[EM] Chicken Dilemma--To whom is it a problem?

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Thu Oct 17 19:36:22 PDT 2013

Hi Mike,

First, regarding the CD criterion and SDSC: They are, it seems
to me, almost totally incompatible. Not just incidentally but
even in their philosophical approach to the situation. This is
why CD makes me skittish.

CD says that when the votes look like this, and A is the winner:

26 A>B
25 B>A
49 C

Then in this election, B cannot be the winner:

26 A>B
25 B
49 C

"Votes-only" versions of SDSC say that C can't win. So if we
were to satisfy both CD and SDSC we would only be able to 

elect A (and I wouldn't see that as viable for a proposal 


In the scenario where B voters truncate, SDSC essentially 

wants to find a majority (even hidden beneath the unviable
A preferences) and count it if possible. This is similar in
spirit to FBC because it means that the A voters can defeat
C while still expressing their support for A. It doesn't 

harm B.

But CD looks at this scenario and concludes that somebody
deserves a beating, and the only way to do it is to punish both
A and B voters.

My concern is that I think scenario #2 is likely in the
"near term" (given adoption of a rank method), and that it is
likely sincere, or at least not intentionally insincere.

----- Mail original -----
> De : Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>  Sure. If they can enact a system that ensures they always have
>>  incentive to vote as a mutual majority, then they don't have any
>>  need of e.g. SDSC.
>>  But this is a long ways off.
>>  Isn't there a sense in which it's
>>  "more realistic," as you say above, to be concerned about whether
>>  methods satisfy SDSC, or other criteria which could be useful to
>>  parties that can't win in the short term but want to at least
>>  collect their share of the votes?
> I haven't evaluated by SDSC for quite a while. I used to apply it to
> compare some wv Condorcet methods to other methods, but I don't know
> how Benham & Woodall do by it.
> I'm not saying that I have a monopoly on saying what's practical.
> You're referring to a time before there is a progressive majority,
> right?


> Before there's a progressive majority, there isn't any good outcome
> that we can hope for, and I feel that Plurality is the only voting
> system that we'll have.  And are you assuming that we can enact a new
> voting system under Republocrat rule? If we could, then, for current
> conditions, it would be best to have one that meets FBC. I just feel
> that if we could ever get a better voting system, it would probably be
> _after_ electing a progressive govt, via Plurality strategy.
> I'm in the odd position of having to ask how my own criterion (SDSC)
> applies.  ..for which conditions (current, or Green scenaio) it
> usefully measures merit...and in what way.  I remember the definition
> of SDSC, and that it shows some benefits of wv Condorcet. But wv
> Condorcet would undeniably give favorite-burial need, under current
> conditions. For Green scenario conditions then?

No, I meant near-term conditions.

SDSC is satisfied by WV methods, yes, but it's not incompatible with
FBC. Examples are MDDA, MAMPO, ICA, ER-Bucklin(whole). None are 
Condorcet methods though (but ICA is quite close).

I suspect that you, at some point, ruled out MDDA etc. due to the 
chicken dilemma. Assuming we might agree that SDSC is useful for near-
term elections (and maybe we can't), I guess that there isn't going to
be one method that is both a good "near term" method and also a good 
Green scenario method.

Kevin Venzke

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