[EM] APR (13): Steve's 13th dialogue with Juho

Tue Dec 30 02:52:05 PST 2014

Hi Juho,

There is no limit on the number of organizations that could apply to become an "association" as a result of APR's primary.  Each applicant organization would have simply to send its application to the central electoral commission containing the essential details about itself, e.g. name, address, names and addresses of current officials of the organization, mission statement, etc.  The commission would then publish the list of all these organizations alphabetically well before the Primary.  As a result of the primary, all these applicants would be eliminated from becoming an association, except those popular enough to receive at least one 500th of the registered voters in the country (i.e. for an assembly to be composed of 500 reps) as its official electors for general election purposes.

What do you Think?

Steve

From: juho.laatu at gmail.com
Subject: Re: [EM] APR (12): Steve's 12th dialogue with Juho
Date: Mon, 29 Dec 2014 19:34:17 +0200
To: stevebosworth at hotmail.com

Thanks for the response. It seems that you describe how the primary determines which associations are allowed to take part in the actual election. My question was however on if and how you possibly plan to limit the number of groupings that take part in the primary. I.e. possible restrictions that take place one step earlier.
Juho
On 29 Dec 2014, at 10:31, steve bosworth <stevebosworth at hotmail.com> wrote:

APR: Steve's 12th dialogue with Juho, 

Hi Juho,
In answer to you question below, APR limits the number of associations that can elect reps.  This is done according to the procedure fully explained by page 6 of the article, Endnote 5, and Flow Chart 2.  Breifly, this number is composed of the most popular applicant voluntary organizations of civil society as determined by APR's Primary, i.e. this group is composed of the number that together both contain all the registered voters in the country as their official electors, and can elect all the pre-established number of reps that will compose the legislative assembly as a result of the general election. 

I look forward to your response.

