[EM] 2 precise and universally-applicable definitions of voting X over Y

[Michael Ossipoff]

On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 4:56 PM, Juho Laatu <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:

> On 11.1.2014, at 20.30, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Because ranking X over Y can (with your hypothetical balloting-system)
> be done circularly, there's nothing wrong with voting X over Y to be
> likewise circuarly do-able.
>
> That's fine if your definition of CD is intended to work also with this
> kind of circular "voting X over Y" relationships.
>
> I also note that sincere voting X over Y thus does not mean that the voter
> would prefer X to Y.
>

If you vote X over Y and don't prefer X to Y, then, by definition, you're
falsifying a preference, and therefore not voting sincerely.

That isn't any different in a circular ranking. In your A>B>C>A ranking, if
you don't prefer A to B, then that is an insincere ballot, based on my
definiitions. And, if you don't prefer A to B, then why would you vote A>B?
Not because you want to use that vote to express your true feelings.

Maybe you really do have circular preferences. As you know,
that's possible, if the alterntives are judged by several different
attributes. If any one or more of the preferences expressed in your
circular rankng is false, then clearly, intuitively, that isn't a sincere
vote.

Some people sometimes propose a balloting system in which, instead of
voting a (necessarily transitive) ranking, you separately vote each
pairwise vote. That could give sincere circular set  of voted preferences.

Of course if your preferences are sincerely circular, then you might as
well not vote in that election.

Michael Ossipoff


>
> Juho
>
>
>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20140112/5bcde756/attachment-0004.htm>