[EM] Approval Voting

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

As with many such scenarios I've seen, it assumes an electorate that 
is firmly attached to one or the other major party, and then, in this 
case, it assumes a third candidate who has supporters similarly attached.

Any idea how preposterous this is in an established two-party system? 
Then, Kristofer again assumes rigid partisan voting, while the 
election method (Approval) sets up the possibility of different 
voting styles, and if free entry of candidates to this election -- 
implied by the setup -- is allowed, again, there is rigid voting.

But the majority of voters in the U.S., anyway, quite simply, don't 
vote that way, and a third party isn't going to arise unless it 
vote-splits with an existing major party. And those who would be 
split with plurality would easily vote for both the new candidate and 
the existing one.

Emotional weight is added to the argument by calling the new 
candidate(s) Hated. But in the circumstances described, it would be 
*easier* -- slightly -- to ascribe that to the D and the R.

So what is set up is a situation where there are three rigid 
factions, and they hate each other. But we then give this a spin by 
*claiming* that the D and the R don't hate each other as much as they 
hate H. Yeah, but in a situation like this, obviously, Approval isn't 
expressive enough. Approval is a Range method, but with the minimum 
expressive range.

Bucklin, Instant Runoff Approval, could handle this pretty well. And 
if the Ds and Rs hold out, each trying to win, yes, H could win with 
a plurality method, *and as described, Approval is a plurality 
method.* That is, it elects with a plurality.

I hope that Kristofer is aware that the U.S. President is never 
elected with a plurality of electoral votes, this only could happen 
in a direct election by plurality.

IRV would handle this situation, because of it's LNH satisfaction, 
but there are much better ways without the IRV pathologies. (Which 
don't bite in this situation, this is one where IRV works.)

To keep the original intention of the U.S. Presidential system, I'd 
suggest Asset, vote for one -- or FAAV, which is Asset with any 
overvotes fractionated to keep it one total vote per voter, since all 
the votes will remain active.

Then a majority of electoral votes can be required, as with the 
original intention. The electoral college without districts, and 
defined by candidate votes directly, instead of indirectly.

If a runoff method is to be used -- which many countries do -- then 
I'd use Bucklin for both elections (or a range hybrid). With Bucklin 
in the runoff, it can be top 3. Any election with leading candidates 
so equally balanced is only resolved based on that data, at 
substantial risk of making a poor decision.

A more sophisticated ballot than Approval is needed, unless the 
election is a series of approval runoffs, with only one eliminated at 
a time. We aren't going to do that.


At 04:42 PM 5/6/2013, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>On 05/06/2013 11:21 PM, Jonathan Denn wrote:
>>In these "likely" scenarios, and assuming there is no electoral
>>college, doesn't a runoff of the top two seem the best method until
>>someone gets a majority?
>
>It would solve that problem, but the problem can be reintroduced if each
>party gets greedy.
>
>Say each party thinks like this: "We can get our partisan voters to 
>vote for only our own candidates. If we'd win an ordinary Approval 
>with a single candidate, then by fielding n candidates, we can win a 
>top-n runoff". So they each field two clones, and you get a result like:
>
>H1: 34%
>H2: 34%
>D1: 33%
>D2: 33%
>R1: 33%
>R2: 33%
>
>now H1 and H2 go to the runoff.
>
>For Approval, it'd be better to pick the challenger as the candidate 
>who's approved by most people who didn't approve of the winner. Then 
>H1 and a non-H candidate go to the runoff, and the non-H candidate wins.
>
>There may be more sophisticated methods that solve that problem as 
>well. My "pick the candidate who's approved by most who didn't 
>approve of the winner" was just something I thought of as I wrote 
>this, and it may (for all I know) have strange strategy incentives.
>
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