[EM] Condorcet-IRV hybrids addendum

[Michael Ossipoff]

I'm not saying that the hybrids meet Later-No-Harm (LNHa), but they meet
the Chicken Dilemma Criterion (CD), and that's good enough to retain IRV's
strategy-free-ness in a mutual majority..

Because the hybrids meet MMC, the members of a mutual majority can be
assured that, by merely ranking sincerely, they'll elect one of the
candidates whom they all prefer to everyone else. In other words, they can
sincerely choose among those preferred candidates, while ensuring that one
of them will win.

And the CD compliance means that they have no chicken dilemma strategic
incentive to not rank eachother's candidates sincerely.

That MMC/CD combination is the same powerful one possessed by IRV, even
though IRV's LNHa is stronger than CD.

Michael Ossipoff
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