[EM] Ranking unacceptable candidates.

[Michael Ossipoff]

I hadn't intended to post my previous posting yet. I sent a copy to
myself, to work on it later, and EM's address wasn't in the "To:"
field. But it got sent to EM anyway.

So let my reply to the rest of the message:

Juho--

On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 1:29 AM, Juho Laatu <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
> On 19.10.2013, at 3.31, Michael Ossipoff wrote:


A number of party platforms offer IRV. That makes it's merits a very
relevant matter.

The only way to really judge what the voting systems and their
properties would be like, is to actually vote a ballot, for those
voting systems.

So, just for your own experience (you needn't post it if you don't
want to), write your ranking of the political parties (of the U.S.,
&/or your country of residence)--not necessarily a sincere ranking,
but the ranking that you'd actually vote if it were a geuine official
public political election, by whatever method you're trying-out, such
as IRV.

I guarantee that your IRV ranking will be sincere, if you expect to be
in a mutual majority. When you try it out, IRV looks pretty good.

 ...And if you aren't in a mutual majority? Well, if your
policy-preferences are good, and if other people's judgment is as good
as yours, then you _will_ be in a mutual majorty. A mutual majority is
the important kind of majority. A cohesive majority of voters who all
support that majority's favorites over all others, because they all
agree on the most important matters of policy.

But try writing a ranking, because that's the only way you'll really
know how you feel about the methods and their properties.

That's why I like polls.

Anyway, I feel that IRV's advantages outweigh its disadvantages. But
IRV's disadvantages are gotten-rid-of by Benham and Woodall, which
retain IRV's advantages.

...almost all of IRV's advantages. They lose IRV's LNHa & LNHe
combination. But the Condorcet Criterion (CC) compliance that they
bring is worth that.

You wrote:

 But generally I lean towards Condorcet style methods (in typical
political elections where the target is to elect good compromise
candidates).
[/quote]

Yes, and that means avoiding dis-satisfied majorities, by electing CWs
or (when there isn't a CW) Smith-set members. Additionally, electing
the CW avoids the worst of IRV's strategy-problems for voters who
aren't in a mutual majority.

But you can have both. You can have IRV's MMC and no-chicken-dilemma,
and also have the Condorcet Criterion, and the Smith Criterion--with
Benham or Woodall.

Michael Ossipoff