No subject

is one that probably is harming proportionality, so it is rejected,

Mr Schulze seems to write very much less than a competent theorist
would be likely to do.

Basically we can merge and separate strict rules using dual polytopes.
In my theory there is no proportionality is never merged. It might
be the only option later but I can't see a reasoning or method for
merging the two. 

The Single-Transferable-Vote mailing list is a place where statements
can be true and where Mr Schulze can say exactly why he won't be
abandoning that unfairness upholding belief of pairwise comparing.
Presumably it could cause misery were it used.

So far I know that the right prionciples are incredibly easy to
memorize and comprehend. WE have Americans here and they might have
a quicker feel for Marcus' R&D (no progress over 5 years except
for the academic stimulatation from Mike Ossipoff).

I claims that my method leads to fairly selected right and correct
winners and it lacks both vote-negating-power-diversions and the
improper providing of corrupt excessive power to any candidate.
Additionally proportionality is simply defined in the way expected:
a ballot paper assists a candidate if naming the candidate.
If a ballot paper assists n candidates then it gives n times its
weight or it gives oly 1 times its weight. Condorcet rolls the
sick grasshoppers into the tobacco and leaves it as a rolled
together fix solving the problem of public interests vs private
interests.


Subject: [EM] Voting Matters, Issue 17




| [EM] Voting Matters, Issue 17
| Markus Schulze markus.schulze at alumni.tu-berlin.de
| Tue Dec 16 16:22:31 2003
|
| H[e]llo,
|
| I forward a conversation between Craig Carey and me about
| issue 17 of Voting Matters.
|
...


By the looks of it, Schulze got snuffed. Further he is running
a policy of never writing to me. If he reagards being moderated
as posing a risk of making to comment to me, he censors himself.
Also he got moderated for censoring out the purpose for not
defending or harming his own preferential voting method.

So "x over y" is a substitute for right summing.
Let Mr Schulze clarify whether a pallot paper gives away n times
its weight (to candidates' subtotals) if it names n candidates,
or whether it gives away only 1x its weight (which could lack
a needed clarity permitting a solution to be obtained).

Mr Schulze should now show these 2 things:

  * he can precisely select the correct option of the two, and

  * to the extend he can retrieve virtue from the mangled
    crumpled principles of the algorithm, he should it absolutely
    plain that the Schulze algorithm got the same choice.

If Schulze is metionably good as a historian he would say if
Condorcet wrote on the topic, and give a page references.

Also he could explain which of the 2 choices STV followers 
prefer. In Mr Schulze's theory, he was omitting all mention
of the topic that the Schule method may be quite corrupt.
In idea STV a grab at overly powerful papers is permitted
since a power<=1 rule acts as needed. 

Mr Schulze might not know much about preferential voting if
unclear on whether the rule of thumb on transfer values that
can be observed in STV is similar or dissimilar to making a
wrong (if wrong) decision to have a 1x power instead of n times
power, or each paper in a multiwinner election.



Craig Carey
Auckland, New Zealand
politicians-and-polytopes
single-transferable-vote