[EM] Chicken Dilemma--To whom is it a problem?

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Fri Oct 18 10:04:23 PDT 2013


You mentioned that votes-only SDSC acts similiarly to FBC. Yes, but
FBC is necessary only for current conditions.

It is my belief that we won't get voting system reform under current
conditions anyway. If a better voting system will come about onlly in
the Green scenario (even if its (e.g.) the Justice-Party instead of
the Greens), then it's more important to find the best voting system
for the Green scenario.

You said that you're talking about voting systems for something closer
than the Green scenario. I don't think voting system reform is as
likely before the Green scenario.

Of course, though SDSC and FBC are mutually compatible, the most
popular methods that elect B in your example, Beatpath and RP, don't
meet FBC, and so are not adequate for current conditions (though they
seem to do excellently in organizational voting where FBC isn't needed
and there's no chicken dilemma).

Michael Ossipoff

On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 10:36 PM, Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr> wrote:
> Hi Mike,
> First, regarding the CD criterion and SDSC: They are, it seems
> to me, almost totally incompatible. Not just incidentally but
> even in their philosophical approach to the situation. This is
> why CD makes me skittish.
> CD says that when the votes look like this, and A is the winner:
> 26 A>B
> 25 B>A
> 49 C
> Then in this election, B cannot be the winner:
> 26 A>B
> 25 B
> 49 C
> "Votes-only" versions of SDSC say that C can't win. So if we
> were to satisfy both CD and SDSC we would only be able to
> elect A (and I wouldn't see that as viable for a proposal
> personally).
> In the scenario where B voters truncate, SDSC essentially
> wants to find a majority (even hidden beneath the unviable
> A preferences) and count it if possible. This is similar in
> spirit to FBC because it means that the A voters can defeat
> C while still expressing their support for A. It doesn't
> harm B.
> But CD looks at this scenario and concludes that somebody
> deserves a beating, and the only way to do it is to punish both
> A and B voters.
> My concern is that I think scenario #2 is likely in the
> "near term" (given adoption of a rank method), and that it is
> likely sincere, or at least not intentionally insincere.
> ----- Mail original -----
>> De : Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>>  Sure. If they can enact a system that ensures they always have
>>>  incentive to vote as a mutual majority, then they don't have any
>>>  need of e.g. SDSC.
>>>  But this is a long ways off.
>>>  Isn't there a sense in which it's
>>>  "more realistic," as you say above, to be concerned about whether
>>>  methods satisfy SDSC, or other criteria which could be useful to
>>>  parties that can't win in the short term but want to at least
>>>  collect their share of the votes?
>> I haven't evaluated by SDSC for quite a while. I used to apply it to
>> compare some wv Condorcet methods to other methods, but I don't know
>> how Benham & Woodall do by it.
>> I'm not saying that I have a monopoly on saying what's practical.
>> You're referring to a time before there is a progressive majority,
>> right?
> Yes.
>> Before there's a progressive majority, there isn't any good outcome
>> that we can hope for, and I feel that Plurality is the only voting
>> system that we'll have.  And are you assuming that we can enact a new
>> voting system under Republocrat rule? If we could, then, for current
>> conditions, it would be best to have one that meets FBC. I just feel
>> that if we could ever get a better voting system, it would probably be
>> _after_ electing a progressive govt, via Plurality strategy.
>> I'm in the odd position of having to ask how my own criterion (SDSC)
>> applies.  ..for which conditions (current, or Green scenaio) it
>> usefully measures merit...and in what way.  I remember the definition
>> of SDSC, and that it shows some benefits of wv Condorcet. But wv
>> Condorcet would undeniably give favorite-burial need, under current
>> conditions. For Green scenario conditions then?
> No, I meant near-term conditions.
> SDSC is satisfied by WV methods, yes, but it's not incompatible with
> FBC. Examples are MDDA, MAMPO, ICA, ER-Bucklin(whole). None are
> Condorcet methods though (but ICA is quite close).
> I suspect that you, at some point, ruled out MDDA etc. due to the
> chicken dilemma. Assuming we might agree that SDSC is useful for near-
> term elections (and maybe we can't), I guess that there isn't going to
> be one method that is both a good "near term" method and also a good
> Green scenario method.
> Kevin Venzke
> ----
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