[EM] Helping the Pirate Party to vanish

[Michael Allan]

Dinu, Paul, Alex, Pablo and Abd,
cc Partido de Internet (please forgive my lack of Spanish)

> > To succeed in taking down the party system, the party must
> > sacrifice itself completely.
 
Dinu said:
> that sounds a lot like what a compatriot of yours, Lester Frank
> Ward, said about political parties in the US, way back in 1893, in a
> paper I've found reprinted in a book about sociocracy, and which I
> extracted and translated ...

Thanks Dinu, I didn't know about sociocracy.  It's similar in some
ways to the designs I work with.  But the words you quoted from Ward
don't seem to connect with my own words above.  He doesn't mention
taking down the party system, or the method of political sacrifice.

It's basically an application of liquid democracy.  Ward could not
have foreseen it, because it depends too heavily on the Internet.  For
details, please see the thread "Parliamentary compromising strategy":
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2013-March/thread.html#31593


Paul said:
> Well, not completely I think. There is no reason why people would
> not organise in parties around some kind of "party program" and try
> to get people elected. But parties respond always, as any
> organistion, to the iron law of oligarchy and therefore it is
> necesssary to keep the ultimate decisive power in the hands of the
> people.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iron_law_of_oligarchy

You're right, it's not a complete sacrifice on the part of the
technical party; it's only a political sacrifice.  (See my reply to
Alex below.)  And I agree with your last point.  The open primary
(link above) can be seen as a method of transferring electoral power
from the political parties to the electors (i.e. the voters).  But in
doing this, it also defeats the purpose of voting for a political
party.  Why vote for a party's candidate list when instead you can
vote for your own candidate list?  the one that you and the other
citizens are compiling in the open, all-party primary?  the one that's
in the news?  the one that names all the members who'll be sitting in
the next assembly?  the one that everyone is looking at, talking about
and debating?  And since it's pointless to vote for a political party,
then isn't it also pointless to join one?  or to organize one?


Alex said:
> Yes, but initially, it probably needs a party that will help to beta
> test everything and bring this which has most support on the open
> plattform into the assembly.  The long established parties will
> never start this.  It needs pressure from the pirates to start this
> and when the other parties join in, then the pirates will vanish or
> at least become totally unimportant.  ...

Yes, politically.  But they'll still be important technically and
socially.  And even politically, they'll win a place in history.
They'll win it precisely because they sacrificed their chance at
political power for the sake of the citizens at large.

> ... But the pirates will make it popular when they start to use such
> a platform and put this, which was decided by people on the
> plattform into the assembly.  Media will start to talk about it and
> people will join, because they KNOW, that whatever is discussed and
> decided here, will be put into the the current governance process by
> the pirates.  Otherwise, people would never make the effort if there
> is nobody who will make it binding.

I don't think it can happen that way.  The technical parties who make
the big news will be the ones who organize the open primary and give
the electors their first chance to vote for something that isn't a
political party.  That's the movement that will triumph in the
Bundestag, the Cortes Generales, the Italian Parliament, and so forth.
For the Pirates to join it (or found it), I think they must give up
all hope of gaining political power, and instead announce that their
candidate list will henceforth be set according to the open primary of
all-party candidates.

If the experts in the Election Methods list can't find a serious fault
with this method, then it might be possible to bring down the party
system in as little as a few years.  Mind you, it would be no bad
thing if it took a while longer, given the disruption it might cause.

> > You predict that AG Meinungsfindungstool can commit to complete
> > user freedom (1) without being stopped by internal party
> > resistance.  I'm less certain.  I know that if you do move toward
> > (1), then the party will immediately start falling apart as such.
> > Citizens will start taking its place, and it'll be a painful
> > transition for the party.
> 
> No it wont be a painful transition, because most pirates waiting for
> this to happen.  There are only a few for which it might painful and
> thats the current "captains" so to say :-) Normal citizens join in
> all the time and discuss in the working groups, and very day, new
> people join in.  Many of them are not party members.

