[EM] How to find the voters' honest preferences

Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet at t-online.de
Mon Sep 9 15:34:50 PDT 2013

On 09/09/2013 11:50 PM, Forest Simmons wrote:
> Kristofer,
> Thanks for your insights and considerations regarding the method and my
> questions.
> It is true as you noted that there is no game theoretic incentive to
> vote insincerely on the second ballot,(unless this election is
> considered as part of an ongoing game including future elections as
> well), it is also true, as you point out, that there is no incentive to
> vote complete preferences on the second ballot.
> You then say ...
> "If you just want to find a winner, then an ordinary runoff might work
> as well: select the finalists as above, then have a majority-rule
> election in the second round."
> The trouble with this ordinary runoff idea is that the runoff stage
> (potentially) over-rides the strategic pairwise preferences implicit in
> the three slot ballots.  In other words it throws out our burial
> disincentive.

Isn't that easily fixed? Consider the runoff part of your method 

>>> The runoff between them is decided by the voters' pairwise
 >>> preferences as expressed on the three slot ballots (when these
 >>> finalists are not rated equally thereon), or (otherwise) on the
 >>> ordinal ballots when the three slot ballot makes no distinction
 >>> between them.

Couldn't you adapt this to a manual runoff? Something like:

1. Determine the virtual runoff candidates X and Y.
2. If there's a pairwise difference between the two on the three slot 
ballots, then whoever it favors, wins.
3. If there's no difference between the two, then go to a manual 
tiebreak runoff.

Or would that mean runoffs would happen so rarely that the electorate 
would fail to get used to them?

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