[EM] Comparing CW with "write-in pairwise" CW

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Wed Oct 30 16:20:30 PDT 2013

Hi Robert,

>De : "rbj at audioimagination.com" <rbj at audioimagination.com>
>>>> ... Condorcet is often indecisive as well.
>>> how often, really, is Condorcet indecisive in a real election?
>> I don't know about a real election, but if you just randomly generate scenarios, Condorcet is frequently indecisive.
>well, we *know* that cycles *can* occur.
>so using a ranked ballot doesn't pass the "monkey test" if your expecting or requiring "decisive"

What I said is that I felt uneasy that, unexpectedly, there are situations where Condorcet is actually more decisive than my write-in CW concept. This isn't a criticism of Condorcet, rather it's looking to Condorcet for an excuse.

>> That's what I meant.
>well, we *know* that cycles *can* occur.
>so any decent Condorcet-compliant method should have a procedure for dealing with cycles.  because i am not convinced that in political reality, cycles would be 

>"frequent" and i'm even less convinced that, if a cycle *did*
>occur, it would involve more than 3 candidates (no more often than once in a blue moon), then i still think a simple method for dealing with cycles (like Ranked 

>Pairs or MinMax) is as good as a complicated method (sorry Marcus).  and with only 3 candidates in the Smith set, i think that Ranked
>Pairs or MinMax (using margins) will come up with the same winner as Schulze.
Technically MinMax doesn't satisfy Smith, but violations would be extremely rare. If you use margins with Schulze, yes, you'd get the same results as RP(margins) given three Smith candidates. Same with River(margins) if there is such a thing.

Kevin Venzke

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