[EM] Comments on MJ discussion (IIAC)
Michael Ossipoff
email9648742 at gmail.com
Mon Jan 7 17:05:50 PST 2013
Andy:
> IIAC merely says that removal of a losing candidate shouldn't change
> the result.
>
> IIAC says nothing about whether there should be another election if a
> losing candidate calls for one without hir in it..
>
> IIAC is merely about consistent count-mechanics, given an unchanging
> set of ballots.
>
Well, you're arguing for a definition of IIAC that even plurality passes.
Yes. One nice thing about Approval and Score is that they pass every
criterion that Plurality passes.
That can't be said for MJ or any Condorcet version.
That means that no one can say that there is any way in which Approval
or Score could be called worse than Plurality. That's important for
enactment proposals.
I think that my definition of IIAC is only one that's been precisely
and completely defined.
You continued:
I find it lacking
[endquote]
It isn't the most demanding criterion, and it's met by Plurality, and
so no one can claim that meeting IIAC makes a method adequate.
In fact, meeting IIAC, Participation, Mono-Add-Top,
Mono-Add-Unique-Top, Consistency, Non-Dictatorshiip and Mono-Raise
obviously doesn't make a method adequate, since Plurality meets all of
those criteria.
But just because Plurality meets a criterion doesn't make it
irrelevant. Non-Dictatorship is a desirable criterion, even though
Plurality meets it.
.
You continued:
, and do not accept it for my definition of "independence
of irrelevant alternatives".
[endquote]
But won't it have to do until someone offers a different complete and
precise definition of IIAC?
I have nothing against there being two kinds of IIAC. They'd have to
be named differently. Maybe the new one could be called "Strong IIAC".
It might be a very desirable and worthwhile criterion, when someone
defines it. If someone already has, I invite someone to post it.
Mike Ossipoff
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