[EM] PR for ethnically polarized electorates

Forest Simmons fsimmons at pcc.edu
Mon Jun 30 15:19:46 PDT 2014


If the voters don't want to strategize, then they just submit their range
ballots (for the parties) directly.  Let R(i) represent range ballot R's
rating of party i, and let S(i) be the social rating of party i, in other
words the average value of R(i) over all R.

Then the single vote of ballot R goes to the party i that maximizes the
product R(i)*S(i).

If the allowable range values are just zero and one, then this method
reduces to Martin Harper's vote assignment scheme.

Example:

70 A(100), C(90), B(0)
30 B(100), C(50), A(0)

S(A)=70
S(B)=30
S(C)=9*7+5*3=78

The first faction products are S(A)*100=7000, S(B)*0=0, and S(C)*90=7020,
which is the greatest, so every ballot of the first faction counts for C.

The second faction products are S(A)*0, S(B)*100=3000, and S(C)*50=3900,
which is the largest, so every ballot of the second faction also goes to C.

The compromise party C gets all of the seats.


On Mon, Jun 30, 2014 at 12:13 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
km_elmet at t-online.de> wrote:

> On 06/26/2014 11:35 PM, Forest Simmons wrote:
>
>> It turns out that the more inequality in the size of the two
>> compromising factions, the closer in expectation the compromise option
>> has to be to the favorite of the larger faction in order to make the
>> compromise worthwhile to the larger faction.
>>
>
> Voters may not want to strategize and take all that information into
> account. I imagine that, particularly in polarized electorates, this could
> be a problem, since the polarized factions wouldn't be interested in doing
> much work to permit a method to find a compromise. So, I'd ask: is it
> possible to make a plain rated/approval version of the method, where the
> system itself finds the compromise coalitions, rather than that the voters
> have to specify what degree of cooperation they need to go along with the
> compromise?
>
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