[EM] APR (7a) Steve’s addition to his 7th dialogue with Toby

steve bosworth stevebosworth at hotmail.com
Tue Dec 2 02:15:51 PST 2014

Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2014 18:48:55 +0000
From: tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk
To: stevebosworth at hotmail.com; election-methods at lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] APR  (6) Steve’s 6th dialogue with Toby

Hi Steve,
T:  Before you send any reply, I just want to add something to this:
T:  Another concern I have is that popular candidates could end up getting significantly more power than based on first preference votes. If, for example, an association makes up 2% of the electorate, they'd expect to get 2% of the power. It might be that there is one candidate in that association who is the most famous and gets more votes than anyone else. They might get 50% of the association's vote. But the other 50% might be spread amongst many different candidates, none of whom get enough to be elected.  S: No, all the pre-establishe number of this associaton's MPs would be elected. No MP could keep more than 10% of weighted votes in the Commons.  If the Primary had determined that this association must elect 5 MPs, the 5 election would be the most popular 5 among all the candidates for that association.  Still some of these 5 may have many few weighted votes than the others.  I see no problem with this as I think I have explained before.  What problem if any do you see?  T:  The well known candidate might still feature fairly highly in the ranks of the voters that don't put him/her top, so all the votes might still end up getting transferred to him/her. This way, someone could get 2% instead of 1% of the power. Obviously these numbers came out of the top of my head, and in practice it might not cause as much as a doubling, but then again, there might be cases where it more than doubles. S:  Please explain this concern more exactly, but you seem to have misunderstood how the final weighted votes of each MP would be determined.  Please read again pages 5 &6 and Endnotes 3, 4 & 5 of my draft article. T: This is another possible advantage of score voting, where a voter's rating of all candidates is taken into account, and it's not blind to everything below how far it gets transferred. For example, the famous candidate might get 10 out of 10 from his/her voters, but other candidates might still get 8 or 9, or possibly even 10 as well. A ranked system doesn't tell us very well how happy voters would really be if their vote was used to elect their second preference. S: Correct, APR does not provide a "score" for the happiness of the voter who is only able to help elect his "second preference" candidate.  Such scores might give researcher more information but this is not the primary concern of an electoral system.  Each citizen already knows how happy he is or is not as a resutl of the election. However,  more importantly and unlike your score voting, APR does allow him to guarantee that his vote will be added to the weidhted vote of his most preferred MP.  Thus, APR allows each citizen to be as happy as possible.
  S:  What do you think? Steve     		 	   		  
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