Steve

> From: election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com
> Subject: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 126, Issue 26
   > To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 05:11:41 -0800
> 
>    2. APR (11): Steve?s 11th dialogue with Juho (Steve) (steve bosworth)
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Message: 1
> Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 03:46:17 +0200
> From: Juho Laatu <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk>
> To: "election-methods at lists.electorama.com"
> 	<election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
> Subject: Re: [EM] APR (10): Steve?s 10th dialogue with Juho (Steve)
> Message-ID: <2AE7B186-BC4B-4F1D-A5EF-65E22E0DAC54 at yahoo.co.uk>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
> 
> 
> > On 19 Dec 2014, at 18:14, steve bosworth <stevebosworth at hotmail.com> wrote:
> 
> > J:   The 10'000 is of course arbitrary since it is not designed for any particular society. Each society should pick a number that suits its needs.
> >  
> > S:  Please formulate the method by which any society could ?pick? this number without being arbitrary.  APR offers one answer to this question.  Can you think of a better answer?
> 
> One more question. Does APR limit somehow the number of associations that can take part in the primary? If not, then you might get e.g. 10'000 associations, and that might be too much, and you would need a similar mechanism to limit the number of associations taking part in the primary.
> 
> Juho
> 
> 
> 
> 
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> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 2
> Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 13:11:38 +0000
> From: steve bosworth <stevebosworth at hotmail.com>
> To: Juho Laatu <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk>,
> 	"election-methods at lists.electorama.com"
> 	<election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
> Subject: [EM] APR (11): Steve?s 11th dialogue with Juho (Steve)
> Message-ID: <DUB115-W1851C4A27AA11698A736A0B6680 at phx.gbl>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1254"
> 
> 
> 
> APR (11): Steve?s 11th
> dialogue with Juho (Steve)
> 
> >
> From: election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com
> 
> > Subject: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 126, Issue 25
> 
> > To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> 
> > Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 13:34:36 -0800
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > 1. Re: APR (10): Steve?s 10th dialogue with Juho (Steve) (Juho Laatu)
> 
> > 
> 
> > >
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> > 
> 
> > Message: 1
> 
> > Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 20:23:57 +0200
> 
> > From: Juho Laatu <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk>
> 
> > To: "election-methods at lists.electorama.com"
> 
> > <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
> 
> > Subject: Re: [EM] APR (10): Steve?s 10th dialogue with Juho (Steve)
> 
> > Message-ID: <304A2E4F-EB71-40CE-AC56-DAE9EF312D86 at yahoo.co.uk>
> 
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > > On 19 Dec 2014, at 18:14, steve bosworth
> <stevebosworth at hotmail.com> wrote:
> 
> > 
> 
> > > J: The 10'000 is of course arbitrary since it is not designed for any
> particular society. Each society should pick a number that suits its needs.
> 
> > > 
> 
> > > S: Please formulate the method by which any society could ?pick? this
> number without being arbitrary. APR offers one answer to this question. Can you
> think of a better answer?
> 
> > 
> 
> J:  The decision making body (e.g. a
> parliament) estimates what would be a suitable number that does not let too
> many groupings in and leaves no such groupings out that may well win a seat. It
> would be good to allow also a number of such groupings in that may win seats in
> some future elections, even if they may not get any seats this time. After one
> or few first elections the number may be adjusted. The result is not arbitrary,
> but based on the characteristics of the society in question.
> 
>  
> 
> S:  I am afraid that any such decisions would be
> ?arbitrary? ( i.e. capricious, unpredictable, unprincipled, haphazard,
> etc.).  The current parties in the
> assembly (including each current majority party or coalition) has a vested
> interest in excluding any threats to the methods by which it has gained
> representation or domination in parliament. 
> In contrast, APR?s method follows inescapably from the logical
> application of the following principle: 
> the vote of each citizen must be equally respected (i.e. it enables each
> citizen equally to guarantee that their vote will continue to count within the
> assembly through the weighted vote of the most favoured rep who has received
> their vote).
> 
> > 
> 
> > > S: I see this as too vague to allow our discussion to progress.
> 
> > 
> 
> J:  I can make the definition simpler:
> "proper party" = "traditional party". This definition works
> in all countries that I could quickly think.
> 
>  
> 
> S:  This ?definition? seems to amount to a
> confession that you are a ?traditionalist?, i.e. simply tied to the status
> quo.  You need to define ?good? or
> ?improvement? independently of what already exists to escape this characterisation.
> 
> > 
> 
> > > J: Since the outcome of the primary has a meaningful impact on the
> outcome of the whole election, this does not solve my problem. Vote buyers,
> coercers etc. may still have an interest to influence the outcome of the
> primary.
> 
> > > >
> 
> > > S: It would be hard to predict this impact because voters can reverse
> all expectations by secretly voting differently in the general election. If so,
> do you have any reason to believe that APR would be more vulnerable to such
> corruption than other system?
> 
> > 
> 
> J:  Systems that do not support secret
> voting tend to be vulnerable to vote buyers and coercers. In APR the general
> election does not cancel all the (important and worth influencing) decisions
> made in the primary (e.g. the decision on which associations are allowed to
> participate).
> 
>  
> 
> S: You
> seem not to have appreciated the fact that an association being ?allowed to
> participate?, by itself, will produce no weighted votes in the assembly unless
> citizens also secretly vote for its candidate(s).
> 
> > 
> 
> > > J: For example, methods that allow only voting of one candidate are
> easier to understand.
> 
> > > 
> 
> > > S: Does the fact that APR allows citizens to choose this simplicity
> rather than being forced into it provide a valid argument against APR in your
> view?
> 
> > 
> 
> J:  Yes. The system is still complex,
> although it would have one rather simple branch too.
> 
>  
> 
> S:  My question was, does this trivial extra
> complexity provide ?a valid argument against APR in your view??
> 
>  
> 
> > > J: I'm not proposing any alternative systems, just discussing the
> properties of APR, and if those properties could be improved.
> 
> > > 
> 
> > > S: Unfortunately, you have not yet defined the value you have in mind
> that would determine what would constitute an ?improvement?. Can you do this
> now?
> 
> > 
> 
> J:  No, since there are hundreds of
> possibilities on what kind of improvements could be made to a voting system.
> 
>  
> 
> S:  Of course, but what we need is a prime value
> or principle which would enable us to assess each of the ?hundreds? of proposed
> changes as to whether it is or is not an improvement.  What is your ?prime value??
> 
> 
> 
> > > J: And a very difficult to understand system to all.
> 
> > > 
> 
> > > S: Please explain or name the parts of APR that you do not
> understand, or you believe ordinary citizens would find hard to understand.
> 
>  > 
> 
> J:  Someone already wrote on this list
> that if it takes days to make the experts on this list understand the system,
> then APR must be quite difficult to understand to the regular voters.
> 
>  
> 
> S:  Yes, Richard Fobes said this.  However, do you independently agree with
> him?  If so, ?please explain or name the
> parts of APR that you do not understand, or you believe ordinary citizens would
> find hard to understand.?
> 
>  
> 
> Also,
> what do you think of Richard?s and my attempt jointly to draft a more simple
> summary of APR?
> 
> > 
> 
> > > J: I see us as experts, discussing the properties of APR. The
> decisions will be made by the societies (whose members also we might be) that
> may take different methods into use. Maybe we can help them in their decision
> making by providing good methods, and good explanations on how they work.
> 
> > > 
> 
> > > S: Of course, I agree with this aim. However, I do not see how our
> dialogue can make any further progress until you find yourself able to define
> what you mean by ?good methods?, what constitutes ?improvements?, or are able
> to describe the practical system that would also be your ?ideal?.
> 
> > 
> 
> J:  You can take my comments one by one,
> and estimate if the arguments that I give are in your opinion on the right path
> towards a good method.
> 
>  
> 
> S: You
> seem to want me only to make a purely ?subjective? judgment in response to your
> ?comments?.  However, as I see it, these
> will only be ?arguments? if you can show them logically to follow from evidence
> and some ?prime value? that might claim to be ?objective?.  As you know, I see a democratically equal respect
> for each citizen?s vote as one value that follows from my own prime value which
> I see as objective, namely:  the value of
> ?free rational living?.
> 
>  
> 
> You have
> not explicitly rejected the value I place on the equality of citizens but you
> seem not to share it.  Instead, you seem simply
> to want to accept the inequalities in the status quo (i.e. in the currently
> dominant traditions).  What do you think?
> 
> 
> 
> > Juho
> 
> 
> 
>  
> 
>  		 	   		  
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