[EM] Historical perspective about FairVote organization
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
abd at lomaxdesign.com
Wed Mar 13 14:48:39 PDT 2013
At 03:16 PM 3/13/2013, Richard Fobes wrote:
>For the benefit of those who don't understand why FairVote promotes
>IRV (instant-runoff voting) in opposition to many forum participants
>here, I'm posting this extract from an excellent, well-written, long
>message by Abd.
>
>On 3/13/2013 11:46 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>[not copied]
>I'll add that in Canada the FairVote group directly advocates STV
>and European-based PR methods, not the stepping-stone IRV path.
>
>(BTW, please don't confuse the similarly named FairVote and VoteFair names.)
I certainly won't.
Yes, STV is a far more sensible method, under certain multiwinner
conditions. However, the essential problem does remain, premature
elimination as a result of vote-splitting in first preference,
further, there is the problem that Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) identified
in the 1880s, that voters don't necessarily have adequate information
to properly rank more than one candidate. Hence he proposed what we
now call Asset Voting, as a tweak on STV.
With Asset Voting, candidates aren't actually eliminated; rather,
they aren't elected yet, but they can exercise the votes they hold,
to create winners, thus converting the voting system into a
*deliberative process.* In theory, if two candidates are holding
votes for the last seat, and can't come to an agreement, they can
choose *someone else*, who might not have been a candidate at all!
The Election Science Foundation, an informal ancestor of the Center
for Election Science, held an Asset election a few years ago, and it
demonstrated the power of Asset. It was amazing to watch, and very
different from what might have been expected, yet, -- except for one
voter who has later said he was disappointed because -- horrors! -- a
candidate who was the leading unelected candidate, after two had been
elected, *gave his votes to another to create him as a winner.*
Every other voter accepted the result, and this one exception *did
not actually object to the result,* but to the behavior of one
candidate. Apparently he had the idea that this person was supposed
to fight to the bitter end or something. Whatever happened to the
idea that people offer to serve, but actually care more about the
purposes and unity of the organization, than about *personal control*?
Just as IRV can fail to elect a candidate who would win, hands-down,
in a pairwise contest with the IRV winner, STV can do something
similar for representatives, it just happens less often and with less harm.
There are other PR methods which are less problematic. Asset could be
the simplest to canvass, but is untried in public elections. I highly
recommend using Asset for non-public elections, where one wants a
truly representative assembly or council or committee. I'd be glad to
assist with any implementation. Asset does something that could bring
major benefits all by itself, the establishment of "electors" or
"public voters" who can create -- or re-create, if needed, a
representation of the *entire membership* with only consensual
compromise. No votes need be wasted.
More information about the Election-Methods
mailing list