No subject

have any baleen left to eschew with :-]

Along these lines I agonized over whether to say that the voters were the
auxiliary candidates or to just say that their ballots were the auxiliary
candidates.

There are some advantages to both points of view.  I finally went with the
more anthropomorphic, less sterile point of view because it breathes some
life into the exposition, making it easier to follow.

I wonder if the simple minded vote/appoint method that this description
conjures up would actually work in small groups: all of the voters rank
all of the voters. Then (say) the MinMax winner (among the voters) chooses
the winner (among the original alternatives).

This wouldn't be quite the same as our Voter Space version of MinMax
because we require secret ballots, etc.  But it might have some live
application in some setting.

Here's a variation: after all of the voters rank all of the voters, the
members of the Smith Set (of voters) get together and hash out which of
the original alternatives to adopt.

Instead of Candidate Proxy this would be Smith Voter Proxy.

Forest

On Thu, 5 Feb 2004, Chris Benham wrote:

> Forest,
> You wrote:
>
>  If you could guarantee that candidates would be evenly distributed among
> > the voters, then you would neutralize all clone problems.  This is what
> > Voter Space accomplishes, because in Voter Space every voter is a virtual
> > candidate.
>
> A friendly semantic quibble: It seems to me that every voter is not
> really a "virtual" candidate (in
> the sense of only existing in cyberspace to fill in gaps and can't  "win"),
> but instead is an  ACTUAL  candidate winner-appointer. Instead of just
> one direct election, there is one election plus an appointment.
>
> Chris Benham
>