Well, the Pirates could start by coding an open, all-party primary.
That would be a firm commitment to (1), because, when it comes to
technical parties like the Pirates and Partido de Internet, all-party
means all-platform.  So the job is to enable the users to range freely
across voting platforms.  A prototype could be running in as little as
a few months.  And the Knight Foundation might even pay for it:
https://www.newschallenge.org/open/open-government/submission/free-range-voting/


Pablo said:
> ... more specifically, is there software out there contemplating the
> liberation of user data? ...
>
> It would also be very nice for new programs to appear and hook up to
> the network of already built user data.  So innovation would thrive.

We're hoping to liberate voting data so that all tools have access to
the same votes (link above).  I think you're right, it will help
innovation to thrive.


Abd said:
> We invented delegable proxy [DP], also known as liquid democracy and
> by various other names, more than a decade ago to allow the
> formation of consensus in large groups, efficiently. DP, however,
> will not reverse or disable the Iron Law. However, it does provide a
> means of watching it and limiting the damage from it. ...

(Abd's an expert on election methods.  He's also written on the topic
of liquid democracy/DP, back as early as 2003.)

> ... In my work, and because DP was untested in large organizations,
> I always combined DP with a Free Association [FA] concept. ...
>
> The FA provides the communication structure and *the same structure
> can be used by competing parties.*

Providing communication structure for their members is also the focus
of technical parties like the Pirates and Partido de Internet.  They
look similar to FAs in this regard.  They're bound by similar
principles of freedom of information and expression that (by the Iron
Law) seem to be incompatible with the exercise of political power.

> However, the existing system generally assumes that parties compete,
> and often ignores the possibility of cooperation. DP technology can
> make it possible to estimate the breadth of support for some
> position, and consensus is powerful. If what people want to do is
> fight and win, they may accomplish something, but necessarily at a
> cost and with the reduced efficiency of dealing with opposition.

(You speak of political parties, but here I suggest they can be swept
away by the technical parties.  Effectively their open DP primary
dissolves away the political boundaries that separate the parties,
which now become fluid in DP.)
 
> FA/DP -- like AA -- is about *communication*, the FA itself has no
> power to fight over. AA deliberately avoided property for this
> reason. Don't like a meeting? Start another. The saying in AA is,
> "All you need to start a meeting is a resentment and a coffee pot."
> And so AA harness the natural differences that appear in people to
> multiply meetings like rabbits. The more meetings, the more
> available meetings are when people need them....

That's how open the technical parties ought to be.  Anyone with a
coffee pot should be able to fork a party (a technical platform) and
invite the members (users) to try it out.  This means open primaries
(electoral, legislative, executive, etc.) based on free-range voting.
It's this that will sweep away the political parties.  Or can anyone
foresee a problem with this approach?

-- 
Mike


Dinu Gherman said:
> Michael Allan:
> 
> > To succeed in taking down the party system, the party
> > must sacrifice itself completely.
> 
> Hi Mike,
> 
> that sounds a lot like what a compatriot of yours, Lester Frank Ward, said about political parties in the US, way back in 1893, in a paper I've found reprinted in a book about sociocracy, and which I extracted and translated into German here:
> 
> http://de.slideshare.net/dinugherman/sociocracy
> http://de.slideshare.net/dinugherman/soziokratie
> 
> I'm adding just one quote below. Unfortunately, Ward was way ahead of his time. And it seems like, even 120 years later, we're still not getting there.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Dinu
> 
> How then, it may be asked, do democracy and sociocracy differ? How does society differ from the people? If the phrase “the people” really meant the people, the difference would be less. But that shibboleth of democratic states, where it means anything at all that can be described or defined, stands simply for the majority of qualified electors, no matter how small that majority may be. There is a sense in which the action of a majority may be looked upon as the action of society. At least, there is no denying the right of the majority to act for society, for to do this would involve either the denial of the right of government to act at all, or the admission of the right of a minority to act for society. But a majority acting for society is a different thing from society acting for itself, even though, as must always be the case, it acts through an agency chosen by its members. All democratic governments are largely party governments. The electors range themselves on one side or the other of some party line, the winning side considers itself the state as much as Louis the Fourteenth did. The losing party usually then regards the government as something alien to it and hostile, like an invader, and thinks of nothing but to gain strength enough to overthrow it at the next opportunity. While various issues are always brought forward and defended or attacked, it is obvious to the looker-on that the contestants care nothing for these, and merely use them to gain an advantage and win an election. -- Lester Frank Ward, 1893


