[EM] Chicken Dilemma--To whom is it a problem?

[Michael Ossipoff]

Kevin--

Part 2 of replly to Oct. 15 post:


>> You continued:
>>
>>>  You seem to be focused on a very specific scenario, where it is very easy
>> to tell (from the scenario definition) who's defecting from which camp and
>> how to punish them for it.
>> [/quote]
>>
>> Well, the trouble is that you can't know for sure that the other party
>> will defect, or that they won't.
>
> What I mean is, if you tell me that B and C are the Green bloc and the
> B voters don't support C, I know that's defection, but only because you
> told me that B and C are in the same bloc. Normally, elsewhere, I would
> not have that information.

But the B voters will know if they feel regret when Badguy wins
instead of C. If they don't care between C and Badguy, then they have
no need to support C.

>> But the whole point of better voting systems is to improve on
>> Plurality, to reduce strategy-need. The progressives will want to be
>> able to vote sincerely, without intra-progressive strategy, even if
>> they can somehow overcome it to initially elect a progressive govt via
>> Plurality.
>>
>
> Sure. If they can enact a system that ensures they always have
> incentive to vote as a mutual majority, then they don't have any
> need of e.g. SDSC.
>
> But this is a long ways off.

Definitely, the Plurality election of a progressiive govt is a very
long way off, and will probably happen. And, as I see it, that's what
the scenario must start with.

If that happened, we'd likely have IRV as the new govt's initial
voting system, and would soon have a referendum or initiative in which
we could choose whatever voting system we the public want.

> Isn't there a sense in which it's
> "more realistic," as you say above, to be concerned about whether
> methods satisfy SDSC, or other criteria which could be useful to
> parties that can't win in the short term but want to at least
> collect their share of the votes?

I haven't evaluated by SDSC for quite a while. I used to apply it to
compare some wv Condorcet methods to other methods, but I don't know
how Benham & Woodall do by it.

I'm not saying that I have a monopoly on saying what's practical.
You're referring to a time before there is a progressive majority,
right?

Before there's a progressive majority, there isn't any good outcome
that we can hope for, and I feel that Plurality is the only voting
system that we'll have.  And are you assuming that we can enact a new
voting system under Republocrat rule? If we could, then, for current
conditions, it would be best to have one that meets FBC. I just feel
that if we could ever get a better voting system, it would probably be
_after_ electing a progressive govt, via Plurality strategy.

I'm in the odd position of having to ask how my own criterion (SDSC)
applies.  ..for which conditions (current, or Green scenaio) it
usefully measures merit...and in what way.  I remember the definition
of SDSC, and that it shows some benefits of wv Condorcet. But wv
Condorcet would undeniably give favorite-burial need, under current
conditions. For Green scenario conditions then?

I really like Ranked Pairs and Beatpath, and their excellently
well-justifed pairwise-based choice.

In the Green scenariio, where FBC isn't necessary, and if there isn't
a chicken dilemma,  I think that Ranked-Pairs and Beatpath make the
best choice. ...But the chicken dilemma will be there, and that spoils
RP & Beatpath.

> I tend to think that there must
> be many progressives who care about being able to support the
> "lesser evil" compromise, and who wouldn't be able to accept your
> advice to just vote sincerely, no matter what.

Quite so. That's why right now we have Obama killing and maiming
children in Afghanistan.

And that's why, in our country, 1% of the population own 40% of the
wealth. And it's why we have the most income-inequality among
industial countries (as measured by Gini index, and by R/P10 & R/P20
(income of richest 10% or 20% divided by income of poorest 10% or
20%)).