[EM] proportional constraints - help needed

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

On 02/12/2013 01:42 AM, Richard Fobes wrote:
> On 2/11/2013 2:33 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>>
>> Although what I'm going to say may be a bit offtopic, I think I should
>> say it. I think it could be useful to quantify exactly what is meant by
>> quoted-in proportionality in the sense that the Czech Green Party
>> desires it. Then one may make a "quota proportionality criterion" and
>> design methods from the ground up that pass it.
>
> In my opinion, your comment is not off-topic.
>
> Yes, I agree that it would be nice to more clearly define the goal.
>
> Yet I've learned that reconsidering goals is a never-ending process
> because, when a clearly defined goal is achieved, often it turns out
> that a better goal becomes evident. (Especially if the intent behind the
> original goal was not achieved, in spite of having achieved the clearly
> stated goal.)
>
> In this case I presume the gender-based quota requirement is a temporary
> goal.
>
> Hopefully, as more women get elected (because of using better ballots
> and better counting methods), the need for it will disappear.
>
> If it's easy to define the quota-based goal, such a definition would be
> useful.
>
> But, in my opinion, spending time developing an election method that
> optimizes the clearly stated goal is not likely to provide a useful
> return on investment (ROI) -- because it must be discarded when the
> quota is no longer needed.

Indeed, that is a point. A more general criterion might be of more use. 
It could be something like: the method is preset with a number of sets 
and restrictions on which set can come in which place. Then the method 
must ensure this invariant is not broken while otherwise being 
proportional (in some manner).

When gender-based quotas are desired, the sets are just the set of all 
men and the set of all women, and the restrictions are on which gender 
can come in which place.

Another criterion could simply say: the proportion of set X in the 
council must be equal to some proportion set as input, +/- some error 
also given as input, unless there are no sets that satisfy this. Again, 
with gender quotas, one can set "must have 50% women +/- 10%", for instance.

In both cases, the method reduces to plain old PR if one doesn't make 
use of the quota. One can easily not provide any constraints in the 
first criterion's case, and say "must have 50% women, +/- 50%" in the 
latter.

If nothing else, the method should be usable as a method without quotas, 
just like, say, Schulze STV is usable as a single-winner method. Then 
one may or may not use the additional quota functionality. In an 
organization, whether or not to have quotas (and how strict, and 
similar) could be decided by consensus, thus protecting the minority 
from being overruled by the majority.

> I think it makes more sense to use an election method that provides fair
> results in many/most situations, and do some adjustments to accommodate
> a temporary situation (such as gender bias), and then abandon those
> adjustments when the results match the ultimate goal.
>
> Presumably the ultimate goal is "gender equality" -- which itself is
> probably worth defining clearly (although not here!).

Yes. I think the quoting-in should be an additional feature that could 
be turned on or off. If one doesn't trust the organization (or 
government, or whoever is using the method) not to turn it off, one 
could just mandate in the bylaws that the setting be on, and that some 
supermajority is required to turn it off.

In a way, that would be the case even if the method had the 
quota-setting forced to on. Say we have a gender-equalized version of 
Schulze STV (call it SSTVG). Then consider a meta-method that uses SSTVG 
if one has agreed a quota is to be used, otherwise uses ordinary Schulze 
STV. That metamethod is now an adjustable gender-equalized method. 
Similarly, there's nothing to prevent a majority or supermajority 
(depending on the regulations) from replacing a gender-equalized version 
of some method with the same method lacking that feature, given power to 
alter the rules.