Paul Nollen said:
> Hi Michel,
> 
> Well, not completely I think. There is no reason why people would not 
> organise in parties around some kind of "party program" and try to get 
> people elected. But parties respond always, as any organistion, to the iron 
> law of oligarchy and therefore it is necesssary to keep the ultimate 
> decisive power in the hands of the people.
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iron_law_of_oligarchy
> 
> Paul


Alexander Praetorius said:
> > Exactly, that's why the party is no longer needed and will vanish.
> > All that's needed is the tooling in the hands of the citizens.  Once
> > they have that, then any party can floor their bills in the assembly.
> > Not only will the party be without a purpose, and subsequently vanish,
> > but the entire party system with it.
> 
> [alex]
> Yes, but initially, it probably needs a party that will help to beta test
> everything and bring this which has most support on the open plattform into
> the assembly.
> The long established parties will never start this.
> It needs pressure from the pirates to start this and when the other parties
> join in, then the pirates will vanish or at least become totally
> unimportant.
> But the pirates will make it popular when they start to use such a platform
> and put this, which was decided by people on the plattform into the
> assembly.
> Media will start to talk about it and people will join, because they KNOW,
> that whatever is discussed and decided here, will be put into the the
> current governance process by the pirates.
> Otherwise, people would never make the effort if there is nobody who will
> make it binding.
> [/alex]
> 
> > Where parties are not required by the constitution (Anglo-America),
> > they are likely to vanish completely.  Elsewhere (continental Europe),
> > they will remain in form, but their content will become purely
> > technical.  So German and Italian citizens (e.g.) will not choose a
> > party (political platform), but instead a toolset (technical
> > platform).  Parties will offer different toolsets, but the same list
> > of candidates as chosen by the citizens.  Election results will be the
> > same no matter how people vote on election day: the citizens' list
> > will always win.
> >
> > Pirates won't be able to count on gaining seats in the Bundestag in
> > their own name, and this is going to upset many in the party.
> 
> [alex]
> I agree with your long term perspective, but i think in the short term, it
> needs the pirates to use an open toolset, so it will become more popular.
> At some point, the pirates will become irrelevant, but they are needed to
> start it, at least in germany they are needed.
> The green party might eventually join in as will the liberals, but only
> because they have to and they only have to if the pirates do it first and
> put pressure on the other parties.
> [/alex]
> 
> > You predict that AG Meinungsfindungstool can commit to complete user
> > freedom (1) without being stopped by internal party resistance.  I'm
> > less certain.  I know that if you do move toward (1), then the party
> > will immediately start falling apart as such.  Citizens will start
> > taking its place, and it'll be a painful transition for the party.
> 
> [alex]
> No it wont be a painful transition, because most pirates waiting for this
> to happen.
> There are only a few for which it might painful and thats the current
> "captains" so to say :-)
> Normal citizens join in all the time and discuss in the working groups, and
> very day, new people join in.
> Many of them are not party members.
> [/alex]
> 
> -- 
> 
> Best Regards / Mit freundlichen Grüßen
> ***********************************************
> Alexander Praetorius
> Rappstraße 13
> D - 60318 Frankfurt am Main
> Germany
> *[skype] *alexander.praetorius
> *[mail] *citizen at serapath.de <alexander.praetorius at serapath.de>
> *[web] *http://wiki.piratenpartei.de/Benutzer:Serapath
> ***********************************************


