[EM] The Green scenario, and IRV in the Green scenario, is a new topic here. Hence these additional comments. Clarification of position and why.

[Michael Ossipoff]

The reason why I'm posting these comments separately, instead of in
one complete message is that it's about a new topic, one that we
haven't discussed.

As I said, we've been talking about methods for current conditions.
Methods for a different electorate haven't been our topic. In
particular, that's true regarding conditions that are being worked for
by alternative political parties, like GPUS. The electorate that would
elect GPUS by Plurality might or might not come into being, but that
"Green scenario", whether or not it will happen, is worth discussing,
because the GPUS is working on it, and because (I claim) it would
happen if people looked at platforms and voted in their best interest.

Anyway, these additional comments, instead of just one complete
message, are because this topic is new to all of us.

What I want to say now is that IRV would be perfectly good, perfectly
ok, in he Green scenario.

It isn't what I'd choose, but it would be ok. If IRV became the voting
system, then, maybe for some of us (in a mutual majority) the voting
situation would be ideal, or maybe (if the mutuality isn't assured)
the situation could take on a confrontational brinksmanship character.
And for those not in a mutual majority (MM), there'd be
favorite-burial need. But that isn't unfair or wrong, because it's
widely accepted that the win is for the majority.

I wouldn't choose IRV, because I just want to approve all of the
progressive candidates.

Every method that gives you a finer choice among your preferred set of
candidates, always comes with a drawback. That luxury always comes at
a price. That's why I've long been saying that improving on Approval
is easier said than done.

In the case of IRV, the drawback occurs if you aren't in a majority,
or your majority isn't mutual, or if the mutuality is in some way
jeopardized.

For example, suppose that there were a progressive party that felt
that it had media-acceptance-strategy incentive to tell its voters to
rank the Democrat in 2nd place. That would clearly jeopardize the
progressive mutual majority. It would create a dangerous brinksmanship
game. I don't want that. As I said above, I just want to approve all
of the progressives.

If that were the situation, and if we had IRV, that party would surely
realize that sincere ranking is assumed in IRV--especially in a mutual
majority, where sincere ranking is optimal. If the situation should be
a mutual majority, but might not be voted as such, might some people
insist on voting as if it were? Might not the defecting party know
that? That's why I said it would be a brinksmanship game.

That's why, even though IRV would be perfectly good in the Green
scenario, it isn't what I'd choose. I'd choose Approval or Score, for
the reasons stated above.

But IRV will be the next voting system unless we can tell to the GPUS
platform committee, some convincing reasons why they don't want IRV. I
described some of those reasons in an earlier post. Maybe other people
here don't want to bother. Ok, then IRV is likely to be the next
voting system.

Michael Ossipoff