[EM] Acronyms

[Michael Ossipoff]

Kathy:

I've been adding some acronyms lately.

First a few that aren't as new:

FBC is the Favorite-Betrayal Criterion. MMC is the Mutual-Majority Criterion.

LNHe is Later-No-Help, a criterion.

LNHa is the critrerion Later-No-Harm.

0-info Later-No-Help is a slightly less demanding version of LNHe.
It's defined at electowiki.

LNHa and LNHe were from Woodall. 0-info LNHe is a criterion of mine.

More recently:

CD is the Chicken Dilemma Criterion (defined at electowiki)

ICT is Improved-Condorcet-Top, a voting system introduced by Chris
Benham, based on Kevin Venzke's Improved Condorcet.

SICT stands for Symmetrical ICT, defined at electowiki.  Symmetrical
ICT is a modification of ICT proposed by me.

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The Chicken Dilemma Criterion measures for a method's ability to
automatically avoid the chicken dilemma. I claim that no method
significantly improves on Approval unless it achieves that.

FBC is variously defined. Here is one of the definitions, the one that
I like best, though I didn't originate it:

FBC:

To vote a candidate "at top" is to not vote anyone over that
candidate, and vote that candidate over someone.

If the winner is someone voted at top on your ballot, then moving an
additional candidate to top on your ballot shouldn't change the winner
to someone who is not then at top on your ballot.

[end of FBC definition]

LNHe:

To vote for a candidate is to vote hir over someone.

Securing the win of a candidate for whom you've voted on your ballot
should never require voting for additional candidates.

[end of LNHe definition]

LNHa:

A candidate for whom you've voted on your ballot should never be
caused to lose, by voting for additional candidates whom you don't
vote over hir, and over whom you vote hir if the voting system allows
you to do so while voting for them.

[end of LNHa definition]

That's how I define LNHa, but I can't guarantee that everyone defines
it the same way. I haven't read Woodall's definition, though of course
I should.

Someone said that Woodall assumed that balloting was by rankings, and
that there was no equal ranking. That would mean that some of
Woodall's criteria might need rewording.

That's why I suggested Mono-Add-Unique-Top, as an addition to
Woodall's Mono-Add-Top.

0-info LNHe:

In a 0-info election, voting for one or more members of candidate-set
S shouldn't reduce the probability that the winner will come from S.

[end of 0-info LNHe definition]


The appeal of ICT and Symmetrical ICT is that they meet FBC, and my
generalization of the Condorcet Criterion, and CD.

Additionally, Symmetrical ICT meets 0-info LNHe, which frees voters
from having to rank unacceptable candidates. That could be a great
convenience in a many-candidates election.

Here's a definition of Symmetrical ICT:

(X>Y) means the number of voters ranking X over Y

(Y>X) means the number of voters ranking Y over X.

(X=Y)B means the number of people voting X and Y at bottom
(not voting them over anyone, and voting someone over them)

(X=Y)T means the number of people voting X and Y at top
(not voting anyone over them, and voting them over someone)

X beats Y if (X>Y) + (X=Y)B > (Y>X) + (X=Y)T.

...except that two candidates can't beat eachother. If, by the above
beat-definition, two candidates beat eachother, then only one of them
beats the other. The one who beats the other is the one ranked over
the other by more voters.

1. If exactly one candidate is unbeaten, then s/he wins.

2. If everyone or no one is unbeaten, then the winner is the candidate
voted at top on the most ballots.

3. If some, but not all candidates are unbeaten, then the winner is
the unbeaten candidate voted at top on the most ballots.

[end of Symmetrical ICT definition]

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Thanks for saying something about the un-specific complaints and
criticisms. Charges, complaints and criticisms that are vague and
un-specified are all too common on the Internet.

Mike Ossipoff