votes. This tactic -- of
> > defining a term and then claiming your method maximizes or minimizes the
> > defined term -- is often used in election-method discussions, yet it's
> > pointless because advocates of competing methods simply do not accept
> > the definition you offer, and instead offer a competing definition.
>>>S: Of course, different people can offer
different definitions. All that I can
hope is that the follow definition is clear and thus help any reader clearly to
agree or disagree that they would also not want their votes to be wasted in any
of these ways:
A citizen sees
their vote as wasted either when they “see no point in voting at all, or they vote
for a favoured candidate who has no chance of being elected, or they vote for
the candidate seen as the lesser evil. ….
“If a ‘wasted vote’ is defined as one that
fails proportionately to increase the voting power of a favoured elected
representative in the legislative assembly, all existing and previously
proposed electoral systems of which I am aware needlessly waste some votes.”
> > Finally, yet most importantly, I'll point out a serious issue that you
> > seem to have overlooked.
> > After your counting method is used, the number of voters who support
> > each winning candidate becomes public knowledge ? because it determines
> > the "weighting" of each legislator's vote. This knowledge, combined
> > with the ability to vote for legislators in other districts, makes it
> > financially profitable for "consultants" and thugs to bribe voters to
> > vote for the legislators whose "backers" provide the most money.
> >>S: I need more explanation of why you think APR would make bribing easier. I see APR as being at least as secret and secure as any other system. In fact, it might be argued that it would be even harder for a 'briber' to infer whether the citizens who agreed to vote as the briber wants had actually done so. This is both because each citizen has the secret opportunity to rank any candidates in the whole country (as you have also said) and each candidate has the structural possibility of receiving votes from any citizens in the country.
> > Perhaps you think this kind of bribery is easy to detect and deter.
> > It's not.
> > For several years, while I was writing my creative-problem-solving book,
> > I lived in a low-income part of a university town and learned a lot
> > about what goes on in a neighborhood that gets lots of police attention.
> > The police (and fire) events are just the tip of the iceberg. The
> > selling of votes would easily become commonplace in places where people
> > are desperate, vulnerable, illiterate, poor, abused (without exceeding
> > the legal limit), etc.
> >>S: I can see that people in such neighborhoods might be more likely to agree to take such bribes but I do not yet see how APR makes it any easier for a briber to enforce such agreements.
> > If my reactions seem to be excessively critical, and not supportive,
> > consider that the best voting methods are the ones with the fewest
> > flaws. There is no such thing as a voting method with no flaws! > >>S: Of course, this may be so, but I'm still looking for any flaws in APR. I have not yet found one from the point of view of a citizen who wants ?an electoral system that would allow them to guarantee that their vote will proportionately increase the voting power of a representative (and) they most trust in their country?s legislative assembly, [and also a system] that will give them every incentive to vote, to vote for candidates they like, never having to vote tactically or negatively.?
> > Regarding this issue, if you are not familiar with the table in the
> > Wikipedia article titled "voting systems," then please become familiar
> > with it, because it portrays the most common "fairness criteria" [my
> > term] that I and others here refer to. >>>S: Yes, those criteria in that Wikipedia article are very useful, but I do not yet see how they lead to a sustainable criticism of APR from the above citizen's point of view.
> > In your article you claim that your method is better than plurality
> > voting. I agree with that claim. But that's not saying much. Every
> > method promoted here can make that claim. >>>S: Yes.
> > You claim that your method is not vulnerable to gerrymandering. I do
> > not disagree with that claim. Yet I'll point out that there are a
> > variety of ways to eliminate gerrymandering. >>>S: Yes, but APR would also eliminate the anti-democratic effects of safe-seats resulting simply by chance. In other words, your
> > suggested approach is not the only way.
> > I understand why you like the method you propose. It has some nice
> > counting characteristics. Yet a voting method has to be workable, and
> > that involves issues such as machine-readability, incorruptibility,
> > ballot simplicity, invulnerability to strategic voting, etc.
> >>S: I agree. However, apart from the questions of machine-readability, ballot simplicity, and strategic voting already addressed above, APR would seem to be more ?workable? in the following way: APR?s ?primary? election?s determination of the ?electoral associations? would be administratively straight forward ? less arbitrary and perhaps cheaper than existing methods for deciding the boundaries of the relevant geographically defined electoral districts. Also, I do not yet see how APR is any more ?corruptible? than the best competing systems.
> > That's all I have time for now. If you have further questions, or you
> > don't understand what I've said here, just ask.
> > Most importantly, thank you for taking the time to learn about the many
> > subtle issues that affect voting methods.
> > Richard Fobes
> > On 10/27/2014 9:12 AM, steve bosworth wrote:
> > >
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