[EM] Chicken Dilemma Criterion definition

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Thu Oct 17 09:02:32 PDT 2013


Here is my electowiki definition of the Chicken Dilemma Criterion.

Chicken Dilemma Criterion

>From Electowiki
Jump to: navigation, search


Supporting definitions:

1. The A voters are the voters who prefer candidate A to everyone
else. The B voters are the voters who prefer candidate B to everyone

2. The "other candidates" are the candidates other than A and B.

3. A particular voter votes sincerely if s/he doesn't falsify a
preference, or fail to vote a felt preference that the balloting
system in use would have allowed hir to vote in addition to the
preferences that s/he actually votes.


1. The A voters and the B voters, combined, add up to more than half
of the voters in the election.

2. The A voters and the B voters all prefer both A and B to the other

3. The A voters are more numerous than are the B voters.

4. Voting is sincere, except that the B voters refuse to vote A over anyone.

5. Candidate A would be the unique winner under sincere voting (...in
other words, if the B voters voted sincerely, as do all the other


B doesn't win.

[end of CD definition]


In the chicken dilemma scenario described in the premise of the
Chicken Dilemma Criterion (CD) defined above, if B won, then the B
voters would have successfully taken advantage of the A voters'
co-operativeness. The A voters wanted to vote both A and B over the
candidates disliked by both the A voters and B voters. Thereby they
helped {A,B} against worse candidates. But, with methods that fail CD,
the message is "You help, you lose".


Some methods that pass the Chicken Dilemma Criterion:

ICT, Symmetrical ICT, MMPO, MDDTR

[to which I now add IRV, Benham, and Woodall]

More information about the Election-Methods mailing list