[EM] CD, briefer, better-workng, and with Juho's clarifications

[Juho Laatu]

I like to talk about the mathematical properties of different methods. That should not be linked to their marketing value, and criteria should not be adjusted to provide the wanted marketing value. So, Approval should clearly fail the CD criterion. Even if Plurality does not have the same problem, that doesn't mean that it would be generally a beter method. It may have some other problems/dilemmas instead.

Juho


On 12.1.2014, at 17.33, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:

> 
> 
> On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 4:57 PM, Juho Laatu <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
> We seem to have similar understanding on how the CD should be defined. My problem was just that I couldn't see these features (multiple strategic groupins, that prefer C candidates above others, causing some cadidate outside C to win) fully reflected in the CD definition that you sent out earlier today.
>  
>  
> The earlier version had the problem of not applying to Approval, but I think that my current, latest, CD version acts as intended.
>  
> The fact that it doesn't apply to Plurality isn't a problem: CD is intended to measure for A voters being able to help B without being taken advantage of. But Pluality won't even let them help B without voting B over A, thereby victimizing _themselves_.
>  
> So, any suggestion that Plurality is ok because it doesn't fail (or pass) CD, would sound like saying that a homeless person is better off, because they don't have to bother to buy a door-lock.
>  
> Michael Ossipoff
>  
>  
> 
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