Pablo Segundo Garcia said:
> Hello everyone (Pablo from Partido de Internet, Spain; and pirate too.
> Living in Köln now.)
> 
> I wonder how is the development of "meinungsfindungstools" right now.
> Maybe some link? Is there a software/schematics comparison page in
> some wiki or wikipedia?
> 
> And more specifically, is there software out there contemplating the
> liberation of user data?
> 
> I am no programmer but understand the technologies (interested
> electronics engineer).
> 
> I can say:
> 
> 1. one approach I usually thought is having the software/plataform,
> work always from the outside, being widgets to be inserted in normal
> forums, or even links in emails. This will make it naturally to use
> more "common" data forms and data meanings. And also it would be easy
> that at some point the widget will send signals not only to the
> "currently used tool" but also to some other, or a personal user data
> box.
> 
> 2. Reading you I came up with another idea. Build a
> software/network/platform made of two type of components. One would
> receive and keep all user data, and the other would use it but in
> every new session it would have to re-upload, or refresh, the data
> from the user data server. Like separating savings-banks from
> investments-banks.
> 
> It would also be very nice for new programs to appear and hook up to
> the network of already built user data. So innovation would thrive.
> 
> Another question. What semantic structures are people using for this
> debate/decision/political-expression tools? Is there much new to be
> "developed"? are there clearly discussed different approaches?
> 
> Cheers!
> 
> Pablo


