[EM] Chicken Dilemma--To whom is it a problem? KV to MO

[Michael Ossipoff]

Kevin--

>> But if some set of voters agree on certain basic important things,
>> differing only in details, and in their beliefs that their own party
>> is the solution, then is it unlikely that theyd all prefer eachother's
>> policy-proposals to the alternatives?
>>
>
> Maybe I overstate the unlikelihood. The scenario doesn't make a lot
> of sense to me though. There is only one seat to win, yet all of
> these voters are reciprocating preferences for multiple candidates.

They're ranking sincerely, because IRV, Benham, and Woodall
strategically allow them to. Mutual majority voters are strategically
free to sincerely vote among their acceptable-set, while also voting
that set over everyone else.

For the members of a mutual majority, IRV, Benham, an Woodall make
available the otherwise unattainable "rank-balloting ideal", strategic
freedom to rank sincerely.

And Benham and Woodall don't make the IRV's strategy-dilemma for non
mutual-majority voters.

> Whether it's because those candidates are really *that* similar and
> their voters are very cooperative, or whether instead the candidates
> or parties are needing to actively plead with the voters to swap
> preferences, it seems like it has an inherent risk (with poor reward)
> that would make it rare.

With Beatpath or Ranked-Pairs, there'd be defection-betrayal risk, in
a rivalrous mutual majority, if you sincerely rank the members of that
MM-preferred set. CD-complying methods are intended to elminate that
risk.


> Bit of a tangent: The method I like for your scenario is a type of
> open party list. Say each party can nominate as many candidates as
> they want to run under that list. Then the voters can approve as
> many lists as they like, and approve any candidates on any lists.
> Then elect the most approved candidate on the most approved list.
>
> To be effective maybe we have to ban approving candidates on the lists
> you don't vote for. As a voter I certainly want that ability, but
> it's possible that the threat of meddling from outside the party
> would discourage parties from accepting a "moderate" on their list if
> they think they have a change to win with a more "off-center" nominee.
>
> Even so, I don't know if it would work. Whoever is crafting the party
> list needs to be accepting of diversity among their candidates or
> there isn't much point to it. Your progressive component parties
> might end up having to run on their own lists anyway, turning the
> method into plain Approval.
>
>
>
>>
>> It seems to me that it's natural that if the A voters think that B's
>> policies are similar enough to their own, so that they prefer B to C,
>> then the B voters would also perceive that policy-similiarity. So
>> mutuality doesn't seem like it would be rare.
>>
>> Yes, I know that one scenario has B somewhere between A and C, maybe
>> halfway between, resulting in indifference between A and C. But how
>> likely is it that B would be exactly halfway inbetween? Isn't it much
>> more likely that B would be closer to one than to the other? ...in
>> which case there would be a {B,A} mutual majority, or a {B,C} mutual
>> majority.
>>
>
> Sure, but that's in sincere terms. If the sincere mutual majority is
> {Bush,Gore} and those are the perceived frontrunners, then that (large)
> coalition won't be visible on the ballots.

...not with chicken-dilemma-vulnerable voting-system.

But if the Republocrat preferrers (pretending that there would really
be any) are concerned about a risk of electing a progressive instead
of a Republocrat, and if the voting-system is IRV, Benham or Woodall,
then the Republocrats, believing themselves a mutual majority, won't
have any reason to not rank sincerely within their mutual-majority
preferred-set, {Gore,Bush}.


> If the sincere MM is {Gore,Nader}

Just to say: I wouldn't support that MM.

> ...but the perceived frontrunners are
> Bush and Gore then I think you have an uphill battle convincing the
> Gore voters to play nice. Nader voters are in the ugly position of
> having to ask the Gore camp for support. They are trying to sell the
> story that they deserve to win if they have the votes. Yet they are
> having to ask for votes to do it.

