[EM] What voting-system topics are relevant now?

[Michael Ossipoff]

Related to voting-systems, the following things (in the order listed) are
what's relevant at this time:
1. Everyone must demand, and get, verifiable vote-counting in our Plurality
elections. Without that, any other reforms are entirely irrelevant.
2. Other than that, the relevant voting-system subject now is Plurality
strategy. ...the matter of how progressive voters can elect a progressive
government to office, using Plurality (because that's what we have).
Disclaimer:
Of course neither of things can really happen. It's been truly said that
the real voting-power belongs to him who counts the votes.
Even if everyone demanded verifiable vote-counting, there would be no
reason or motive for such demands to be granted.
And those currently in power wouldn't be motivated to allow themselves to
be voted out. If they lost an election, there's no reason to expect them to
cede power. But, for that matter, of course it's obvious that there's no
reason why they'd let themselves lose an election. As I said above, the
real voting-power belongs to him who counts the votes.
But, if you want to pretend that impovement is possible, then the
least-naive (but naive nevertheless) pretense would be to pretend that we
can get verifiable vote-counting, if we all insist on it. So that would be
where to start the pretense--I mean the "effort".
But, just for pretend, you understand, there's another interesting
voting-system topic. A number of political parties, nearly all of them
progresssive parties, offer, in their platforms, a voting system better
than Plurality. They offer IRV. While Benham and Woodall (which I've
defined before at EM) are probably better than IRV, because they meet the
Condorcet Criterion (CC), IRV has the important advantage of meeting the
Mutual Majority Criterion (MMC) and CD (CD is defined at electowiki, but,
briefly, it means that a voting system doesn't have the chicken-dilemma).
But IRV meets Later-No-Harm (LNHa), and Later-No-Help (LNHe) which counts
for something, though CC is probably more important.
Anyway, if one of those progressive parties were elected to office, then
conditions would be different in 2 obvious ways:
1. All of those parties guarantee a much more honest, open, agenda-free,
and participatory media system. No longer would there be media
disinformation regarding winnabilities, the "viability" of parties and
candidates, etc.
2. The electorate would obviously, having elected that progressive
governmnent have demonstrated that they are no longer susceptible to
concerted media disinformation anyway--having just ignored it when electing
a progressive government to office.
That different set of conditions, I refer to as "the Green scenario". FBC
would no longer be needed.
So, in addition to demanding and getting verifiable vote-counting, and the
Plurality strategy for electing a progressive government, it's also of
interest what voting system(s) would be good for the Green scenario.
(I call it "the Green scenario, because curently the Greens are the biggest
progresive party. Actually, that might not mean much. The Greens might seem
a bit elitist to some, and might still be (mis-) regarded as a 1-issue
environmental party. Maybe the Justice Party's emphasis on justice, justice
for everyone, will resonate better iwith the population. The Pirate Party's
platform is brief, but what there is of it is progressive.
What would be the progressives' best strategy, to elect a progressive
government?:
1. All progressives vote for the candidates of their favorite progressive
party
(The progressive parties include the nonsocialist progressive parties(GPUS,
Justice, Pirate); democratic socialist parties (G/GPUSA, SPUSA); and the
many communist parties)
2. When the total (divided) progressive vote adds up to a majority, then
all progressives vote, in the next election, for the nominees of whilchever
progressive party has just gotten the most votes.
What voting system would be best in the Green scenario?
FBC would no longer be needed. That allows us to achieve a good combination
of properties:
MMC + CD. Or, better yet, MMC + CD + CC.
IRV meets MMC and CD. Benham and Woodall (defined in previous posts of mine
here) meet MMC, CD, and CC.
Michael Ossipoff
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