Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Thu Oct 17 18:51:32 PDT 2013

Hi Forest,
> De : Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu>

>In other words, MMPO[IA>=MPO], even with approval style ballots is a better remedy to the spoiler problem than Approval (which does always elect from ballot Smith if not actual Smith).  I think that this was Kevin's idea on one of his initial posts to the EM list years ago.  He saw that MMPO was better at discerning central candidates than Approval, even when limited to approval style ballots.  He abandoned the idea after seeing that MMPO by itself failed Plurality.  But now we have fixed that!

Yes, about 10 years ago. I don't want to verify the details for fear of having to read embarrassing posts. But I don't think I even knew about MMPO at the time. The Plurality criterion probably had not yet appeared on EM, but I knew "two-slot MMPO" had oddities, and I knew you could play with it by subtracting MPO from approval. I never tried this with rank ballots though.

>So far I don't see any bad side of MMPO[IA>=MPO].

I still plan to (remember how to) run my simulations and give it a try. The code is crowded with confusing switches designed to capture different types of information...

Quite curious where the incentives land on the MAMPO-to-MMPO spectrum. Hoping for closer to the latter but with less burial incentive. Maybe I said that already.

Kevin Venzke

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