Thu May 8 11:58:05 PDT 2014
isn't unusual for preferrers of non-big-2 candidates to insincerely rank in
first place the big-2 candidate whom they like better than the other big-2
candidate, to avoid "wasting [their] vote". Australia has had IRV for a
along time, but parties are still mostly unwilling to run more than 1
candidate per election, contrary to the hopes when IRV was adopted.
So what concepts
do they have? They have the concept that political parties that win
single-seat elections are those
that get lots of votes, including lots of first-preference ("primary")
votes. They have the concept
that the winner definitely should never be the Majority Loser.
IRV's flagrant majority rule violations are just as obviously wrong as
Majority Loser violations. Majority Loser violations are a special case. IRV
doesn't need a special case like that in order to fail.
They have the concept that votes for
losing candidates should not be avoidably completely "wasted".
You mean the way they're wasted in IRV when the compromise that you need
gets eliminated because your traveling vote didn't reach hir in time? So
that your preference for hir over someone worse was never counted?
They have a concept that elections
are not purely about who wins, but also about things like identity,
Well then, you've just told why the experience there isn't applicable here:
American progressives care about who wins, and they're quite willing to
flush their principles and self-expression down the toilet if they believe
that it's the pragmatic thing to do, to elect a lesser-evil. Case closed.
and (sometimes class-based)party-loyalty. Very few voters in Australia are
interested in strategising, and in (at least)some countries that even use
...which demonstrates that there's no reason to expect U.S. voters to vote
as those others do, in IRV either, if, for instance Australian voters
strategize less than U.S. voters do. (But, as I've said, I've been told that
favorite-burial strategy isn't unusual in Australia either).
So instead of "elect the CW", and apart from (the admittedly somewhat
circular) "elect the sincere
IRV winner", what do I mean by "perform reasonably"? The method chooses the
winner in a (somewhat)
intuitive and orderly manner,without appearing to "waste" more than half the
A wins. 60% had voted that they'd rather elect B than A. Do you really
believe that their votes weren't wasted? Maybe you mean something different
by "wasted", but definitely their B>A vote was ignored by IRV, resulting in
a majority rule violation.
Ignore the voted wishes of a majority, and you have a majority rule
violation. IRV will have many avoidable majorilty rule violations.
There are many quite intelligent and thoughtful voters in Australia, to whom
it has never occured
that there might be any better single-winner election method.
There are people there trying to tell them different. You could help.
They have failed to notice IRV's
"absurd non-monotonicity", and they have no concept of the "CW".
Our voters, whether or not they have a concept of the CW, will do what it
takes to elect the CW.
They would laugh at Approval.
Of course it's easy to say that without backing it up in any way. They
haven't been asked about Approval. You don't know how they'd react. You're
trying to speak for them. Approval is one of the most popular alternative
Some object to Approval because of a mistaken interpretation of
"one-person-one-vote", but that is avoided if Approval is presented as a CR
version. Mention CR 0-10, and then CR 0,1.
Anyway, the topic was about the actual relative merits of IRV & Approval,
not your unsubstantiated claim about how someone would react to a method
that they have never heard of before.
I think in many countries, even the US...
Now you're getting even farther from justifiability, telling us how people
in another country would react to what they've never heard of.
Admittedly Approval would be new to them. But you're speculating about their
..., voters and political parties would hate approval.
Why would voters hate Approval more than Plurality? Because it lets them
always vote for their favorite instead of having to strategically abandon
hir? Because it gives them the freedom to vote for and show support for
people they like better than their Plurailty compromise?
Your claim is not only unjustified, it's absurd.
Of course, as you said, the Democrat & Repulican parties would hate
Approval. Or Condorcet wv, or any good method, because it would end their
were to be persuaded to drop my Clone Independence standard and take a
limited-slot method seriously,
I would go for one of Kevin Venzke's 3-slot methods, like "Withdrawable
Sure, Approval can be improved upon by more elaborate methods. Especially
Condorcet wv. Approval's appeal is that it needs only a very modest change
from Plurality, with no new balloting or counting technology.
As it is, I think most promising-looking for public political elections is
probably something from
the "automated approval" family (which uses ranked ballots).
That sounds like Bucklin or DSV(Approval). Well, then propose those instead
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