[EM] CD, briefer, better-workng, and with Juho's clarifications

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Sat Jan 11 10:38:55 PST 2014


On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 11:03 AM, Juho Laatu <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:

> Some comments on the CD criterion itself.
>
> I see CD as a situation where there is a group of voters (V) that has
> majority and whose members all prefer certain set of candidates (C) over
> all other candidates. With sincere votes one of the C candidates is
> guaranteed to win (it may be unclear which one of them). Some V voters can
> improve the expected outcome by voting some C candidates "lower". The
> Chicken Dilemma emerges when multiple members/subgroups of V (with
> different preferences within C) follow this strategy, and as a result some
> candidate outside C wins.
>
>

Yes, that's the situation that CD is intended to test for.


>
>
> This is not an exact definition yet, but you can see what I mean. Should
> we assume that in CD there are multiple strategic groups within V?
>

Yes. There might not always be, but there often will be. U.S. progressives
are a terribly fractious group, with certain factions, which will remain
un-named, angrily criticizing all progrssives who don't share their
ideology.

With a chicken-dilemma-vulnerable voting system, the chicken dilemma would
devastate the progressives. The progressives would mutually self-destruct.
...unless they were real good at probabilistic partial-cooperation
anti-defection strategy. Should we count on that? Better to just not have
chicken dilemma, and thereby have the benefit of MMC and the Condorcet
Criterion.



> Should we assume that one of the candidates outside C will win?
>
>

Most definitely.

Michael Ossipoff
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