Abd ul-Rahman Lomax said:
> I've been watching this discussion, and think it might be useful to 
> raise some Free Association/Delegable Proxy concepts.
> 
> First of all, we should be aware of the Iron Law of Oligarchy:
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iron_law_of_oligarchy
> 
> The Iron Law is a result of the centralization of power. Where power 
> is centralized, there are gate-keepers, and in spite of theory, for a 
> functional organization, there must be privileged access. 
> Organizations without privileged access rapidly are overwhelmed by 
> noise, and power then devolves to those with special skills at 
> manipulating opinion in the presence of noise.
> 
> The goal of eliminating oligarchy is probably equivalent to a goal of 
> eliminating the coordinating power of large organizations. In other 
> words, oligarchy is not "bad." In many organizations, the Iron Law 
> arises through the Dictatorship of the Involved. I.e., some people 
> are more involved than others, and become more conversant with the 
> organization's "language" and how to function within it.
> 
> The problem is that a gap can appear between the interests of these 
> people and the overall interests of the organization's general 
> membership. This becomes visible, often, when a proposal is made that 
> would spreak out or decentralize responsibility or power. Those whose 
> effective power would be reduced by this will very naturally see it 
> as harmful, as turning over the organizational purpose to the less 
> informed. They might even be right. By the conditions of the problem, 
> they have a power advantage, and will typically, then, resist the 
> change. They may not see any difference between what advantages them 
> and what advantages the organization. In their own view, they *are* 
> the organization. And, again, they may even be right.
> 
> So ... what we know is that genuine consensus is powerful. The 
> consensus of the oligarchs may, to some degree, represent the 
> consensus of the whole, but it can rapidly become isolated, and the 
> organization will then bleed members ( who think of the existing 
> oligarchy as "them" rather than as "us."
> 
> We invented delegable proxy, also known as liquid democracy and by 
> various other names, more than a decade ago to allow the formation of 
> consensus in large groups, efficiently. DP, however, will not reverse 
> or disable the Iron Law. However, it does provide a means of watching 
> it and limiting the damage from it. In my work, and because DP was 
> untested in large organizations, I always combined DP with a Free 
> Association concept.
> 
> Free Associations were modelled on the structure set up for 
> Alchoholics Anonymous, beginning in the 1930s. There are really two 
> "AA"s. Bill Wilson, who became the theoretician behind AA structure, 
> wrote the Twelve Traditions, covering the essentials (and wrote 
> another book later, Twelve Concepts for World Service, with 
> additional details.) Basically, one of the traditions is, "AA as such 
> ought never be organized, but we may create service boards or 
> committees directly responsible to those they serve." So there is AA 
> itself, which is a ground-up organization, the individual groups are 
> autonomous, "excepting in matters affecting other groups or AA as a 
> whole." Nobody tells the groups how to run their meetings, or what 
> must be conveyed there. There is broad consensus on many matters, 
> which should not be confused with central control.
> 
> The most prominent "special board" is AA World Services, Inc, the 
> legal structure with headquarters in New York. They publish the 
> material and hold the copyrights. However, the publishing operation 
> -- which is huge -- is generally operated to be self-supporting. The 
> intention was, very specifically, to make AAWS, Inc., dependent on a 
> continual flow of small donations. They don't accept bequests beyond, 
> I think it's now about $3,000. They don't accumulate assets beyond 
> what is directly and short-term necessary. The *real* AA, which is 
> not organized, is out there in the field, in the millions of members 
> who make it work, and who support their own work. The central office 
> never sends money out to members in the field. There is no dependence 
> on the central office, in fact, it could disappear and local groups 
> would simply print their own literature, or form a new "service 
> board" to do this on a large scale.
> 
> Free Associations, then, don't collect power. However, a Free 
> Association may facilitate the formation of an ordinary organization 
> "directly responsible to those it serves." Free Associations are 
> formed around an "interest group." They generally have no 
> requirements for membership other than self-declaration. They don't 
> charge dues or fees for membership. And ... they don't collect major 
> funding to distribute by majority vote or similar process. They only 
> collect what they need for immediate expenses, such as meeting room 
> rent and, of course, coffee. Perhaps they buy some literature to give 
> away. And when they have some money left over, they give it to the 
> local intergroup for its expenses.
> 
> AA Clubs have formed and incorporated. They are legally independent 
> from AA. Political action groups have formed, Alcoholism Councils 
> become politically active. AA itself stays *entirely out of politics* 
> or any unnecessary controversy. The goal is to maintain AA as a 
> totally universal interest group for alcoholics who have a "desire to 
> remain sober." The rest of what happens is what happens when people 
> are brought together under those conditions, which, it turns out, can 
> be amazingly effective.
> 
> For many years, as I studied -- and used -- the AA structure (I'm not 
> an alcoholic, but there are other programs using the same structure), 
> I encountered people who would say how wonderful it could be if 
> everything worked how it works in AA.
> 
> Hence the Free Association concept, which is a generalization of the 
> AA principles. There is an "interest group" which defines the 
> Association. It could be very broad, or it could be relatively 