This self-fulfilling media-fabricated perception of Dem & Repub as the
frontrunners is part of what I call "current conditions". For the
strategically-pesimistic current conditions, I don't propose IRV,
Benham or Woodall. For current condiions, I'd propose Approval, Score,
ICT or Symmetrical ICT. But, as I always say, if there's any way that
voting-system reform can ever happen, it's much more likely to happen
by first electing a progressive govt, via Plurality, than by achieving
voting system reform under Republocrat rule.

...Hence my greater intrerest in  voting systems for the Green
scenario, as opposed to current conditions.

Those strategically-optimistic Green scnario conditions allow us to
more be ambitious, because, not needing FBC, we can get the MMC+CD+CC
combination.

> Under an SDSC method of course the Gore camp doesn't need to do
> anything in this scenario. With a CD method it's less clear. But
> without a change in the perceived status quo (of Gore being stronger)
> the Nader voters can be conceivably blamed for threatening to wreck
> an election over a candidate who has (without concessions from the
> Gore camp) no chance of winning.

Under our abysmally regrettable current-conditions, progressives think
they need Dem. At least with Approval they could approve Dem and
Nader.

With Plurality, non-Republocrat candidates (in other words, candidates
not permitted by the media) won't have a chance unless everyone who
prefers progressive policies is willing to start voting honestly, for
what they actuallly prefer.

I'm not saying that that will happen. In fact, I'm not saying that
people will even ever demand a verifiable vote-count. And, even if
they ever did, the regime would, of course, have no reason to grant
that request for legitmate elections.

> I think that the Gore camp can tell better stories and so will
> probably truncate with clear conscience, and Nader voters will
> probably see that, which reinforces still the likelihood that the
> Gore camp will win the game of chicken.

There won't be a game of chicken unless the voting-system is
chicken-dilema-vulnerable.

In Approval, which I recommend for current conditions, there can, and
probably will, be chicken-dilemma. Progressives would have to deal
with it as best they can, via
strategic-probabilistic-partial-defection, which is all guesswork.

But, for the conditions that you're talking about, where progressives
think they need Dem, and where Plurality is the voting-system, Gore
beats Nader every time. I claim that the "Gore voters" are most or all
Nader-preferrers, in terms of policy-preference. They accept Gore as a
lesser-evil compromise. People who vote for Gore as a lesser evil
can't  be called Gore-preferrers.

By the way, I wouldn't vote for Nader anymore, even if he ran,
because, during one of his campaigns, he advocated continuing the war
on Iraq for a while longer. I'd probably hold my nose and vote for him
if 1) The progressives had a collective majorty; and 2)  Nader was the
highest-polling (questionably) progressive candidate.


> If we have no idea which of Gore and Nader is the stronger, then
> I have no idea what happens. I doubt this is a stable situation
> that would survive for long.

The media never leave any doubt about which is stronger, Dem or
progressive. It's always Dem.

If people tried voting honestlly, and if elections and polls were
non-frauduently counted, then we might find out differrent. Won't
happen.

>> B voters being indifferent between A and C; and C voters being
>> indifferent between A and B--That doesn't seem likely.
>>
>
> I think that sums up the Bush/Gore/Nader scenario quite well though,
> at least in terms of what the cast rankings would probably look like.

If we had rank-balloting now, our existing media would tell Republican
top-rankers to rank Dem 2nd, even while telling Democrat top-rankers
to not rank Progresive.

>> CD is compatible with Condorcet. Benahm and Woodall comply with both CD and CC.
>>
>> They both comply with CD and Smith.
>>
>
> Did you say CD will be limited to the three-candidate case?

I've considered that simplification of CD, but, so far, I haven't seen
need for it. It may yet turn out to be needed. I don't know.

But I do feel that CD's premise should have an additional stipulation:

Voters who don't prefer anyone to the non-{A,B} candidates are
indifferent between A and B, and don't vote A or B over anyone.

That's for simplicity.

Michael Ossipoff