> narrow. The FA will operate, then, within the Association definition 
> -- and may refuse to be involved with organization on any other basis.
> 
> But, in politics, how would this fit with an exercise power in a 
> system that expects organizations with centralized control?
> 
> AA did it. Where property was involved, centralized control was 
> necessary. Someone must be responsible for it. A treatment center 
> may, in fact, end up with many millions of dollars in property, 
> staff, etc. AA does not create these, but AA *members* do, working 
> with others as well. AA is not going to give an opinion on 
> legislative or legal issues involving alchoholics, but AA *members* 
> -- through Alcholism Councils -- do.
> 
> In an FA/DP organization, what we call "natural caucuses" will form. 
> A natural caucus is a proxy together with all the clients, direct and 
> indirect, oof that proxy. A proxy can be, then, considered as the 
> natural leader of a "political party," consisting of all those who 
> chose that person, directly or indirectly. A collection of proxies 
> who are members of a political party could, in fact, fully represent 
> that party in the FA -- or close.
> 
> What is the FA going to do? Is it going to recommend candidates for 
> office, collect donations for them, etc.? No. Not as the FA. But 
> natural caucuses are free to do this. The FA sets up a communication 
> structure that would make it simple for a collection of like-minded 
> individuals to rapidly negotiate an internal consensus toward such 
> matters as whom a political part -- technically independent but with 
> overlapping membership -- should nominate, and can rapidly determine 
> how to coordinate toward that goal.
> 
> The FA provides the communication structure and *the same structure 
> can be used by competing parties.*
> 
> However, the existing system generally assumes that parties compete, 
> and often ignores the possibility of cooperation. DP technology can 
> make it possible to estimate the breadth of support for some 
> position, and consensus is powerful. If what people want to do is 
> fight and win, they may accomplish something, but necessarily at a 
> cost and with the reduced efficiency of dealing with opposition.
> 
> FA/DP -- like AA -- is about *communication*, the FA itself has no 
> power to fight over. AA deliberately avoided property for this 
> reason. Don't like a meeting? Start another. The saying in AA is, 
> "All you need to start a meeting is a resentment and a coffee pot." 
> And so AA harness the natural differences that appear in people to 
> multiply meetings like rabbits. The more meetings, the more available 
> meetings are when people need them....
> 
> But everyone stays connected, through "AA." Local intergroups 
> maintain meeting lists. And the understanding of the traditions is 
> widespread, efforts to control those meeting lists to exclude the 
> "wrong kind of meetings" are generally resisted. Members know how 
> important AA unity is, and the know that meetings which ignore the 
> general consensus usually don't last long.
> 
> So, take-home:
> 
> 1. A metapolitical structure can be designed to *advise.* Advise 
> whom? Its own members and anyone else who wishes to be advised. 
> Advice is not control.
> 2. Within that structure, "caucuses" -- special interest groups -- 
> may exist, and these groups may separately organize or be affiliated 
> with political parties. A political party may be represented within 
> the FA structure by as few as one person, or an FA can be organized 
> to specifically be an interest group for a political party.
> 3. FAs can easily merge, so, for the U.S., members of a Democratic FA 
> and a Republican FA could form a meta Citizen's FA, say. And then the 
> ability of *party members* to nevertheless organize to find consensus 
> across party lines is developed. If there is a large Citizen's FA, 
> consensus within it, I'd predict, *would* become party policy in the 
> political parties. Consensus is powerful.
> 4. The key is the network formed, through proxy/client relationships, 
> where the central characteristic of that relationship is not a 
> designation in some software structure, but an actual linkage of 
> direct communication and relative trust.
> 5. So, if necessary, FAs can also split. The only reason for this, 
> that seems at all likely, would be that someone takes over the 
> central FA communications mechanism and attempts to dominate the FA, 
> violating the Traditions. Instead of fighting over it, members simply 
> walk, but because of the DP structure, they *already have the basic 
> organizational structure.* The "dominators" end up only advising themselves.
> 
> (For the same reason, we are not terribly worried about "sock 
> puppets" in FA structures. It is possible to analyze votes by much 
> more sophisticated means than just doing a straight proxy expansion; 
> the exactly analytical tools used can depend on the needs of the one 
> seeking to be advised by a vote. The vote itself isn't going to 
> exercise power, because the FA doesn't collect power. For this 
> reason, while centralized software for amalgamation of positions can 
> be useful, the raw member/proxy assignments and raw votes should be 
> accessible to anyone. "Secret ballot" may see proper usage in 
> accessory organizations (like political parties).
> 
> This system harnesses the Iron Law, in fact. People who might 
> dominate in a classical organization may dominate in an FA, but only 
> to the extent that they are able to maintain their own positions, 
> continuously, as serving their clients. In standard organizations, 
> the gap between a major leader and the common member can be far too 
> great, i.e., it can be impractical for the common member to actually 
> have a conversation with the leader. In an FA, I expect, people will 
> generally assign their proxy to someone *not far from them*, in any 
> of several different ways. The bottom line for a proxy/client 
> relationship is an agreement to accept communication, in both 
> directions. Personally, I'd want a phone number as well as an email address....
> 
> The structure will self-adjust to maintain optimal average client/proxy ratios.